tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3393487124647625882024-03-14T05:12:43.193-07:00The Jet AgeGregory Maxwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14018544410005482774noreply@blogger.comBlogger12125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-339348712464762588.post-57035463819191229262014-01-23T18:24:00.001-08:002014-01-28T16:16:07.264-08:00South African Airways Flight 295<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-1LV8jc7Hfug/Ut2AKyFqLnI/AAAAAAAAFVY/15SgKla_UfU/s1600/SA295-01.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-1LV8jc7Hfug/Ut2AKyFqLnI/AAAAAAAAFVY/15SgKla_UfU/s1600/SA295-01.png" height="248" width="640" /></a></div>
<br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><b>Accident Snapshot:</b><br />Date: Saturday, November 28, 1987<br />Location: Indian Ocean </span><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;">(<a href="https://picasaweb.google.com/lh/photo/_yZYmL_Ynh_8ZWTeCp0iKNMTjNZETYmyPJy0liipFm0?feat=directlink">19° 10' 30" S, 59° 38' 0" E</a>)<br />Persons/Fatalities: 159/159<br />Operator: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_African_Airways">South African Airways</a></span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">Origin Airport: </span>Taipei, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taipei_Chiang_Kai-Shek_International_Airport">Chiang Kai Shek<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;"> (TPE/RCTP)</span></a><br />
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Destination Airport: Mauritius, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sir_Seewoosagur_Ramgoolam_International_Airport">Plaisance (MRU/FIMP)</a><br /><b><br /></b><b>Accident Aircraft:</b><br />Aircraft Type: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_747">Boeing 747-200B Combi</a><br />Registration: <a href="http://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-b747-22171.htm">ZS-SAS</a><br />First Flight: 1980<br />Total Airframe Hours: 26,743<br />Cycles: 4,877<br />Engines: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pratt_%26_Whitney_JT9D">4 Pratt & Whitney JT9D-7R4G2 Turbofan Engines</a></span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span>
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-PTzMysXtHUw/Ut2BBfezVZI/AAAAAAAAFVg/DTurPJE5VlM/s1600/SA295-02.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; display: inline !important; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-align: center;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-PTzMysXtHUw/Ut2BBfezVZI/AAAAAAAAFVg/DTurPJE5VlM/s1600/SA295-02.png" height="204" width="640" /></a><br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;">Profile view of South African Airways Boeing 747-200B Combi</span><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"> </span><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;">© Gregory Maxwell, 2014</span><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"> </span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><b>Resources:</b></span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"><u><a href="http://jet-age.net/Documents/Accident_Reports/SACAA_SA295_English.pdf">SACAA Final Accident Report - English</a></u></span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"><a href="http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19871128-0">Aviation Safety Network Page</a></span></span><br />
<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_African_Airways_Flight_295" style="line-height: 18px;">Wikipedia Page</a><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><a href="http://www.smithsonianchannel.com/sc/web/series/802/air-disasters/138704/fanning-the-flames">Air Disasters TV Series S1.E4 - Fanning the Flames</a> (47 min) on iTunes</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PzZfSMQ45fM">Air Crash Investigation TV Series S5.E4 - Cargo Conspiracy</a> (39 min)</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="line-height: 18px;"><b>Accident Summary:</b></span><br />
<span style="line-height: 18px;">On November 27th 1987 at 14:23, flight SA295, a Boeing 747-244B Combi of South African Airways, departed from Taipei's Chiang Kai Shek Airport for Mauritius Plaisance Airport with 159 persons on board. In the main deck cargo hold 6 pallets of cargo had been loaded. Some 9 hours out and some 46 minutes before the estimated time of arrival at Plaisance the flight deck informed the approach control at Plaisance that there was a smoke problem in the airplane and that an emergency descent to flight level (FL) 140 had been initiated. The last radio communication was at 00:04 on November 28th, 1987. At about 00:07 the airplane crashed into the sea. The wreckage, consisting of thousands of fragments, sank to the ocean bottom at depths of the order of 15,000 feet (about 4.5 kilometers), although many of the lighter materials floated away on the currents. Some of the latter items were recovered from the sea, or from the sea-shores where they had been washed up far from the scene of the crash. Months later one such item was found on a beach in Natal, over 2,000 nautical miles away. There are clear indications that a fire developed in the right hand front pallet in the main deck cargo hold, that the fire got out of control and that it eventually led to the crash.</span><br />
<span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span>
<span style="line-height: 18px;"><b>Probable Cause:</b></span><br />
<span style="line-height: 18px;">The accident followed an uncontrolled fire in the forward right pallet in the main deck cargo compartment. The aircraft crashed into the sea at high speed following loss of control, consequent on the fire. The ignition source of the fire was not able to be determined. The design of the aircraft and lack of adequate fire suppression systems in the main deck cargo compartment inhibited the crews ability to control and extinguish the fire.</span><br />
<span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span>
<span style="line-height: 18px;"><b>ACCIDENT ANALYSIS:</b></span><br />
<span style="line-height: 18px;"><b><br /></b></span>
<span style="background-color: #eef1f1; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">On the night of November 28, 1987 the "Helderberg" a Boeing 747-200B Combi operated by South African Airways as flight SAA295 disappeared 134 nautical miles northeast of the island nation of Mauritius in the middle of the Indian Ocean claiming the lives of 159 people. </span><br />
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">In the aftermath of the crash, the largest and at the time most expensive marine search and salvage expedition was launched to locate the aircraft on the sea floor, examine the wreckage and retrieve the 747's black boxes in an effort to determine what exactly caused the massive airliner to fall out of the sky. The task before investigators was daunting as they had very little information at the outset of their inquiry save for the series of ATC recordings between Springbok 295 and Mauritius control during which the flight crew alerted air traffic controllers to the presence of a fire on board the aircraft and declared an emergency. </span></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The team of South African investigators aided by officials from Boeing and the NTSB painstakingly examined each peace of wreckage recovered from the ocean floor scouring it for any evidence as to the source of the fire. But despite their best efforts to this day no one has been able to determine either the origin of the fire or the sequence of events that ultimately led to the demise of the Boeing 747 and its compliment of 159 passengers and crew.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-9vsQo3RI6qo/Ut2dUDYq4JI/AAAAAAAAFWA/81HgAyWwDQ8/s1600/SA295-03.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-9vsQo3RI6qo/Ut2dUDYq4JI/AAAAAAAAFWA/81HgAyWwDQ8/s1600/SA295-03.png" height="320" width="640" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">South African Flight 295's Intended Flight Path from Taipei across the Indian Ocean to Mauritius </span><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-size: x-small; line-height: 18px;">© Gregory Maxwell, 2014</span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-size: x-small; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<span style="line-height: 18px;"><b>Apartheid's Effect on South African Airways</b></span><br />
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">In 1987 the country of South Africa was still deep in the throws of apartheid, and as a result the state owned South African Airways (SAA) suffered under the weight of stiff sanctions imposed on the country by the United Nations and its member countries. </span></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">As a condemnation of South Africa's government sponsored subjugation of the majority "non-white" population a large number of countries around the world led by black African nations to the country's north refused to grant SAA rights to overfly their territory. As a result the airline was forced to fly long, circuitous routes around the continent of Africa on its flights to Europe and the Middle East. These same policies also made SAA a target for terrorists and protestors alike with the company's offices in London and other major cities frequently becoming a target of vandalism and destruction.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-AmC9wFPRhvM/Ut2egiNC84I/AAAAAAAAFWM/emlkHpk7-vo/s1600/SA295-04.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-AmC9wFPRhvM/Ut2egiNC84I/AAAAAAAAFWM/emlkHpk7-vo/s1600/SA295-04.png" height="640" width="574" /></a></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;">Map of South African Airways Apartheid Restricted Flight Routings </span><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-size: x-small;">© Gregory Maxwell, 2014</span><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-size: x-small;"> </span></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><b>Boeing 747-200B Combi</b></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">Due largely to the apartheid motivated overflight restrictions and its geographic position on the southern tip of the African continent, SAA's far flung route network required an aircraft with substantial endurance; with the 747-200B proving the ideal fit for the carrier's long distance over water routes. However like most medium sized international airlines of the day, South African Airways didn't have the passenger traffic on the majority of its routes to support the capacity provided by 747. The 747-200B Combi model proved the ideal solution, allowing the carrier to offset the lower passenger demand with revenue cargo carried on the main deck immediately behind the passenger cabin. </span></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">The genius of the 747 Combi was the flexibility of its design which allowed airlines to adjust the passenger/main deck cargo capacity by re-positioning the partition separating the two sections as demand warranted. As a result the 747-200B Combi proved very popular with airlines around the world.</span></div>
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">
</span>
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-HFnQYjlDUsg/Ut2ioKMafBI/AAAAAAAAFWY/11gKHLw55ys/s1600/SA295-05.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-HFnQYjlDUsg/Ut2ioKMafBI/AAAAAAAAFWY/11gKHLw55ys/s1600/SA295-05.png" /></a></span></div>
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">
</span>
<br />
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;">Boeing 747-200B Combi, as it was configured on South African Flight 295 <span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;">© Gregory Maxwell, 2014</span></span></span></div>
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;">
</span>
<br />
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<b style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">Flight History</b></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">South African Airways Flight SAA295 was due to depart Taipei's Chiang Kai Shek International Airport at 13:00 local time, but due to adverse weather conditions which caused passengers on a connecting flight to be delayed the aircraft was held at the gate for a further hour, finally taking off at 14:23. Before departure ZS-SAS had taken on 328,488 lbs of fuel for the 10 hour and 14 minute sector to Mauritius Plaisance Airport. Joining the 19 member flight crew, comprised of 14 flight attendants and 5 pilots, were 140 passengers. The manifest also listed 95,294 lbs of passenger baggage and cargo, with the majority of the freight being held in the main deck cargo area arranged on six pallets, immediately behind the passenger cabin.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">An hour and a half into the flight at 15:55:18 the crew of ZS-SAS put a call into the company's operations base at Jan Smuts Airport in Johannesburg passing along their departure time from Taipei and informing staff that they anticipated arrival in Mauritius at 00:35. The crew made further routine position reports with Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Colombo and the Cocos Islands before entering HF radio range of Mauritius and establishing contact with the center controller at Plaisance Airport at 22:30.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">Springbok 295 informed the controller that the aircraft had passed 070 degrees east at 22:29:00 and was presently cruising at flight level 350. The crew further stated that they expect to reach position 065 degrees east at 23:12:00 local. At 23:13:27 the crew reported passing 65 degrees East longitude and gave an ETA of 23:58:00 at 060 degrees east. At no point during the conversation with Mauritius FIC which ended at 23:14:00 did the crew indicate their was anything abnormal about the flight.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<b style="background-color: transparent; font-family: inherit;"><br /></b></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<b style="background-color: transparent; font-family: inherit;">Cargo Fire Detected</b></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">Somewhere between passing 065 degrees east longitude around 23:14:00 and their next reporting point of 060E longitude the flight crew first becomes aware of the presence of a fire on board the airplane when the master fire alarm warning sounds. The captain responded to the alarm by inquiring with the flight engineer as to the origin of the alarm. The flight engineer responded that the source of the alarm was the main deck cargo area. Shortly there after the pilot contacts the Mauritius controller to alert him to the situation with the following radio exchange taking place:</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">23:48:51 - Eh, Mauritius, Mauritius, Springbok Two Niner Five</span></div>
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;">
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
23:49:00 - Springbok Two Niner Five, eh Mauritius, eh, good morning, eh, go ahead</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
23:49:07 - Eh, good morning, we have, eh, a smoke, eh, eh, problem and we're doing emergency descent to level one five, eh, one four zero</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
23:49:18 - Confirm you wish to descend to flight level one four zero</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
23:49:20 - Ya, we have already commenced, eh, due to a smoke problem in the airplane</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
23:49:25 - Eh, roger, you are clear to descend immediately to flight level one four zero</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
23:49:30 - Roger, we will appreciate if you can alert, eh, fire, eh, eh, eh</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
23:49:40 - Do you wish to, eh, do you request a full emergency?</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
23:49:48 - Okay Joe, kan jy ... vir ons {Okay Joe can you ... for us}</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
23:49:51 - Springbok Two Nine Five, Plaisance</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
23:49:54 - Sorry, go ahead</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">23:49:56 - Do you, eh, request a full emergency please a full emergency?</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">23:50:00 - Affirmative, that's Charlie Charlie</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">23:50:02 - Roger, I declare a full emergency, roger</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">23:50:04 - Thank you</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-LrbMTx0zVmk/Ut2lDjaVJkI/AAAAAAAAFWk/wD-o4Z_psGM/s1600/SA295-06.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; display: inline !important; font-family: inherit; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-align: center;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-LrbMTx0zVmk/Ut2lDjaVJkI/AAAAAAAAFWk/wD-o4Z_psGM/s1600/SA295-06.png" height="640" width="640" /></a></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;">Map of Flight Progress from Point of Fire Detection to Impact with the Ocean </span><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;">© Gregory Maxwell, 2014</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">23:50:40 - Springbok Two Nine Five, Plaisance</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">23:50:44 - Eh, go ahead</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">23:50:46 - Request your actual position please and your DME distance</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">23:50:51 - Eh, we haven't got the DME yet</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">23:50:55 - Eh, roger and your actual position please</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">23:51:00 - Eh, say again</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Two second later at 23:51:02 the Plaisance controller asked the crew for a position report to which the pilot responded that, "Now we have lost a lot of electrics, we haven't got anything on the ... aircraft now."</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">23:51:12 - Eh, roger, I declare a full emergency immediately</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">23:51:15 - Affirmative</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">23:51:18 - Roger</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">23:52:19 - Eh, Springbok Two Nine Five, do you have an Echo Tango Alfa Plaisance please</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">23:52:30 - Springbok Two Nine Five, Plaisance</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">23:52:32 - Ya, Plaisance</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Further communication with the crew occurred at 23:52:33 with the controller requesting an ETA at Plaisance, the crew estimated a 00:30 arrival. At 23:52:50 the controller overhead an inadvertent transmission from the pilot, "Hey Joe, shut down the oxygen left." After this transmission their was 8 minutes and 44 seconds of silence until the next transmission. </span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">00:01:34 - Eh Plaisance, Springbok Two Nine Five, we've opened the door(s) to see if we (can?) ...we should be okay </span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
Then at 00:01:36 the pilot again is overheard giving instructions to the flight engineer, but most of the conversation was unintelligible.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">00:01:45 - Donner se deur t... (Close the bloody door) (?)</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">00:01:57 - Joe, switch up quickly, then close the hole on your side</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">00:02:10 - Pressure (?) twelve...thousand</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">00:02:14 - ... ...Genoeg is ...Anderster kan ons vlug verongeluk (is enough...Otherwise our flight could come to grief)</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">00:02:25 - Carrier way only</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">00:02:38 - Eh Plaisance, Springbok Two Nine Five, do (did) you copy</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">00:02:41 - Eh negative, Two Nine Five, say again please, say again</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">At 00:02:43 the pilot reported that he was 65 nautical miles out, this report was misunderstood by the Plaisance controller to be distance from the airport instead of the next waypoint Xagal. At that moment in actuality SAA295 was about 145 nautical miles from the safety of Plaisance Airport. </span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">00:02:45 - Confirm sixty fie miles</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">00:02:47 - Ya, affirmative Charlie Charlie</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">00:02:50 - Eh, roger, Springbok eh Two Nine Five, eh re you're recleared flight level five zero. Recleared flight level five zero.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">00:02:58 - Roger, five zero</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">00:03:00 - And, Springbok Two Nine Five copy actual weather Plaisance Copy actual weather Plaisance. The wind one one zero degrees zero five knots. The visibility above one zero kilometers, and we have a precipitation in sight to the north. Clouds, five octas on six zero zero, one octa five thousand feet. Temperature is twenty two, two two. And the QNH one zero one eight hectopascals, one zero one eight over.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">00:03:28 - Roger, one zero one eight</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">00:03:31 - Affirmative, eh and both runways available if you wish</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">00:03:43 - And two nine five, I request pilots intentions</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">00:03:46 - Eh we'd like to track in eh, on eh one three</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">00:03:51 - Confirm runway one four</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">00:03:54 - Charlie Charlie</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">00:03:56 - Affirmative and you're cleared, eh direct to Foxtrot Foxtrot. You report approaching five zero</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">00:04:02 - Kay</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">There were no further transmissions from the aircraft and the approach controller at Plaisance tried unsuccessfully for the next 30 minutes to re-establish communication with the aircraft but there was only silence in response. The aircraft crashed into the Indian Ocean at approximately 00:07:00, the time being established by examining two damaged wrist watches recovered from pieces of carry-on baggage.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Search and Rescue Efforts</b></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Mauritius search and rescue officials began a search for the aircraft the next day, scanning the ocean for any signs of survivors but it became quickly apparent that the crash was not survivable. The pattern and type of debris that was found floating on the surface suggested that some catastrophic failure had overtaken the 747.<br /><br />On November 30th the decision was made to end the search for survivors and focus on the recovery of bodies and aircraft wreckage. The search was initially focused on the floating debris field which was slowly drifting in a westerly direction. Helicopters were used to search coral reefs for wreckage that may have become entangled while surface ships recovered floating wreckage. The surface debris search was suspended after 8 days on December 10th.<br /><br />Floating debris recovered from the ocean consisted mainly of light cargo, cabin paneling, cabin furnishings, escape slides and rafts in addition to some pieces of carry on luggage. Secondary parts of the wings were also recovered, such as access panels and pieces of the wing leading and trailing edge.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-eIndz9U8OKE/Ut2nCzhcEiI/AAAAAAAAFWw/4t2lCPL4sfs/s1600/SA295-07.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-eIndz9U8OKE/Ut2nCzhcEiI/AAAAAAAAFWw/4t2lCPL4sfs/s1600/SA295-07.png" height="640" width="640" /></a></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Map Showing Distance from Mauritius and the Aircraft's Last Known Position Fix </span><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;">© Gregory Maxwell, 2014</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<b>Undersea Search</b></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">On December 11th the investigators began their search for the CVR (Cockpit Voice Recorder) and FDR (Flight Data Recorder) by utilizing sonar to listen for the underwater pingers attached to the recorders. The pingers were designed to transmit for a period of 30 days, until such time as the battery supply was exhausted. A search grid was established based on the aircraft's last known position and the time of impact as established by the wrist watches recovered from carry-on luggage and the rate of drift of the surface debris. </span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">A vessel from Mauritius was contracted to perform the sonar survey of the ocean bottom. The survey which lasted from the 12th through the 21st of December revealed some small pieces of debris, which were confirmed to have originated from ZS-SAS after visual examination of the underwater video footage. The sonar survey was ultimately unsuccessful in locating the aircraft's flight data and cockpit voice recorders. A second search was commenced using a ship equipped with side scan sonar equipment, and after just three days the main wreckage area was found and marked by underwater sonar beacons resting at a depth of 14,436 feet.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The wreckage of the Helderberg was strung out on the sea floor in two oblong debris fields with the aircraft split into two main sections. The fact that the aircraft's front and rear section were found in two separate debris areas suggests that it broke up in flight, prior to the impact with the sea surface. The aircraft debris field on the sea floor was aligned with 320 degrees magnetic, which approximates the direction of the ocean current in the area at the time. The two main wreckage fields were referred to by investigators as the northeastern and southwestern areas</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br />The northeastern debris field was approximately 2,953 feet long by 1,476 feet wide, and the centers of the two wreckage fields were located 1,968 feet apart. In between the two main wreckage areas some small pieces of debris and cargo including computers were found strewn about.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
The northeast debris field contained 70% of the aft fuselage structure rear of door number four, and included major structural pieces such as the main deck cargo door, horizontal and vertical stabilizers, two sections of the main deck cargo floor, the rear pressure bulkhead, the auxiliary power unit, tail cone and large concentrations of freight contained in the main deck cargo area.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-MiYF7BOLJbs/UuANHA_i7ZI/AAAAAAAAFYM/8sMVqpAbitQ/s1600/SA295-08.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-align: center;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-MiYF7BOLJbs/UuANHA_i7ZI/AAAAAAAAFYM/8sMVqpAbitQ/s1600/SA295-08.png" height="456" width="640" /></a><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span><span style="font-size: x-small; text-align: center;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small; text-align: left;">Photo of Wreckage on the Bottom of the Indian Ocean, Fuselage Section is Same Depicted in Graphic Above</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-size: x-small; text-align: center;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-RvNqc1c-0sA/Ut2zmKgOjcI/AAAAAAAAFXM/Cx7_s1SsC_M/s1600/SA295-09.png" height="480" width="640" /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The southwestern debris field contained the fuselage structure forward of door number four but unlike the rear section the forward section was highly fragmented. Major structural items found in this area included three of the four engines, all five landing gear assemblies and major pieces of both wings.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Salvage Operation</b></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
Due to the depth of the wreckage and given the technology available at the time of the accident, recovery of the debris was a massive challenge. Investigators were forced to prioritize recovery efforts to focus on retrieval of key pieces of debris as it was cost prohibitive and unfeasible to attempt to recover every piece of the aircraft debris. The highest priority was obviously locating and retrieving the the FDR and CVR recorders. Without this data it would be difficult to discern exactly what the crew were experiencing and how the aircraft was being effected by the fire in the main deck cargo compartment.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
With the aid of an ROV with camera equipment the team of salvagers directed by the the investigative team from the South African Civil Aviation Authority photographed 3,940 areas of interest and recorded 806 hours of video of the debris field and main wreckage.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
The primary focus of interest for investigators was the main deck cargo compartment where the fire had originated. The team attempted to recover as much debris from this section of the aircraft as well as the surrounding areas that showed direct heat damage. They were aided in their efforts to identify pieces of interest by representatives from both South African Airways and Boeing. However the team's<span style="font-family: inherit;"> salvage attempts were hampered by the ROV's limitations and ultimately only 25 targets of significance were able to be recovered from the sea bed. Among the items recovered were the CVR, rearmost galley support structure, sections of the main cargo deck, fuselage skin from the crown of the aircraft and a section of the rear pressure bulkhead.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<b>Examination of Floating Debris</b></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
None of the wing components, items from the forward upper deck or from the passenger cabin exhibited any signs of heat damage or soot from smoke exposure. A portable fire extinguisher recovered from door 2R showed sooting and had a splatter of molten plastic on the bottle. Investigators also noted that the galley stowage doors and lower portions of cabin door 4R had soot deposits on them.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
To the team's surprise, all checked baggage and cargo found and identified as coming from the lower deck cargo hold, beneath the main deck cargo compartment, showed no signs of either heat damage or soot that would suggest exposure to fire. </div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">However cargo that was identified as having come from the main deck cargo area was heavily scorched and burned, while cosmetic paneling from the passenger cabin adjoining the main deck cargo area had heavy deposits of soot. In addition the bulkhead door separating the cargo and passenger compartments was distorted due to heat damage and had become delaminated. The door frame and hinge showed signs of smoke streaking and distortion from heat exposure. The team also identified heat damage on the number 5 left and right doors, a shelf from the aft coat closet and a section of the left upper side wall lining.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Examination of the Wreckage Recovered from Sea Bed</b></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
Smoke and heat damage were identified on fuselage structures recovered and positively identified as being located above the passenger cabin ceiling, as well as areas above the rear galley on a load bearing beam at the back of the passenger cabin. This beam contained deposits of melted aluminum and nylon material. insulation of wiring in the immediate area was burned away and the wires showed signs of arcing. These wires were identified as being the AC power leads for the main deck cargo compartment crown lights.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
Pieces of the forward left main deck cargo floor were also recovered and contained deposits of both melted aluminum and nylon on the upper surface, but there was no evidence of heat or smoke damage on the underside of the floor panel. Portions of the outer fuselage sections from the side and crown of the aircraft exhibited signs of heat distortion and paint bubbling.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-7oFjB2yzwjI/UuAJNYWSaLI/AAAAAAAAFX8/U4ejraLAAes/s1600/SA295-10.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; display: inline !important; font-family: inherit; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-align: center;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-7oFjB2yzwjI/UuAJNYWSaLI/AAAAAAAAFX8/U4ejraLAAes/s1600/SA295-10.png" height="370" width="640" /></a></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;">Main Deck Cargo Compartment Showing Location of Pallets and Position of Key Pieces of Debris Recovered</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
Lower portions of two of the straps from the 9g cargo barrier net forward of the PR pallet position were damaged by heat exposure below the cabin window level, above that level the straps had been burned away completely.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">H</span><span style="font-family: inherit;">eavy sooting and evidence of heat exposure were present on the left and right top panels and upper surfaces of the rear galley unit. Portions of the outer fuselage skin on the right side of the aircraft adjacent to pallet position PR showed blistering and discoloration of the paint as well as deformation and buckling of the skin.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Sections of the upper half of the aft pressure bulkhead contained heavy smoke deposits and heat discoloration. The elevator cables were still attached and the control cable aperture seals were damaged. Investigators also discovered light traces of smoke deposits on the back surface of the bulkhead.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Wreckage Observed but Not Recovered from Sea Bed</b></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
The team through video footage analyzed major components of the left wing and body gears, the right wing gear and the nose gear and determined the landing gear was retracted at the moment of impact with the sea.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
Three of the four jet engines were located and visual analysis showed that all three had experienced severe impact damage. The distortion of the fan blades suggested that the engines were operating at a low power setting and producing minimal thrust at the moment of impact.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
A large section of the fuselage which included most of the main deck cargo door frame was found to have severe heat damage in the crown skin and heavy smoke deposits all the way down to the door frame at the base of the cabin floor. Pieces of the cargo compartment floor still attached to this segment contained deposits of molten material between the 9g barrier and pallet position PL. Unlike the the right side, portions of the straps securing the retaining barrier on the left side were still largely intact all be it with noticeable heat damage.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-ndDan2a8bJg/UuAtqhFNs8I/AAAAAAAAFYo/5ngLLZnzvSU/s1600/SA295-12.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-ndDan2a8bJg/UuAtqhFNs8I/AAAAAAAAFYo/5ngLLZnzvSU/s1600/SA295-12.png" height="304" width="640" /></a></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-P7PA1_J7GOw/UuAqjYidqJI/AAAAAAAAFYc/PHY8tLTUwN0/s1600/SA295-11.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; display: inline !important; font-family: inherit; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-align: center;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-P7PA1_J7GOw/UuAqjYidqJI/AAAAAAAAFYc/PHY8tLTUwN0/s1600/SA295-11.png" height="304" width="640" /></a></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Reconstruction of the Fuselage Section Containing the Main Deck Cargo Door Frame as Shown in Graphic Above</span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
The horizontal stabilizers was found completely intact with elevators still attached. However the leading edge of the left stabilizer was detached and was bent upwards. The right stabilizer inboard root rib of the leading edge was deformed which indicated to investigators that the aft fuselage structure had twisted in a counter-clockwise direction.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
The vertical stabilizer was found largely intact with portions of the fuselage structure still attached. Both the upper and lower rudders were still attached to their mountings and there appeared to be no evidence of smoke exposure or heat distortion.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<b>Cargo Manifest</b></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
14,588 kg (32,161 lbs) of cargo was loaded into the main deck cargo compartment on six pallets. The cargo consisted of a mixture of electronic components (computers) and parts, hardware, paper articles, textiles, medicines and sports equipment. The aircraft was also rumored to have been transporting an undetermined quantity of fire works however after extensive investigation into this theory the team were not able to substantiate this claim. Tests for traces of nitrates and ferrites on the pieces of cargo and airplane wreckage recovered proved inconclusive. However even a very small amount of fireworks as noted by the team could have provided a source of ignition because of the inherent instability of the chemical makeup of most pyrotechnic devices.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
Most of the cargo was packed using highly flammable polystyrene, polyurethane or polyethelene products, while lighter articles were packed in cardboard cartons. Heavier items like machine parts were either contained in wood crates or small wooden boxes. The pallets were noted to have been stacked on average about 2 meters (6.5 feet) high.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<b>CVR Analysis</b></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
The salvage operation was able to successfully locate and retrieve the CVR. Unfortunately the DFDR (Digital Flight Data Recorder) which was positioned immediately adjacent to the CVR on the left aft side of the main deck cargo compartment was never located, nor was the QAR (Quick Access Recorder) which was positioned in the main equipment bay forward of the lower cargo hold.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
The body of the recorder was damaged from the impact and the paint was blistered from exposure to heat. Electrical wiring insulation was scorched and the solder of some of the wiring joints had melted. This indicated to the investigators that the unit was exposed to temperatures of at least 183 C (361 F). Examination of the interior of the unit unveiled oily soot deposits that they believed penetrated through an aperture in the front cover. The heat and resulting damage to the solder joints on the device and the electrical wires running from the CVR through the overhead ceiling of the main deck cargo compartment had caused the device to short circuit and stop functioning.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
The CVR was designed to record all verbal communication from flight deck crew members through mics in the oxygen masks, hand held and overhead microphones in the audio selector panels of the captain, first officer and flight engineers stations. Unfortunately the device was not set up as a hot mic to recorded everything within range of the microphones on the flight deck. Instead it only recorded when the mics picked up speech between crew members through any of the previously mentioned input devices. For investigators this meant that vital sounds, instrument indications and warnings possibly were not captured on the CVR tape.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
Another problem for investigators is they were not able to sink the CVR recording with the recordings from Mauritius ATC as the CVR record didn't contain either the last HF communication with Mauritius at 23:14:00 nor the the first VHF communication with Mauritius approach control at 23:48:51. A further issue was discovered when the tapes were played back as <span style="font-family: inherit;">only the last 1 minute and 14 seconds of the 29 minute 52 second recording were able to be clearly deciphered. Despite this the team was reasonable confident that conversations up to the point the fire alarm bell rang were of a personal nature and inconsequential to the accident. Below are the last 1 minute 14 seconds of the CVR recording.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">28:31 - Fire alarm bell (was stopped very quickly by the crew)</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">28:35 - Intercom chime</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">28:36 - What's going on now?</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">28:37 - Huh?</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">28:40 - Cargo?</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">28:42 - It came on afterwards</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">28:45 - Strong click sound hear and </span>simultaneously<span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">And where is that?</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">28:46 - Click sound again</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">28:48 - Just to the right</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">28:49 - Say again(?)</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">28:52 - Main deck cargo</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">28:57 - Then the other one came on as well, I've got two</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">29:01 - Shall I (get/push) the (bottle/button) over there</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">29:02 - Ja (Yes)</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">29:05 - Lees vir ons die check list daar hoor (Read the check list there for us please) followed by a double click sound</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">29:08 - The breaker (presumably referring to the circuit breaker) fell out as well</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">29:09 - Huh (Two click sounds)</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">29:11 - We'll check the breaker panel as well</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">29:12 - Ja (Yes)</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">29:33 - Fok dis die felt dat altwee aangekom het - dit steur mens (Fuck it is the fact that both came on - it disturbs one)</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">29:36 - Intercom chime (while captain is speaking)</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">29:38 - Aag shit</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">29:40 !!! (800 Hz test tone signal commences)</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">29:41 - Wat die donner gaan nou aan? (What the hell is going on now?) This is said in a surprised tone of voice.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">29:44 - Sudden loud sond</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">29:46 - Large and rapid changes in amplitude of test tone start</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">29:51 - End of test signal, very irregular near end</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">29:52 - End of recording. There is about 1 second of old recording on this side of the tape.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The test tone which occurs simultaneously on all four CVR channels is and indication that both the audio input and test signal wiring were being affected by exposure to the fire.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<b>Examination of Human Remains</b></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
Remains from 8 separate individuals were identified and five were tied to a specific individual and their seat location in the aircraft determined. Six of the eight persons had extensive injuries to the upper parts of their body including the head, chest and ribs. </div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
Soot was found in the lower respiratory tract of all eight vicitims. All the individual remains were tested for the presence of carboxyhaemoglobin. The results showed saturation levels as high as 60.9% and 67.2%. The tests did not reveal the presence of cyanide in the bloodstream of any of the victims. The seat assignments of the two individuals with the highest saturation levels were identified as 30E and 40D. The remaining three people were assigned seats 37A, 37D and 42A.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<b>Origin and Propagation of the Fire</b></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
The flight crew were first alerted to the presence of a fire in the main deck cargo compartment when a smoke detector alarm signal was triggered on the flight engineer's panel, 28 minutes and 31 seconds into the CVR recording. About 26 seconds later a second smoke alarm signal also from the main cargo deck alarmed, as noted in the CVR recording with the flight engineer stating "Other one came on as well, I've got two". At 29 minutes and 5 seconds on the CVR the captain can be heard asking for the main deck cargo fire checklist to be read. Less than a minute later at 29 minutes 52 seconds the recording ends, this event occurs 1 minute and 21 seconds after the first fire alarm bell was heard on the flight deck, suggesting the spread of the fire was rapid and quickly compromised the electrical system wiring in the crown of the fuselage which included the wiring between the CVR and the flight deck. </div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
The main deck cargo compartment in the 747-200B Combi is a Class B compartment and is divided into two smoke detection zones, each of which is equipped with dual smoke detection system that is tied to an alerting system on the flight engineers panel on the flight deck.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-UZFgEfy_4ws/UuBwXFwKGqI/AAAAAAAAFY4/-J5Hs_15mz8/s1600/SA295-13.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-UZFgEfy_4ws/UuBwXFwKGqI/AAAAAAAAFY4/-J5Hs_15mz8/s1600/SA295-13.png" height="370" width="640" /></a></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Origin of the Fire at Pallet Position PR in the Main Deck Cargo Compartment </span><span style="font-size: x-small;">© Gregory Maxwell, 2014</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Investigators determined through examination of the wreckage and confirmed by the alarms received from the main deck cargo compartment on the CVR that this was the origin of the fire. Structures in this section of the airplane had the most damage from both smoke and heat exposure. With the origin of the fire and area with the highest heat intensity being pallet PR. However despite recovering almost all of the contents of this pallet the team was unable to determine the source of ignition. </span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Cargo retrieved from the sea surface and observed during the underwater wreckage survey that was identified as coming from pallets PR, RR and SR showed varying signs of heat damage, while no cargo from pallets PL, RL or SL found showed any signs of heat damage. South African Airways was not aware of any hazardous materials being transported according to the waybills of the shipments loaded onto the aircraft. Further the cargo manager for SAA at Taipei stated that he had not been informed of any dangerous cargo that made up the load for SA295. </span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Six consignments of electronic equipment were discovered to contain small lithium battery cells which were fitted to the circuit boards, but these cells were considered non-dangerous.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
A representative from Taiwan's Commissioner for Customs informed investigators that a random sampling of the cargo on the flight had been undertaken with a computer selecting 10 house waybills and one master waybill. The inspection revealed that all 11 consignments matched the waybill documentation provided.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
The team also followed up on a theory that the South African Defense Force was using the flight to transport weapons or explosive devices, but the Chief of the SADF confirmed to investigators that no such materials were being transported on SA295. This would be a direct violation of ICAO and UN statutes which expressly prohibit the transport of military hardware and munitions on passenger transport aircraft.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Boeing Emergency Procedures for Main Deck Cargo Fire</b></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
The emergency procedures for dealing with a fire in the main deck cargo compartment were part of the Emergency Operations Checklist carried on the flight deck. The procedures require that the crew don their oxygen masks and if required smoke goggles. One of the flight attendants at the Captain's request must also don an oxygen mask and portable oxygen cylinder and if directed enter the cargo compartment via the bulkhead door. After closing the door the attendant in order to gain access to the cargo area and fight the fire must first retrieve the fire extinguisher from its storage area, unclip the cargo barrier to gain access to the pallets and locate and attach the 3 meter long extinguisher nozzle extension. The attendant must then locate the source of the fire and apply the extinguishing agent. Meanwhile the captain must locate the nearest suitable airfield and land immediately.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
In the event that smoke enteres the passenger cabin the flight crew is instructed to follow and execute the Upper and or Main Deck Smoke Evacuation check list depending on the location of the smoke condition. The procedure calls for the non flying pilot to identify the passenger compartments affected by smoke and for the flying pilot to execute and emergency descent to 14,000 feet if and when the smoke condition is identified as severe and an immediate landing is not possible. </div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
In this situation the flight deck personnel must go on 100% oxygen. The non-flying pilot must then identify which cabin doors to open to evacuate the smoke. Before conducting this procedure the aircraft must be depressurized and slowed down to a speed of less than 200 knots. The flight attendant must then place the involved door in manual mode. Only at the captain's direction should the doors be opened to evacuate the smoke.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<b>Evidence of Crew's Attempt to Fight Fire</b></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
Investigators noted that two of the cargo barrier net clips had been released at their retainer fittings which indicated that someone had entered the cargo compartment from the passenger cabin. Additional evidence of the crews attempts to fight the fire were seen on the fire extinguisher later identified to have come from door 2R. The extinguisher from door 2R was recovered on the sea surface and was noted to be full but had deposits of molten cargo barrier material on its housing. <span style="font-family: inherit;">This extinguisher was the only one of the aircraft's 11 total fire extinguishers recovered. The crew had at its disposal eight 2.5 lb Halon fire extinguishers and three 3.63 lb water extinguishers with which to combat a fire.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<b>Search for an Ignition Source</b></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">In an effort to determine the ignition source of the fire investigators interviewed and made site visits to multiple shippers who's products made up the cargo manifest of SA295. The team was particularly interested in testing the lithium battery cells installed in many of the computers and electronic equipment, as they had uncovered reports of certain types of lithium batteries exploding in emergency locator beacons.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Six small battery cells, similar to those installed on the electronic equipment shipped as cargo on SA295 was examined. Two of the battery cells were identified as being composed of a lithium-thionyl chloride, two were lithium-carbon monoflouride and the remaining two were nickel-cadmium. The tests concluded that the small size of the battery units, most were the size of a small coin, and their low capacity (less than 1900 mA/hr, made them unlikely sources of ignition. The nickel-cadmium batteries, which were in various states of charge on SA295 were generally accepted as being very safe to transport. The report further noted that lithium-thionyl chloride cells are generally safe to transport as long as they are stored properly and not subject to excessive heat or physical abuse which could cause them to short circuit and auto-ignite.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<b>Fire's Effect on Fuselage Structure</b></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
Investigators were also interested to know how the fire, as it grew in intensity and spread through the cargo compartment affected critical aircraft systems and the airworthiness of the aircraft. The focus of the analysis was the crown of the fuselage structure above the main cargo compartment where the fire was most intense and damage to aircraft systems occurred. Under normal operating conditions at cruise altitude the maximum operating maneuvering loads are 1g plus or minus 0.3g assuming a cabin pressure of 8.9 psi. It is possible that the aircraft loading exceeded 2g's during its emergency descent from FL 350 to FL 140. The team calculated that the descent took 3 minutes and 30 seconds and the aircraft's nose down pitch angle varied from a high of 15 degrees at the start of the descent to around 10 degrees during the stabilized descent. Investigators considered the possibility that the fuselage crown structure weakened by exposure to the fire was further compromised by the loads placed on it during the emergency descent.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<b>Fire's Effect on Electrically Driven Systems</b></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
Electrical wiring and control cables routed through the main cargo deck crown were separated into two corridors or raceways on the left and right crown of the fuselage crown. These wiring bundles fed various systems in the tail of the airplane including the CVR, DFDR, autopilot systems, yaw damper controls, stabilizer trim controls and cabin interphone system among others. From the CVR investigators were aware that these systems were being progressively compromised by exposure to fire, as the distinctive popping sound of the circuit breakers could be heard on the flight deck panel through out the recording. The flight crew also made several comments about the breakers popping. The fire caused the system wiring to short-circuit resulting in the tripping of the circuit breaker to isolate power to the affected system and triggered a cascade of warning lights and alarms to alert on the flight deck. In total the team believed that at least 80 individual circuit breakers were tripped.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<b>Fire's Effect on Flight Control Systems</b></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
Even with the loss of these electrically powered systems some of which control critical control functions in the elevators and trim controls on the horizontal stabilizer the pilots would still have retained adequate control over the aircraft. Boeing had considered loss of these systems during the design of the aircraft. Ensuring through rigorous design reviews and testing that loss of these systems would not adversely inhibit the controlability of the aircraft.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
For example the horizontal stabilizer trim which was normally electrically controlled and hydraulically operated, could be controlled manually in the event that the electrical system that powered it failed. The elevator and rudders on the 747 were cable controlled and hydraulically boosted and not dependent on electrics for actuation. Conversely loss of the yaw damper control was not a critical failure as the system was designed primarily to reduce fatigue loads on the structure during encounters with turbulence. All of these systems and control units were designed to maximize the handling qualities of the aircraft and provide the most comfortable ride for passengers, not to serve as structural load limiting protections during manual flight modes by the pilot. In other words the aircraft could still fly safely with the loss of any or all of these control inhibiting systems.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<b>Fire's Effect on Flight Deck Systems</b></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
Critical electrically driven flight deck systems were also backed up by standby battery power in case of an electrical failure. The fact that the pilot was still able to communicate with Mauritius control via VHF radio even after remarking that he had lost all his electrics is a sign that the standby 28v DC bus was still powered. Batteries also supplied emergency power to the No. 1 ILS and marker beacon, secondary artificial horizon instrument, No. 1 Glide Slope receiver, No. 1 HSI, No. 1 ADI, No. 1 INS, main interphone system and the cabin P.A. system.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><br /></b></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<b>Design of the Boeing 747 Combi</b></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
The aircraft was certified with the idea that in the event of a cargo fire the smoke detection system would quickly alert crews to the threat in sufficient time to locate the source of the fire and extinguish it before it had a chance to take hold and spread out of control. </div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
The basic design of the 9,600 cubic foot compartment it was thought would help ensure that byproducts from the fire like smoke and flames would not penetrate the passenger cabin due to a built in pressure differential between the two compartments. A 25 cm (.8 in) thick partition fitted just forward of the cargo door separated the passenger cabin from the cargo space. This partition was not designed to provide an air tight seal but rather to restrict airflow between the two zones. By controlling the direction of the airflow within the aircraft and air circulation patterns the air pressure in the cargo compartment could be kept at a slightly lower pressure than the passenger cabin which would inhibit transmission of smoke into the cabin in the event of a fire in the cargo compartment.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
However this design concept failed to take into account thermal expansion caused by a fire in a real world scenario. During certification Boeing was required to test the effects of thermal expansion on the 747 combi but the smoke generated from combustion of bundles of tobacco leaves only produced a thermal release of 6,000 BTU's, far below the thermal release experienced during the fire aboard ZS-SAS. </div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
Following the accident the FAA used a computational model to try to determine whether thermal expansion could have caused flames and smoke to enter the passenger cabin of the aircraft. For their calculations they used a fire that produced a constant 10,000 BTU's per minute, and the results showed that this rate of thermal expansion would very quickly eliminate the small existing pressure differential between the cargo compartment and the passenger cabin. The FAA chose the 10,00 BTU figure based on the fact that polystyrene and polyurethane, the most common packing materials used on the cargo on SA295, had thermal expansion rates of 18,100 and 10,300 BTU/lb respectively. The FAA's calculations seem to be supported by the medical examiner's findings of soot in the respiratory tracts of the human remains recovered, in addition to the heat damage and sooting found in the rear galley.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><br /></b></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>FAA Review of Certification of Class B Cargo Compartments</b></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
In response to the accident the FAA appointed a team to review standards associated with the certification of main deck class B cargo compartments on Combi aircraft like the Helderberg. After much study and review of the accident record and known facts about the case and other incidents the board concluded the following:</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
1. The existing rules, policies and procedures being applied to the certification of class B cargo or baggage compartments in terms of smoke and fire protection are inadequate.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
2. The use of pallets to carry cargo in class B compartments is no longer acceptable.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
3. While entry into the cargo compartment is available, not all cargo is accessible.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
4. It is unlikely that personnel would have the means available to extinguish a fire (particularly a deep-seated fire).</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
5. The reliance on crew members to fight a cargo fire must be discontinued.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
6. The quantity of fire extinguishing agent and the number of portable extinguishers are inadequate.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
7. The level of visibility in a smoke filled cargo compartment is not adequate for locating and fighting a fire with a portable fire extinguisher.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
8. Most existing transport airplane smoke or fire detection systems were certified prior to FAR 25 Amendment 25-54 and are incapable of giving timely warning.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
9. There were differences in the smoke testing procedures and criteria used from manufacturer to manufacturer, prior to issuance of FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 25-9.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<b style="font-family: inherit;">Inadequate Fire Protection for Class B Main Deck Cargo Compartments</b></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
The lower deck cargo holds were both fitted with photo-electric smoke detectors in each of the compartments. When a smoke alarm was triggers it would result in a warning light being displayed on the flight engineers panel, indicating which compartment sensor had been triggered. The flight engineer could then by a press of a button automatically discharge the two freon gas fire extinguishers into either the forward or rear cargo compartment. The same was true of the APU compartment which had a separate semi-automatic fire extinguishing system that could be triggered from the flight deck.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
By contrast to combat a fire in the much larger main deck cargo compartment there were no automatic fire suppression systems installed on the 747-200B Combi. Instead one or more crew members were relied upon to enter the dark cargo compartment, where visibility was most likely limited by smoke and quickly locate the source of the fire and extinguish it. While in practice this sounded like a feasible solution, the FAA and Boeing never considered the type of fire that occurred on SA295.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
Both the intensity of the fire and the temperature made it almost impossible for the crew to effectively fight the fire with hand held extinguishers. By the time the crew were alerted to the presence of the fire in the cargo compartment it was most likely too late to contain it by the means available. However even if the crew had been aware of the fire earlier it is difficult to say whether they would have been able to extinguish it, especially if the fire was seated deep within the middle of the pallet near the bottom of the stack as was theorized.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
The ability of crew members to reach the fire was also inhibited by the limited space in the compartment. There was not a lot of room between the pallets and side walls for the crew to maneuver around to get in position to fight the fire. It would have taken both hands to hold the 16 lb extinguisher and the 10 foot long extension wand. The crew's efforts to extinguish the fire would have had the highest probability of success if the origin of the fire was on the outside of the pallet stack and easily accessible to them from a safe distance. </div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
The fire that took hold in the PR pallet was very hot and any person in close proximity to it would have been quickly overwhelmed by the radiant heat and been forced to retreat back into the passenger cabin after only a short time. It is likely that any attempts to fight the fire were quickly abandoned as the fire grew in intensity and the temperature in the compartment began to elevate.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
As a result of their findings the investigators recommended that no new main deck class B compartment designs be approved to existing class B criteria and that main deck cargo compartments provide a level of safety equal to class C compartments or that cargo be carried in fire resistant containers meeting class C requirements, including smoke detection and automatic fire suppression capability.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<b>Use of the Smoke Evacuation Checklist</b></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
When the crew began the emergency descent in preparation to evacuate the smoke from the passenger cabin they would have referenced and completed the Smoke Evacuation Checklist. Part of this checklist requires that the cabin recirculating fans be turned on again. These fans had been previously shut off as part of the Main Deck Cargo Fire/Smoke Checklist to help prevent smoke from entering the passenger cabin through the air circulation system and help isolate the cargo compartment air supply. Unfortunately for the crew of SA295 the Emergency Checklist did not spell out clearly that the smoke evacuation checklist was only to be used if and when the fire in the main deck cargo hold had been extinguished. But with the smoke situation growing worse in the cabin the crew followed the procedure as dictated in the manual to get rid of the smoke.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
The flight crew did not realize by turning on the recirculating fans they actually made the problem much worse as now the smoke and byproducts of the raging fire in the cargo compartment were carried by the ventilation system into the passenger cabin. This accelerated the spread of the fire, giving it a pathway through the partition and increasing the rate at which toxic smoke and gases were entering the passenger cabin. Investigators believe it is possible that the recirculating fans continued to operate through the rest of the flight absent a loss of electrical power.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<b>Conclusions of the Investigators</b></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
What is known is that a fire ignited in the PR pallet, the fire developed rapidly and could not be controlled by crew members. The fire generated smoke, carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide, some of which penetrated the passenger cabin and possibly the flight deck. However the complexities of how air flows inside an aircraft cabin when driven by a thermal driver such as a fire, and unknowns such as the rate of penetration into the cabin and the duration the recirculating fans ran makes any definitive conclusion impossible to reach.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
The ignition source of the fire was never determined, but an explosion was ruled out based on detailed examination of the aircraft wreckage and the absence of a rapid depressurization of the aircraft, which would have almost certainly followed the detonation of a device in the main deck cargo compartment. No such event is noted by the crew on the CVR recording.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
Nothing listed on the cargo manifest, or waybills on pallet PR could be described as dangerous goods. Nor had the team recovered any item of cargo from this pallet that seemed suspicious. But the possibility remained that a mis-declaration or deliberate false declaration on the waybill could have concealed a dangerous shipment from the cargo manager and customs officials in Taiwan.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
Whatever the source of the fire was, the packing material and cardboard boxes would have provided sufficient fuel to the fire, in the process allowing it to reach the high temperatures evidenced on the wreckage and potentially caused a flash fire in a matter of minutes. Investigators believe if a flash fire had occurred in the crown of the main cabin cargo compartment that the temperatures could have reached 2,000 F and the condition could have been sustained from anywhere between 30 seconds and 2 minutes.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
The burning of the packing materials produced the smoke, carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide which penetrated the cabin and may have asphyxiated the passengers and possibly even the flight deck crew before the aircraft crashed.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<b>Possible Causes of the Crash</b></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
The crew may have been overtaken by the toxic levels of carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide in the air and lost consciousness which resulted in the aircraft crashing. It is also possible that the levels of smoke in the flight deck and loss of instrumentation lead to disorientation of the flight crew which led to the crash.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
The aircraft structure, weakened by exposure to fire may not have been able to withstand the aerodynamic loads imposed on it which led to an in flight break up. This theory is supported by the two distinct and separate debris fields found on the sea bottom. Experts from engine maker Pratt & Whitney in their analysis concluded that the engines were rotating at a very slow speed at impact which indicated to them that the airplane was no longer flying but falling or tumbling.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
The investigators also considered that the flight control cables were compromised by the fire to the point of failure causing the flight crew to loose positive control of the aircraft's elevators which made the aircraft uncontrollable.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
What can be stated with certainty is that the effects from the fire directly led to the aircraft crashing into the sea. But beyond that conclusion the investigators were not able to precisely identify the chain of events that led to the loss of the aircraft.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
<b>Final Thoughts</b></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-family: inherit; text-align: left;">
We will probably never know what happened to the passengers and crew of the Helderberg on that dark night in 1987 over the Indian Ocean. Although the cause of the crash was never definitely determined the accident and the subsequent investigation did go a long way towards advancing the cause of safety for the flying public. The regulations pertaining to certification of Combi aircraft and class B main deck cargo compartments were significantly modified and much stricter standards were enacted. These stricter standards including automatic fire suppression systems were incorporated into the design of the 747-400 Combi model, which continues to operate in mainline service for several airlines to this day.</div>
</span></div>
Gregory Maxwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14018544410005482774noreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-339348712464762588.post-31123744507182977542014-01-18T20:03:00.000-08:002014-01-28T16:19:12.199-08:00Sabena Flight 548<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-6ax7aADghNI/Utr1r2LTB4I/AAAAAAAAFSs/Xk_1DF7A0jA/s1600/Sabena+548+Title.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-6ax7aADghNI/Utr1r2LTB4I/AAAAAAAAFSs/Xk_1DF7A0jA/s1600/Sabena+548+Title.png" /></a></div>
<span style="background-color: white;"><br /></span>
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><b style="line-height: 18px;">Accident Snapshot:</b><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Date: Wednesday, February 15, 1961</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Location: Berg, Belgium (<a href="https://picasaweb.google.com/lh/photo/A7daq_BplLbd_NHNLH9bJtMTjNZETYmyPJy0liipFm0?feat=directlink">50</a></span></span><span style="color: black;"><a href="https://picasaweb.google.com/lh/photo/A7daq_BplLbd_NHNLH9bJtMTjNZETYmyPJy0liipFm0?feat=directlink"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;">°</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"> 56' 1" N, 4° 32' 9" E</span></span></a></span><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">)</span><br />
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">Persons/Fatalities: 72/72 +1 on the ground</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Operator: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sabena">Sabena Belgian World Airlines</a></span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">Origin Airport: </span><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; color: black; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">New York, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_York_JFK">Idlewild (JFK/KJFK)</a></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">Destination Airport: </span><span style="color: black;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"> </span></span></span>Brussels, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brussels_National_Airport">Zaventem <span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">(BRU/EBBR)</span></a><br />
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><b style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></b><span style="line-height: 18px;"></span><b style="line-height: 18px;">Accident Aircraft:</b></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;">Aircraft Type: </span><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; color: black; line-height: 18px;"><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_707">Boeing 707-320</a></span><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Registration: OO-SJB</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">First Flight: 1959</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Total Airframe Hours: 3,038</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Cycles: Unknown</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Engines: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JT4A">4 Pratt & Whitney JT4-9A Turbojet Engines</a></span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;">
</span>
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-V3Ti5Xgzcm0/Utr10VYH2zI/AAAAAAAAFS0/wE1bQ2_uCAc/s1600/Sabena+548.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-V3Ti5Xgzcm0/Utr10VYH2zI/AAAAAAAAFS0/wE1bQ2_uCAc/s1600/Sabena+548.png" /></span></a></div>
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><u><br /></u></span></span>
</span><br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="line-height: 18px;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;">Profile view of Sabena-Belgian World Airlines Boeing 707-320 © Gregory Maxwell, 2014</span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: Arial, 'Arial Unicode MS', Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: xx-small; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><b>Resources:</b></span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"><a href="http://jet-age.net/Documents/Accident_Reports/BCAA_SN548_English.pdf">BCAA Final Accident Report - English</a></span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"><a href="http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19610215-3">Aviation Safety Network Page</a></span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sabena_Flight_548">Wikipedia Page</a></span></span><br />
<a href="http://www.hangarflying.be/nl/content/sabena-548-de-laatste-vlucht-van-juliet-bravo" style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">Book about the Crash</a><br />
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: black;"><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1kk4jLVX7ZA"><span style="line-height: 18px;">N</span>ewsreel Footage of the Crash</a></span><span style="line-height: 18px;"> (59 sec)</span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><b style="background-color: #f3f3f3;">Accident Summary:</b></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;">At the end of a New York/Brussels flight, which is normal in every respect, the aircraft is on a long final to runway 20 of the Brussels National Airport and receives clearance to land. Instead of landing the pilot, near the runway threshold, increases power and retracts the undercarriage. The aircraft gains some height and executes several circles in a left turn. During these evolutions the bank angle - while however decreasing several times for short periods - increases more and more until finally the aircraft is in a near vertical bank. The aircraft crashes and fire breaks out upon impact. The 11 crew members and 61 passengers are fatally injured. The aircraft is completely destroyed. One person on the ground is killed; another is severely injured.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><b style="background-color: #f3f3f3;">Probable Cause:</b></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;">Having done all possible reasonable investigations, the Commission concludes that the cause of the accident must be looked for in the physical failure of the flying controls.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">However, while it was possible to advance certain hypothesis relative to these possible causes, it must remark that they generate certain objections and can therefore not be considered as entirely satisfactory. Only the physical failure of two systems can lead to a complete explanation, but leaves the door open to an </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">arbitrary</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"> choice because there is not sufficient evidence to corroborate it.</span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><b>ACCIDENT ANALYSIS:</b></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><b><br /></b></span></span>
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><b>Boeing 707 History with Sabena</b></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;">The accident aircraft, OO-SJB, was the second of seven new Boeing 707-320 Intercontinental jets ordered by Sabena Belgian World Airlines. Aircraft c/n #17624 was the 92nd 707 to roll off the Renton line and was handed over to the company on the 15th of January 1960. Sister aircraft OO-SJA, delivered to the airline just a little over a month earlier on 12/04/59 launched the airline into the Jet-Age. Sabena wasted little time deploying the aircraft on its flagship Brussels-New York route and in the process the airline became continental Europe's first airline to offer trans-Atlantic jet service. Britain's BOAC had been operating regularly scheduled jet services between London and New York on the Comet 4 since October of 1958.</span></span><br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-HoodInb04tI/T0GTVtHZkLI/AAAAAAAABtg/6fmK9ink_Xo/s1600/08-06-11+02.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-HoodInb04tI/T0GTVtHZkLI/AAAAAAAABtg/6fmK9ink_Xo/s1600/08-06-11+02.png" height="235" width="640" /></span></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;">Sabena-Belgian World Airlines Boeing 707-320 Poster Circa 1960</span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><b>Pre-Departure</b></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">The mood in the terminal on Valentine's Day night at Idlewild International Airport on February 14, 1961 was festive as the 61 passengers and 11 crew prepared to board the sleek new 707 aircraft that would carry them to Brussels. Among the sixty-one people listed on the passenger manifest of flight 548 were the entire roster of the 1961 United States Figure Skating team which was on its way to the World Championships in Prague, Czechoslovakia. The U.S. Figure Skating Association contingent consisted of thirty-four athletes, coaches and support staff, which accounted for more than half of the passengers on board the flight. The remaining twenty-seven passengers were mostly American's hailing from every corner of the country from California to New Jersey and Texas to Michigan, as well as two Canadians and six Belgian nationals.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Around 6:00 pm the passengers stepped out of the cozy warmth of the terminal into the bitter cold winter night, walking across the snow dusted ramp to the buses that would deliver them to the waiting airplane. The boarding process unlike today was leisurely enough and without concern for security that the members of the U.S. Figure Skating team, bundled in their full winter coats, paused briefly on the rear aircraft boarding stairs for a series of pictures to capture the beginning of their grand adventure to Prague.</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-pZjqeo_U6Ic/T0GTbf76ftI/AAAAAAAABto/xpXoD-JS2VU/s1600/08-06-11+03.png" imageanchor="1" style="background-color: #f3f3f3; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-pZjqeo_U6Ic/T0GTbf76ftI/AAAAAAAABto/xpXoD-JS2VU/s1600/08-06-11+03.png" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;">United States 1961 National Figure Skating Team Photo, Taken Prior to Departure of Sabena Flight 548</span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><b>Flight History</b></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">Shortly after 7:00 pm eastern time the aircraft, with an all up weight of 263,452 lbs. and filled with 110,231 lbs. of fuel, taxied slowly to the threshold of runway 22R at Idlewild. OO-SJB at the moment it started its takeoff roll from New York had only been in service with Sabena for 13 months, having flown a little over 3,000 hours in the air. Departing into the cold night sky the 707-329 turned east and began its 7+ hour flight across the Atlantic Ocean to Belgium.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">At 08:36 am Brussels time the aircraft cruising at 38,000 ft. reported over Dover, a few minutes later beginning its descent to flight level 200. In contact now with Brussels Center, the pilots received an updated weather report for Brussel-Zaventem Airport. The controller reported visibility of two miles, a ceiling of 19,000 ft and a temperature of 44 degrees F.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">At 08:43 the 707-329 passed over Wulpen descending through 28,000 ft. Four minutes later the pilot reported Mackel descending through 19,000 ft.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">At 08:48 the following message was transmitted by the crew on company frequency, "Estimating Brussels 08:54, aircraft technically O.K." The Boeing jet then overflew Dender passing through 13,000 ft at which time it was handed off to Brussels Approach Control.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">The following is a transcript of the conversation between Sabena 548 referred to as, "JB" short for Juliet Bravo and Brussels Control up to the point of the accident as stated in the official accident report.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">08:50:55</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - Brussels Approach JB, we checked DU flight level 130 descending.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - Roger, JB, you (..?..) runway 20 for landing, the wind 330/2 kt, if you wish I'll take you for</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> final approach.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - Roger, thank you.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - What's your heading now?</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - Heading 10 ... (hesitation) 110.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - Roger, take the heading of 080 to the left.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - Roger, 080 JB.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">08:51:35</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - JB, may start descend to 1,500 feet QFE 1024.5</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - 1024.5, cleared to 1,500 feet.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">08:52:10</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - JB identified 13 N.M. WNW., continue on your heading and also your descend.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - Roger, JB.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - JB, present level and rate of descend?</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - We have to reduce speed to make a quick descend, JB, we are now descending thousand feet a</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> minute, we expect to go in south as soon.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - What's your present level?</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - 10,000 feet descending.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - In that case will you turn left on heading 020</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - Roger 020.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - You are coming too close to the antenna, I will loose sight of you on the radar.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - Roger.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">08:53:40</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - Brussels JB, heading 020, flight level 7,500 now.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - Roger, understand, your position is 7 miles N.W., continue present heading.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - Roger.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">08:55:40</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - JB, flight level?</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - 3,000 feet descending, still heading 020.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - OK, turn to the right on a heading 180.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - Roger, 180 to the right.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - Position is .... You are turning on long final, 13 miles north.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - Roger.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">08:57:20</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - Brussels JB, heading 180, height 1,500 feet.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - Roger, maintain 1,500 feet and turn to the right on a heading of 190.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - Roger JB, 190 to the right.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">08:59:30</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - Brussels JB, Hofstade 1,500 feet.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - OK can you continue on contact with the ground?</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - OK Roger.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - You are cleared to land and call 118.6 from now on, you are 6 miles on final approach.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - All right, 118.6 - JB.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">09:02:00</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> The intonation of voice was normal and does not lead one to suppose that, until that moment, there</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> was any particular worry on board, at least in the voice of the second pilot. However no call was</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> received on frequency 118.6 which was operating normally. The aircraft was called several times</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> on this frequency. The calls remained unanswered. Following this lack of contact, Brussels</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> Approach 124.5 again called the aircraft several times until 09:04 giving it amongst other things</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> clearance to land. These calls remained unanswered.</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-Yt7xPdkcfHg/T0GTj3FtwaI/AAAAAAAABtw/jacPZ8Ec3w0/s1600/08-06-11+04.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-Yt7xPdkcfHg/T0GTj3FtwaI/AAAAAAAABtw/jacPZ8Ec3w0/s1600/08-06-11+04.png" height="428" width="640" /></span></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;">Map Depicting the Location of the Crash Site Relative to the Final Approach Path to Runway 20 at Brussels-Zaventem</span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The controllers would learn soon enough that the aircraft had in fact crashed into a field on the outskirts of the sleepy village of Berg a few miles northeast of Zaventem Airport. The aircraft impacted the ground with tremendous force, instantly killing all 72 passengers and crew on the aircraft as well as one person on the ground. The crash of OO-SJB marked the first crash of a Boeing 707 in commercial service and to this day remains the most tragic aviation accident in Belgium's history.</span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><b><span style="font-family: inherit;">Flight Path Trajectory</span></b></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Based on eyewitness reports including the tower personnel on duty, traces from the aircraft's flight recorder, ATC information and radio communications the Belgian Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) was able to reconstruct the final minutes of Sabena Flight 548. The aircraft's last position report came at Hofstade, approximately 5.5 nm from the threshold of runway 20 at Brussels-Zaventem Airport. The aircraft was established on the final approach with landing gear down descending through 1,500 feet. </span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Shortly thereafter Brussels Approach instructed "Juliet Bravo" to contact tower on 118.6, but the aircraft never did. According to personnel on duty in the Brussels tower the aircraft's altitude and attitude seemed normal as it approached the runway to land. Instead of landing OO-SJB overflew the runway threshold at an altitude of approximately 300 feet in a steep climb while banking to the left. At an estimated height of about 1,500 feet the aircraft was observed to have leveled off and a reduction in engine power was heard.</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-hqARVl67lcM/UtskSUXzLRI/AAAAAAAAFTQ/Y7s0637FlW4/s1600/Sabena+548+Bank.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-hqARVl67lcM/UtskSUXzLRI/AAAAAAAAFTQ/Y7s0637FlW4/s1600/Sabena+548+Bank.png" height="434" width="640" /></span></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">OO-SJB in the Final Desperate Moments of Flight with Bank Angle Approaching 90 Degrees </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">© Gregory Maxwell, 2014</span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Next the aircraft entered into a series of steep left hand 360 degrees turns, maintaining a high bank angle throughout. During this time the aircraft's pitch was seen to oscillate between a nose up and nose down position and engine power was applied and the retarded several times. As the left hand turning maneuver continued the bank angle continued to increase until it reach almost 90 degrees according to several witnesses on the ground. Next the nose of the aircraft pitched over and the 707 crashed violently into the ground. Immediately following the aircraft's overshoot of the runway and as a result of its erratic flight maneuvers Air Traffic Control personnel in the tower alerted the fire fighting services of the Air Force and Brussels City who arrived quickly on the scene of the crash.</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="480" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/1kk4jLVX7ZA?rel=0" width="640"></iframe></span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;">Newsreel Footage of the Crash</span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">As fire fighters and other first responders arrived at the crash site, it became quickly apparent that the crash was likely not survivable due to the fragmentation of the airplane debris. Large parts of the aircraft structure had been completely destroyed by the impact and post crash fire, but it was still possible to reconstruct vital components of the flight controls on the wing and tail surfaces.</span><b style="line-height: 18px;"> </b><span style="line-height: 18px;">From the aircraft remains the investigators were able to determine that the aircraft was intact prior to impact with the ground.</span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><b style="line-height: 18px;">Control Surfaces Examination</b><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;">Inboard Ailerons</i><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - The components were examined for damage and faults separate from those caused by the impact and fire and were found to be in a normal configuration. Examination of markings left on the structure allowed investigators to conclude that the inboard ailerons were in a right turn configuration. The left hand inboard aileron was in a 10 degree down position and the right hand surface was in a 14 degree up position. Examination of the cockpit revealed that the control pulleys beneath the captain's control column were locked in a left hand turn position while the copilot's controls were found to be in a right hand turn configuration. Importantly the cable that connects the two controls was found to be broken which explained why the copilot and captain's controls were in opposite positions.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;">Aileron Trim</i><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - The left hand trim mechanism was found in serviceable condition, outside of the damage sustained from the impact. The right hand trim mechanism had been exposed to fire and was jammed. The jamming of the mechanism was isolated to corrosion on the spring retainer and when examined by Boeing it was determined that the corrosion agent was a byproduct of the fuel fire and was not present before the impact.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;">Outboard Ailerons</i><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - The position of the ailerons at impact could not be determined with any degree of certainty based on the evidence available, however the position of the control rods of the lock-out mechanism indicated they must have been functioning and under normal conditions would have been in the neutral position. The left hand aileron was largely intact and no fault was found in the system absent the deformation caused by impact forces. The right hand aileron control system was badly damaged and the control rod was bent and the steel extremity was broken. Tests involving the control rod were undertaken to find out how and why it possibly failed. Results of these tests showed that their was an inherent weakness in the mechanism at the point of the attachment bolt to the bell crank, which caused the aileron control rod to fail due to impact forces and not a mechanical failure of the system.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;">Spoilers</i><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - </span><b style="line-height: 18px;"> </b><span style="line-height: 18px;">Investigators had a difficult time determining the position of the spoilers at the moment of impact as the panels were all found to be in the retracted position when they examined the remains of the wing surfaces. However marks found on the control rods possibly indicated that the right hand inboard spoiler was extended about 40 degrees, which would therefore correspond to a right turn control input. Examination of the speed brake handle on the flight deck showed that the spoilers were retracted at impact. None of the system components examined by the investigators showed signs of failure prior to the crash.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;">Flaps</i><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - Examination of the wreckage showed the flaps were in the retracted position, which was confirmed by the position of the flap selector on the center pedestal in the cockpit.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;">Rudder and Vertical Stabilizer</i><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - The vertical fin was undamaged by fire and largely intact having been broken near the base by the force of the impact. Traces on the structure indicated the rudder was deflected 20 degrees to the right at impact which was cross referenced against the position of the rudder pedals, both were found to be in agreement. No abnormalities or flaws were found in the structure, hinges, tabs or balance panels. The control rods were also found to be correctly assembled and in good working order.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;">Elevator</i><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - The elevator was not exposed to fire and despite the impact was relatively undamaged. Examination of the structure showed no indication of failure prior to impact and the moveable control surfaces were concluded to have been in good working order prior to impact.</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-kiIqognnHgY/T0GVhQmxy0I/AAAAAAAABuY/7Jk0I8LFol8/s1600/08-07-11+02.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-kiIqognnHgY/T0GVhQmxy0I/AAAAAAAABuY/7Jk0I8LFol8/s1600/08-07-11+02.png" height="526" width="640" /></span></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;">First Responders Search Through the Wreckage of Sabena Flight 548</span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><i style="line-height: 18px;">Stabilizer</i><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - Investigators observed that the stabilizer was in position of 10-10.5 units of noise-up trim which was very close to the maximum limit of 11 units. The position of the stabilizer was determined by examining traces on the structure as well as the position of the control screw and the position of the cables on the rear and front drums. Traces left by the needle on instrument indicator on the flight deck indicated a 8-8.5 unit nose up trim. The discrepancy between the traces on the structure and the instrument indicator was most likely due to the fact that the cable connecting the front drum and the indicator mechanism was severed at impact. The stabilizer control mechanism was closely examined for any electrical or mechanical failure and none was found. However an abnormal quantity of water condensation was found in the lower housing and the input shaft well for the electric actuator. In addition the locking nut of the input shaft of the electric trim actuator was found to have been excessively tightened and the locking washer had sheared. A piece of fiber was also found to be jammed between the rear drum and the cable. Chafing was also observed on the protective cover which had been caused by excessive rubbing of the cable on the housing. The stabilizer trim controls on the captain's and copilot's control column were removed and closely examined for any faults. Investigators determined that the thumb switch, cut-out switch, power and safety relays and the limit switch were in good working order. The cut-out switch on the panel appeared to indicate it was in the "On" postion however the pedestal had been deformed in the impact so a positive determination could not be made of the switch position.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;">Engines</i><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - All four Pratt & Whitney JT4-9A turbojet engines were removed and dismantled for closer examination. Investigators determined that the damage to the engines was consistent with that sustained from the impact and that all four engines were turning and functioning normally prior to the crash. The thrust reverser mechanisms on the number 1 and 4 engines were found intact and in the stowed position and all four thrust reverser levers controls in the cockpit were found to be in the stowed position. In addition the fuel controls on each engine were taken apart and no abnormality was noted. Engine instruments on the flight deck also indicated that all four engines were functioning normally with oil pressure, oil temperature and engine temperature readings all in the normal range. The instantaneous fuel flow indicators also showed 1,543 lbs/hr and 881 lbs/hr respectively. The engine oil quantities for all engines was also in the normal range. Examination of the fuel gauges indicated there was more than sufficient fuel remaining to feed all four engines.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Left Auxiliary 0 lbs</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Main 1 3,500 lbs</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Main 2 ------ (needle not present)</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Main 3 4,400 lbs</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Main 4 3,300 lbs</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Right Auxiliary 0 lbs</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Center 220 lbs</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Total 11,420 lbs</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Examination of the thrust levers on the center pedestal showed that all four engines were operating in the range of idle power. The thrust readings were determined by measuring the distance of the individual thrust levers from their respective rearward stops.</span><i style="line-height: 18px;"> </i><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;">Electrical System</i><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - Auxiliary hydraulic pumps, lighting switch positions and the fact that the flight recorded was active indicate the engines were providing electric power and signified the presence of both AC and DC electrical current powering the various aircraft systems.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;">Radios</i><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - The VHF transceivers were badly damaged but the investigators were able to establish that they had indeed been set to the tower frequency of 118.6 as instructed by Brussels Approach control.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;">Autopilot</i><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - The "On, Off, damper" was found in the off position and the aileron synchro was found to be against the stop which indicated that the autopilot was disengaged at impact. The elevator and ruder servo motors were also found to be in good working order and the electric wiring didn't exhibit any signs of a fault. In addition the mach-trim switch was found in the "Off" position, indicating the system was disengaged at impact. The speed of the aircraft at impact was determined to be 177 knots as indicated by the KIFIS.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;">Hydraulic System</i><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - No system faults were found and investigators observed traces in the ventilators of the electric motors driving the auxiliary pumps that indicated they were operating at the moment of impact.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;">Landing Gear</i><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - The landing gear were found to be retracted based on the examination of the wreckage and the position of the landing gear arm on the flight deck panel.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">The only abnormality discovered during the examination of the wreckage was the fault in the stabilizer trim mechanism, but what exactly could have caused this condition.</span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">After examining all the evidence at the crash site investigators were left with few clues outside of the anomalies in the stabilizer trim system. They could not explain why the flight crew would have trimmed the aircraft in such a manner that would place the mechanism so closed to the upper stop. Under normal flight conditions the stabilizer would never approach such a high nose up setting. To answers these questions the investigators turned to Boeing to help them understand the limitations of the system. </span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><b style="line-height: 18px;">Stabilizer Tests</b><span style="line-height: 18px;"> </span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Tests were carried out to by investigators with the help of Boeing that tried to isolate certain fault conditions and insure the trim mechanism operated normally when taking into account the position of the stabilizer. Cold soak tests were conducted to simulate the atmospheric effects of the aircraft being at cruise altitude during its long trans-Atlantic flight. The results showed that water in enough quantity in the input shaft-well of the electric actuator could potentially cause the electric trim motor control to jam, which could also lead to excessive tightening of the locking nut as observed on the accident aircraft.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Further low temperature tests were conducted to determine the effects of contamination on the serviceability of the mechanism. Contamination was found to be a result of humidity in the air that penetrates the stabilizer control system during each flight at a time when the mechanism is no longer air tight and grease being forced into the top casing as a result of normal movement of the screw. Grease was found to have the potential to contaminate the lower casing by packing inside the mechanism's roller bearings. But could this contamination cause a fault in the rudder system that would leave the aircraft uncontrollable? To answer this question investigators had to better understand how the stabilizer's mechanical systems worked in particular how the primary and secondary brakes functioned to retard undesirable movement of the screw which was reversible.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">The primary braking system utilized plates which when engaged came in contact with the screw shoulder on one side and the ratchet wheel on the other. The ratchet wheel's movement in the direction of the braking was prevented by a pair of dogs. When the stabilizer was moved in the direction opposite of the load, the dogs retract and only the outside loading must be overcome. When the nut moves due to the loads applied by the stabilizer movement, the screw will slip on the brake plates and the dogs will engage to limit the movement.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">The secondary braking system employed a shoe brake, which when the screw was driven the shoes remained in the released or open position and when the screw moved as a result of the loading of the stabilizer the shoes was engaged to limit movement of the screw.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Tests were carried out to see to what degree both the primary and secondary brakes might be effected by contamination due to humidity, ice or grease or any combination of the three. Investigators observed that the secondary brake was prone to slipping when contaminated by grease as well as low temperature conditions. The brake was also vulnerable just after periods of cold soaking say during the descent phase of the flight as the system components were warmed by the hotter ambient air temperature in the lower atmosphere. Brakes which were not air tight were removed from an identical aircraft and under certain test conditions were made to slip. Not only were the brakes found to slip, but the rate of slip was observed to be very high. In some case the slip rate was twice the rotational speed of the electrical motor.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">The primary braking system was also tested under the same conditions. While the efficiency of the system was reduced with the introduction of contamination of the same source, the effects were much less pronounced. The rate of slip was much lower, equating to only a fraction of a turn of the screw.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">The influence of the fiber lodged between the rear drum and the cable due to the chafing of the cable on the protective cover could have in the investigators' opinion caused the disconnect clutch to function and render the electrical trim inoperative. However lab tests were not able to substantiate this theory.</span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">
</div>
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><b style="line-height: 18px;">Sabena Maintenance Records</b><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Following the test of the stabilizer control system investigators from the Civil Aviation Authority were left with more questions than answers and sought to examine the maintenance records of Sabena's Boeing 707-320 fleet to see if there were any previous incidences of faults involving the stabilizer system. Combing the records they were surprised to learn that there was in fact a history of faults involving the flight controls on Sabena's 707 fleet, but not with the stabilizer system but rather the aileron control system. OO-SJB in particular was found to have been affected numerous times by blocking or hard spots in the aileron control system which were documented in the aircraft's fault log.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><b style="line-height: 18px;">Summary of Aileron Stiffness Reports on OO-SJB From 01/12/1960 to 02/14/1961</b><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - 01/12/1960 Captain Libert - Flight LEO/E'VILLE</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;"> </i><span style="line-height: 18px;">During descent LEO/E'VILLE, the aileron servo remained engaged. Right ailerons did not</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> function, after disconnecting A.P.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> </span><i style="line-height: 18px;">Note: These controls refunctioned after using the A.P. disconnect switch on the control wheel, </i><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;"> noted that the A.P. switch on the control pedestal was not completely in the "Off" position.</i><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;"> - Checked controls on ground and found "O.K."</i><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - 5/11/1960 Captain Schreiden - Flight LEO/JOBURG</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><b style="line-height: 18px;"> </b><span style="line-height: 18px;">During descent at Jo'Burg - 260 IAS - 10,000 ft - Damper "On" - aileron very stiff, may be</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> slightly more to the right, become normal after very pronounced stiffness.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> </span><i style="line-height: 18px;">- Ailerons checked on ground - normal - no stiffness noted.</i><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - 06/29/1960 - Captain Owen - Flight LEO/JOBURG</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> Flight controls (descent) at 12,000 ft, right aileron control completely locked. At 8,000 ft.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> becomes normal.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> </span><i style="line-height: 18px;">- Proceed with complete aileron check and control of cables; nothing abnormal found.</i><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;"> </i><span style="line-height: 18px;">06/29/1960 - Captain Smith - Flight LEO/BRUSSELS</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;"> </i><span style="line-height: 18px;">At 31,000 ft tried control wheel to the left O.K., to the right was locked for a short instant to free</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> suddenly</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> </span><i style="line-height: 18px;">- Controls tested on ground: nothing abnormal noted.</i><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;"> </i><span style="line-height: 18px;">07/14/1960 - Captain Smith - Flight LEO/BRUSSELS</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;"> </i><span style="line-height: 18px;">During the descent to Brussels, the aileron control is stiff in right turns only and without A.P.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> engaged.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> </span><i style="line-height: 18px;">- Checked controls on ground: O.K. suppose icing.</i><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - 08/10/1960 - Captain Jaumoulle - Flight LEO/BRUSSELS</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> At 39,000 ft. found aileron locked, right turn impossible. Freed itself at 2,000 ft. after 2 to 3</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> minutes in warm air.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> </span><i style="line-height: 18px;">- Checked control action on ground - O.K., point under observation.</i><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;"> </i><span style="line-height: 18px;">- 08/24/1960 - Captain Gigot - Flight JOBURG/LEO</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;"> </i><span style="line-height: 18px;">Stiffening of aileron control during descent.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> </span><i style="line-height: 18px;">- Probably ice on ailerons during descent.</i><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - 09/17/1960 - Captain Jaumoulle - Flight BRUSSELS/JOBURG</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> At F.L. 330, right aileron locked, freed after slight force on control wheel. During descent to</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> E'VILLE the ailerons (left and right) are locked; freed by moderate force on wheel.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> </span><i style="line-height: 18px;">- Checked aileron system on ground: O.K., greased system.</i><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;"> </i><span style="line-height: 18px;">- 11/02/1960 - Captain Schreiden - Flight JOBURG/LEO & ROME/BRUSSELS</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;"> </i><span style="line-height: 18px;">Frozen ailerons did not move by wheel or trim - please check controls - after thawing, feeling</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> looser than normal.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> </span><i style="line-height: 18px;">- Checked controls on ground - nothing abnormal noted.</i><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - 11/03/1960 - Captain Henquin - Flight ATHENS/TEHRAN</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> Ailerons and aileron trim frozen during descent to Athens and Tehran.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> </span><i style="line-height: 18px;">- See point T.R. 9 S.V.P.</i><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - 11/04/1960 - Captain Henquin - Flight BEIRUT/ATHENS/BRUSSELS</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> Aileron and aileron trim frozen during descent.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> </span><i style="line-height: 18px;">- Problem under study - to follow.</i><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;"> </i><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - 11/09/1960 - Captain Jaumoulle - Flight LEO/JOBURG</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> After one hour of flight aileron trim locked (SAT - 55 C). Aileron trim freed during descent (SAT -</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> 10 C). During descent, noted ailerons also locked; all normal with SAT +10 C.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> </span><i style="line-height: 18px;">- To be followed.</i><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - 11/12/1960 - Captain Verpoorten - Flight GENEVA/BRUSSELS</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> Clear air T -62 C stiffening in the ailerons during turns to the right in climb. Same thing noted</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> during descent to Geneva after 33,000 ft. in left turn till final approach speed 160 indicated (idem</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> at Brussels).</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> </span><i style="line-height: 18px;">- To be followed.</i><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;"> </i><span style="line-height: 18px;">- 11/13/1960 - Captain Jaumoulle - Flight LEO/BRUSSELS</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;"> </i><span style="line-height: 18px;">After 1 hour aileron trim blocked. Ailerons very stiff, mainly in case of left turn.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> - 11/17/1960 - Flight NEW-YORK/BRUSSELS</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> For information, during climb, the left aileron control remained temporary locked. Idem during</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> descent.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> </span><i style="line-height: 18px;">- Under observation.</i><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;"> </i><span style="line-height: 18px;">- 11/24/1960 - Captain De Keyser - Flight JOBUR/LEO/ROME</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;"> </i><span style="line-height: 18px;">There seems to be hard spot in the aileron control, sometimes to the left sometimes to the right.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> </span><i style="line-height: 18px;">- During test: O.K., seems to be due to icing.</i><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><b style="line-height: 18px;">Examination of Aileron Seizures</b><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Armed with the information from the trouble reports and after speaking to Sabena maintenance personnel the investigators were able to determine the cause of the aileron seizures was exposure to low temperature. The cold soaking of the aircraft at altitude led to the seizure of the aileron trim mechanism under certain conditions. Tests conducted by Boeing were successful in replicating the conditions described by pilots in the trouble reports. The blockage was able to be overcome by applying a force equal to 90 lbs on the control column. It is important to note that both the left and right aileron trim mechanisms on OO-SJB were removed and replaced during the aircraft overhaul that began on 01/11/1961. After the overhaul there were no further reports of aileron blockage or stiffness in the controls of OO-SJB leading up to the accident flight.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">However the log did reveal abnormalities in the stabilizer trim system that were encountered during a test flight immediately following the overhaul before the aircraft was placed back into line service. The first incident occurred on the first test flight on 02/09/1961 during which the pilot indicated that the trim button had to be pushed harder than normal in order to activate.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">A second test flight was conducted to confirm the fault, after which the pilot in command reported that the stabilizer's response was abnormal, particularly after trimming, nose down, slight nose-up impulses gave no result. Another incident on that same test flight was observed with the pilot noting:</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> "At the beginning of the flight - strong tendency of the aircraft to roll to the right - in level flight,</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> the two left wing spoilers are at the inch up."</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> "After descent, speed brakes out, at the moment of retraction there was a marked roll to the right -</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> did not reoccur afterwards."</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> "At the end of the flight, the tendency to roll to the right was considerably diminished."</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Maintenance addressed the issue by replacing the stabilizer trim motor. Ground testing of the stabilizer, showed normal travel in both directions after the motor replacement and no further action was taken.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">Between the aileron stiffness reports in the trouble log of OO-SJB and the test conducted on the stabilizer control system it became apparent to investigators that Sabena 548 had crashed as a result of a mechanical failure. Investigators also were able to surmise that the fault must have occurred sometime in the 60 seconds after the overshoot maneuver was initiated. While the fault mechanism that triggered the aircraft's erratic flight profile was not known the potential source had been isolated to three components: A fault in the stabilizer trim system, a seizure of the ailerons or a malfunction of the wing spoilers.</span><b style="line-height: 18px;"> </b><span style="line-height: 18px;">It was also entirely possible that some combination of faults in two of the three systems combined to place the aircraft in an upset condition from which recovery was not possible.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Reviewing the information from the accident scene investigators knew the position of critical flight control surfaces.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">- Stabilizer: 10 to 10.5 units nose up</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">- Elevator: Pointing Up</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">- Rudder: 20 degrees right deflection</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">- Ailerons: Inboard set for a right turn</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> Outboard probably neutral</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">- Spoilers: Left hand outboard: undetermined</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> Left hand inboard: probably retracted</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> Right hand inboard: extended (40 degrees)</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> Right hand outboard: undetermined</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">- Flaps: Up</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Eyewitness reports and tracings from the flight recorder showed that the aircraft made only left hand turns and that the bank angle during these turns exceeded 60 degrees at times. However all the evidence from the crash scene indicates that the aircraft was in a right hand bank configuration. Despite the evidence from the crash scene the team could not with any degree of certainty prove that the position of the control surfaces as found was in fact the same position they maintained when the aircraft was in flight. But the appearance of the stabilizer near its maximum nose-up limit and the position of the elevators also in the up position was something that could not be easily dismissed. </span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">As was previously established the stabilizer setting was well outside the position for a normal approach, given the aircraft's weight, flap configuration and airspeed. The aircraft would have had a tendency to pitch violently nose up with this stabilizer setting, a condition which would have only been amplified by application of any degree of elevator movement in the upwards direction. It would be counter-intuitive for a pilot to apply up elevator with such a high nose-up trim setting as the result given the aircraft's low airspeed and altitude would certainly be a stall from which recovery was impossible. So the question remains how did the aircraft get into this configuration and what aspects of the flight control surfaces failed during this critical phase of flight.</span></span><br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-B5yThHBKe5Q/UtsqTaP2XBI/AAAAAAAAFTk/WVetHaT01VI/s1600/Sabena+548+Stabilizer.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-B5yThHBKe5Q/UtsqTaP2XBI/AAAAAAAAFTk/WVetHaT01VI/s1600/Sabena+548+Stabilizer.png" height="198" width="640" /></span></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;">Maximum Travel of the Boeing 707-320 Horizontal Stabilizer </span></span><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-size: x-small; line-height: 18px;">© Gregory Maxwell, 2014</span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">The position of the stabilizer can only be explained if:</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">1. One of the control systems of the stabilizer ran away.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">2. There was an untimely slipping of the horizontal stabilizer due to unbalanced aerodynamic loads</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> acting upon it.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">3. A failure of one of the other flight control surfaces required an increased action of the stabilizer</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><b style="line-height: 18px;">Accident Scenarios</b><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;">1st Hypothesis: The position of the stabilizer is the result of a failure in the stabilizer trim control system.</i><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Three independent systems can direct movement of stabilizer, the auto-pilot, the mach-trim system and the electric motor of the manual system. The auto-pilot aileron synchro switch was found in the off position on the flight deck and the system was disengaged. The mach-trim switch inside the KIFIS was in the open position, which eliminates this system. It is possible that the wiring to the stabilizer trim toggle switch on the pilot's control column experienced a short or became stuck allowing the stabilizer to runaway to the full nose up position unchecked. </span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">The wiring in the control column was badly damaged by fire and it was impossible to discern the presence of electrical arcing or chafing of the wiring. Even if this did occur this event was foreseen in the emergency procedures by Boeing and can be easily rectified by operating the motor cutout switch on the center pedestal. It would have taken the stabilizer between 8 and 10 seconds to travel to the position of 10-10.5 units nose-up, and it is hard to imagine in that time that pilots would not have had sufficient time to operate the cut-out switch.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;">2nd Hypothesis: The position of the stabilizer is the result of a slipping stabilizer caused by a failure of the primary and secondary brakes.</i><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">As mentioned in Part 3 of this story uncontrolled slipping of the stabilizer under normal aerodynamic loading is prevented by the primary and secondary friction brakes. While lab tests did reveal that the secondary brake under certain conditions can experience high rates of slip, the primary system was found to have a very minimal slip rate in comparison. Investigators also had to concede that the efficiency of the two brakes under different aerodynamic loads was not known. </span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">This could possibly explain why the crew lost control of the aircraft. But in order for this scenario to play out both the primary and secondary brakes would have had to fail simultaneously and the slipping of the primary brake would have to have been rapid which was contrary to the test results in the lab. If a rapid slipping of the stabilizer due to aerodynamic loads had occurred it is highly probable that the screw nut would have come into contact with the mechanical stop. When it actuality investigators found it was 1 to 2 turns from the stop when examined at the crash scene. This finding could have been the result of an attempt by the pilot to correct the out of trim condition, but this would require use of the manual trim system and investigators could find no evidence that the manual trim system had been activated leading up to the accident.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><i style="line-height: 18px;">3rd Hypothesis: The position of the stabilizer was necessary to compensate for the failure of one of the other flight controls.</i><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Under this scenario it assumed that the extreme nose up trim position of 10 units was a deliberate action of the pilots to counter the loss of one of the other flight control surfaces and find a position of equilibrium. It is a known fact that the effectiveness of the elevator decreases during a turn, causing the aircraft's nose to pitch down this is caused by the distance between the stabilizer and the center of gravity. In order to counteract the nose down movement the nose-up angle of the stabilizer must be increased. </span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">So it follows that a position of 10 units nose up trim could be necessary for a coordinated turn at a bank angle of 60 degrees at a speed between 120 and 155 knots with flaps fully extended. If the flaps were fully retracted the nose up trim would be reduced to no more than 7 units in a 60 degree turn near buffet speed. The investigative commission considered a failure of the stabilizer control system to be unlikely as in their estimation it could have been set to this position to aid in a steep low altitude turn brought about by the failure of one of the other control surfaces</span><i style="line-height: 18px;">.</i><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><u style="line-height: 18px;">Inboard Ailerons</u><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">During high speed flight regimes with flaps retracted the outboard ailerons are inoperative leaving the inboard ailerons to control the aircraft's bank. As the trouble log indicated their were numerous write ups concerning sticking or seizing of the inboard ailerons in flight. The crash site revealed that the inboard ailerons were in a right turn configuration but whether the impact caused this deflection or they maintained that position in flight could not be definitively determined.</span><i style="line-height: 18px;"> </i><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">When examining the aileron trim cartridge investigators discovered a pinch point where jamming occurred in the tests due to insufficient clearance and corrosion. The corrosion deposits were found to be a byproduct of the fuel fire and were therefor not present prior to impact. The pinch point in the cartridge made lateral control beyond that position impossible. The position of the pinch would have allowed full travel of the aileron to the left and only limited movement passed neutral in the right hand turn direction. Investigators had a difficult time understanding why when the pilot realized he had limited roll control to the right that following the decision to go around that he did not maintain the aircraft in a wings level position and utilizing the rudder and other available control surfaces to control roll authority.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Lab test also showed that the jamming of the stabilizer trim cartridge could be overcome by applying a theoretical shear force of 105 lbs. on the control column which would cause the shear rivets on the connecting rod between the aileron trim cartridge and the aileron control to shear, thus clearing the jam. In actuality the lab tests performed by Boeing showed a shear force of 152 lbs. applied to the control column was needed to cause the rivets to shear, but when you consider both pilots applying force to the control column it seems entirely possible the crew could have produced the force necessary to clear the jam. But this theory ultimately does not pan out, as the critical rivets were found undamaged during the investigation of the wreckage.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><u style="line-height: 18px;">Outboard Ailerons</u><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">If the conclusion is that the outer ailerons became blocked in a position just beyond neutral in either direction, then the extension of the flaps either partially or fully would serve to lock both the inboard and outboard ailerons. The only hint the pilot would have had to this developing condition would be a temporary displacement of the control wheel, which would probably have been slight enough that it would have gone unnoticed. If this condition was present then when the pilot initiated the go-around maneuver after overshooting the runway the action of raising the flaps would have had the following effect on the ailerons. First the inboard ailerons would react to the flap retraction by moving in the opposite direction and the amplitude of the movement would be several times the amount of offset from neutral of the outboard ailerons. </span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">This movement could impart high stress loads onto the control system. These stresses had the potential to cause permanent distortion of the control elements or in the worst case failure of one or more of the aileron components. It is however possible to free the jammed inboard ailerons once the flaps reach the fully retracted position and if the movement did not cause permanent damage or distortion to the system. The linkage mechanism between the inboard and outboard ailerons and flaps makes it possible to setup a hard over position on the inboard ailerons if the outboard ailerons were locked before or after the extension of the flaps. This scenario is one possible explanation of the accident but the following facts would have to be ignored for this theory to have played out.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">1. The commission did not uncover any evidence in the maintenance logs or trouble reports covering</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> Sabena's Boeing 707 fleet in which a seized outboard aileron was reported or found during regular</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> inspections.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">2. There is no evidence in the wreckage at the crash scene that supports this hypothesis.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">3. The inboard ailerons were found in a position for a right bank which, due to the presence of the</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"> snubbers, could only with difficulty be explained by impact forces.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><u style="line-height: 18px;">Spoilers</u><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Upon examination of the spoilers at the crash scene investigators determined that the shear rivets on the mechanism between the spoilers and hydraulic valves were sheared on all four pairs of spoilers. Even more unusual the hydraulic bypass valve of the left hand outboard spoiler was found to be locked in the open position indicating a potential failure in the mechanism. If the rivets of the left outboard spoiler were sheared before impact, which couldn't be determined, then it would be possible for this set of spoilers to deflect to the full up position of 40 degrees. The position of the spoilers in this condition is dependent on the friction that exists in the system between the control valve, shear rivets and control rods. Over time the forces will cause the follow-up mechanism and the associated hydraulic valve to move out of alignment which will effect the up position of the spoiler when full deflection is commanded.</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-DIqVzuRFW6M/UttKlD5nrEI/AAAAAAAAFUs/c811ZXSdnRg/s1600/Sabena+548+Normal+Turn.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-DIqVzuRFW6M/UttKlD5nrEI/AAAAAAAAFUs/c811ZXSdnRg/s1600/Sabena+548+Normal+Turn.png" height="302" width="640" /></span></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"> <span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small; line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">Normal Coordinated Left Turn </span></span><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-size: x-small; line-height: 18px;">© Gregory Maxwell, 2014</span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small; line-height: 18px; text-align: center;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-7r2YVqOrblc/UttKnvlBn8I/AAAAAAAAFU4/X1psKsQvWvM/s1600/Sabena+548+Jammed+Spoiler+Turn.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-7r2YVqOrblc/UttKnvlBn8I/AAAAAAAAFU4/X1psKsQvWvM/s1600/Sabena+548+Jammed+Spoiler+Turn.png" height="302" width="640" /></span></a></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-size: x-small;">Induced Left Turn due to Fault in Left Outboard Spoiler </span><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-size: x-small; line-height: 18px;">© Gregory Maxwell, 2014</span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">the pair of outboard spoilers were in fact jammed in the full up position of 40 degrees this would result in a roll rate of the aircraft of about 13 degrees per second at 150 knots. In order to overcome this induced roll the pilot would have to apply more than 20 degrees of movement to the control wheel in the opposite direction to neutralize the roll. Once the roll rate in the opposite direction of 20 degrees was reached the offending spoilers would collapse resulting in a roll in the opposite direction of around 4 degrees per second with flaps up and the aid of spoilers on the opposing wing. Without spoilers the roll rate would be around 2 degrees.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Normally a fault in any one of the four spoilers could be corrected by the pilot by activating the corresponding spoiler bypass switch. However the malfunctioning spoiler can't be succesfully bypassed if the bypass valve for that spoiler is stuck in the open position. Diagnosing the failure would be very difficult for the crew given the window of time and the fact that from their position in the cockpit they would not have been able to see the spoilers to know which one was not functioning properly. </span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">Investigators know the bypass valve of the left hand outboard spoiler was faulty as it was found jammed in the fully open position. In this scenario if the shear rivets of the associated spoiler were sheared and the bypass valve was stuck in the open position the pilot would not have been able to overcome this fault and roll control of the aircraft would have become almost impossible. The crew would have struggled to find an equilibrium in roll control, a position which had become very unstable and variable. The only possible means the crew would have had to rectify this issue would have been to cut all hydraulic power to the spoiler system by de-energizing the entire hydraulic utility system. But this action would be predicated on the assumption that the crew was able to isolate the fault to the left outboard spoiler. </span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">As mentioned before given the time constraints and the limited visibility of the wing this task was not possible. The investigative commission believes that given this scenario the aircraft's roll rate of 13 degrees per second would quickly place it in an attitude where control of the aircraft was lost and recovery was not possible given the low altitude and airspeed of the Boeing 707 at the time.</span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">After analyzing all the data, investigating every piece of wreckage, performing hundreds of hours of lab tests and interviewing countless people the investigators of the Belgian Civil Aviation Authority were unable to definitively isolate the cause of the accident. There was little doubt, given the evidence that the aircraft experienced a singular, or series of failures of critical flight control which rendered the 707 uncontrollable, ultimately leading to the loss of the airframe and its compliment of 61 passengers and 11 crew members and one person on the ground.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Despite being unable to determine the cause of the accident the investigative commission went on to issue several recommendations which improved the safety of the Boeing 707 and helped prevent future accidents of the same nature. The commission in its final report made the following critical safety recommendations, all of which were addressed through Service Bulletins issued by aircraft manufacture Boeing and adopted by Sabena before the final accident report was issued. Those recommendations were as follows:</span><b style="line-height: 18px;"> </b><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><b style="line-height: 18px;">Recomendations</b><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">#1117 - Spoiler follow-up crank shear modification (01/18/1961)</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">#1336 - Outboard spoiler shut off valve consolidation (09/18/1961)</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">#1344 - Inboard aileron centering spring cartridge modification (07/27/1961)</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">#1410 - Control wheel stabilizer trim switch replacement (09/05/1951)</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">#1484 - Hydraulic system solenoid valve replacement spoiler system (12/15/1961)</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">#1635 - Stabilizer trim electrical limit revision (06/15/1962)</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">#1680 - Rudder control centering spring cable guard installation (05/25/1962)</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">#114 - Sabena Bulletin: Installation of a supplementary brake for the stabilizer actuator (05/07/1962)</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><b style="line-height: 18px;">Accident Aftermath</b><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">The crash of Sabena flight 548 has been largely remember because of the tragic loss of those promising young athletes who who made up the roster of the 1961 United States Figure Skating Team. In the lead up to the 50th Anniversary of the crash, the stories in the media reflected largely on this loss and the profound effect it had on the U.S. Figure Skating community, but largely ignored the accident itself or the other passengers who's lives were also so tragically cut short on that fateful day in 1961. </span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">It is easy to forget that in a tragedy such as this that the pain of loss lingers long after the media spotlight fades. The husbands, wives, mothers, fathers, sons, daughters, sisters and brothers left behind must somehow find a way to pick up the shattered pieces of their lives and move forward. For them February 15, 1961 is much more than a newspaper headline, or a dusty newsreel from 50 years ago that is replayed on this the 50th anniversary of the accident. It is a day in which the entire country of Belgium and people in every corner of the United States remember the tragic loss of their loved ones and reflect on the life and times of 73 extraordinary individuals. Through their deaths the cause of aviation safety was advanced, making all future air travelers safer and for that we owe an immeasurable debt of gratitude.</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-lWmYvUG8sN4/T0Gb7JA6kqI/AAAAAAAABwA/K96ibwhYBNY/s1600/08-14-11+01.png" imageanchor="1" style="background-color: #f3f3f3; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-lWmYvUG8sN4/T0Gb7JA6kqI/AAAAAAAABwA/K96ibwhYBNY/s1600/08-14-11+01.png" height="440" width="640" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;">Sabena Flight 548 Memorial in Berg, Belgium</span></span><br />
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><b><span style="font-family: inherit;">Victims of Flight 548</span></b></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<b style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Crew</span></b></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Captain - Louis Lambrechts</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Co-captain - Jean Roy</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Flight Engineer - Lucien Eduwaere</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Navigator - Jean Kint</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Steward - Pierre van den Busche</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Steward - Marcel DeMayer</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Steward - Paul Evos</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Steward - Henri Vernimmen</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Steward - Robert Voleppe</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Hostess - Jacqueline Rombaut</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Hostess - Jacqueline Trullemans</span><b style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;"> </b><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><b style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Passengers</b><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Dayton Alexander - Olney, TX</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Julian Baginski - Englewood Cliffs, NJ</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Pierre Balteau - Stamford, CT</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Germaine Berbruggen - Brussels, Belgium</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Jean Berbruggen - Brussels, Belgium</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Otmar Boesch - Seattle, WA</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Ann Campbell - North Hollywood, CA</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Roger Campbell - North Hollywood, CA</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Dona Lee Carrier - North Hollywood, CA</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Mercellin DePrince - De Panne, Belgium</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Patricia Dineen - New York, NY</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Robert Dineen - New York, NY</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Iris Duke - Dallas, TX</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Linda Foster - Houston, TX</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Alvah "Linda" Hadley - Seattle, WA</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Ila Ray Hadley - Seattle, WA</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Ray Hadley Jr. - Seattle, WA</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Harold Hartshorne - New York, NY</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Louise Hartshorne - New York, NY</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Daurice Herring - Dallas, TX</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Jacob Hershkowicz - Jackson Heights, NY</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Laurie Jean Hickox - Colorado Springs, CO</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">William Holmes Hickox - Colorado Springs, CO</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Harold G. Kellett - Bronxville, NY</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Gregory Kelley - Newton Center, MA</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Nathalie Kelley - Newton Center, MA</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">William Kipp - Downey, CA</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Edward LeMaire - Rye, NY</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Richard LeMaire - Rye, NY</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Juanita Lemoine - New Orleans, LA</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Howard Lillie - Corning, NY</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Bradley Lord - Swampscott, MA</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Victor Maes - Ontario, Canada</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Deane E McMinn - Lomita, CA</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Francisco C. Medina - Winnetka, IL</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Rhode Lee Michelson - Long Beach, CA</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Herbert Myers - East Orange, NJ</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Franz Offergelt - Hanset, Belgium</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Laurence Rochon Owen, Winchester, MA</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Maribel Vinson Owen - Winchester, MA</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Maribel Yerxa Owen - Winchester, MA</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Dallas "Larry" Pierce - Indianapolis, IN</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Walter S. Powell - St. Louis, MO</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Margaret Pozzuolo -Drexel Hill, PA</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Douglas Alexander Ramsay - Detroit, MI</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Robert Raulier - Brussels, Belgium</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Dudley Shaw Richards - Boston, MA</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Jacqueline D. Robinson - Winona Lake, IN</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Richard Robinson - Winona Lake, IN (U.S. Armed Forces)</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Daniel C. Ryan - Indianapolis, IN</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Edi Scholdan - Colorado Springs, CO</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">James "Jimmy" Scholdan - Colorado Springs, CO</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Diane Carol Sherbloom - Los Angeles, CA</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Max Silberstein - Westport, CT</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Martin S. Soria - East Lansing, MI</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Robert Stopp - U.S. Armed Forces</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">William (Carl) Swallender - Southfield, MI</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Dominique Vernier - Mouscron, Belgium</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Sharon Westerfeld - Colorado Springs, CO</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Stephanie Westerfeld - Colorado Springs, CO</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">George W. Young - Olney, TX</span><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><b style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Killed on the Ground:</b><br style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;" /><span style="background-color: #eef1f1; line-height: 18px;">Theo De Laet - Berg, Belgium</span></span></div>
</div>
</div>
Gregory Maxwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14018544410005482774noreply@blogger.com9tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-339348712464762588.post-76148878455930856352014-01-17T15:32:00.000-08:002014-01-25T22:40:29.388-08:00Air France Flight 4590<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-wBhN0_g8ZTQ/UtyYYn60WjI/AAAAAAAAFVI/AqIFEQioCEQ/s1600/Air+France+4590+Title.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-wBhN0_g8ZTQ/UtyYYn60WjI/AAAAAAAAFVI/AqIFEQioCEQ/s1600/Air+France+4590+Title.png" height="248" width="640" /></a></div>
<u><br /></u>
<b style="font-family: inherit;">Accident Snapshot:</b><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Date: Tuesday, July 25, 2000</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Location: Gonesse, France (<a href="https://picasaweb.google.com/lh/photo/w6TJ7dVcD5DMg3iGeMqxIdMTjNZETYmyPJy0liipFm0?feat=directlink">48° 59' 8" N, 2° 28' 20" E</a>)</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Persons/Fatalities: 109/109 +4 on the ground</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Operator: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France">Air France</a></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Origin Airport: Paris, </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_de_Gaulle_Airport" style="font-family: inherit;">Charles de Gaulle (CDG/LFPG)</a><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Destination Airport: New York, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JFK_Airport">John F. Kennedy (JFK/KJFK)</a></span><br />
<b style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></b>
<b style="font-family: inherit;">Accident Aircraft:</b><br />
Aircraft Type: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concorde">Aerospatiale/BAC Concorde</a><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Registration: <a href="http://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-ssc-203.htm">F-BTSC</a></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">First Flight: 1975</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Total Airframe Hours: 11,989</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Cycles: 4,873</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Engines: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolls-Royce/Snecma_Olympus_593">4 Rolls-Royce/Snecma Olympus 593-610-14-28 Turbojet Engines</a></span><br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgPS6k_6g9HECHv9Ua4oQ_Tvk8Cl8-g3_HCOukNDghyphenhyphen9BQHeeAZrv6uKdh93GgCOrcJDbPSW-h9QsSVnWjas5w3JPek_AQImswcWO3sdSZAW5P_1FEUHodEskuhYM9E34uAwCV0HRhXIrsJ/s1600/Air+France+Concorde.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgPS6k_6g9HECHv9Ua4oQ_Tvk8Cl8-g3_HCOukNDghyphenhyphen9BQHeeAZrv6uKdh93GgCOrcJDbPSW-h9QsSVnWjas5w3JPek_AQImswcWO3sdSZAW5P_1FEUHodEskuhYM9E34uAwCV0HRhXIrsJ/s1600/Air+France+Concorde.png" /></a></div>
<u><br /></u>
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Profile view of Air France Concorde © Gregory Maxwell, 2014</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<u><br /></u>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Resources:</b></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="http://jet-age.net/Documents/Accident_Reports/BEA_AF4590_English">BEA Final Accident Report - English</a></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="http://jet-age.net/Documents/Accident_Reports/BEA_AF4590_French">BEA Final Accident Report - French</a></span><br />
<a href="http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20000725-0">Aviation Safety Network Page</a><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_4590">Wikipedia Page</a></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="http://www.concordesst.com/">Concorde SST Website</a></span><br />
<a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/id/29306441/ns/dateline_nbc-international/#.UtmrfhDTmUk">Dateline NBC Segment</a> (42 min)<br />
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_TS83bFLh8w">Air Crash Investigation Special S10</a> (45 min)<br />
<b><br /></b>
<b>Accident Summary:</b><br />
During takeoff from Runway 26R at Charles de Gaulle Airport, shortly before rotation, the front right tire (tire No 2) of the left landing gear ran over a strip of metal, which had fallen from another aircraft, and was damaged. Debris was thrown against the wing structure leading to rupture of tank 5. A major fire, fueled by the leak, broke out almost immediately under the left wing. Problems appeared shortly afterwards on engine 2 and for a brief period on engine 1. The aircraft took off. The crew shut down engine 2, then only operating at near idle power, following an engine fire alarm. They noticed that the landing gear would not retract. The aircraft flew for around a minute at speed of 200 kt and at a radio altitude of 200 feet, but was unable to gain height or speed. Engine 1 then lost thrust, the aircraft's angle of attack and bank increased sharply. The thrust on engines 3 and 4 fell suddenly. The aircraft crashed onto a hotel.<br />
<br />
<b>Probable Cause:</b><br />
High-speed passage of a tire over a part lost by an aircraft that had taken off five minutes earlier and the destruction of the tire.<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
The ripping out of a large piece of tank in a complex process of transmission of the energy produced by the impact of a piece of tire to another point on the tank, this transmission associating deformation of the tank skin and the movement of the fuel, with perhaps the contributory effect of other more minor shocks and/or a hydrodynamic pressure surge.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
Igniting of the leaking fuel by an electric arc in the landing gear by or through contact with the hot pars of the engine with forward propagation of the flame causing a very large fire under the aircraft's wing and severe loss of thrust on engine 2 then engine 1.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
In addition, the impossibility of retracting the landing gear probably contributed to the retention and stabilization of the flame throughout the flight.<br />
<br />
<b><span style="font-family: inherit;">ACCIDENT ANALYSIS:</span></b><br />
<div style="line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px;">
<span style="line-height: normal;"><b>Pre Accident Landing Gear Maintenance</b></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">July 18, 2000 Air France Concorde, registered <a href="http://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-ssc-203.htm" style="color: #249fcc; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">F-BTSC</a>, enters the hangar at Charles de Gaulle Airport for routine maintenance. Concorde due to the stresses incurred during its supersonic flight regime and its unusually high takeoff and landing speeds required regular, extensive maintenance ever few hundred flight hours to ensure the aircraft remained airworthy. Critical parts especially those associated with the Concorde's landing gear assembly had a useful life of only a few hundred hours due to the tremendous strain placed on them by the weight of the aircraft during takeoff where it reached an average speed of 250 mph before lifting off the ground. By comparison a <a href="http://www.boeing.com/commercial/747family/back/index.html" style="color: #249fcc; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">747-400's</a> average takeoff speed is around 180 mph, a full 70 mph slower than Concorde.</span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">Concorde's high takeoff speed is due to its Delta wing configuration which is optimized for high speed supersonic flight, but as a result it produces much less lift at lower speeds than a conventional airliner wing requiring Concorde to accelerate to a much higher airspeed in order to generate enough lift to climb into the air. Concorde's delta shaped wing in fact produces almost no lift up to the point of rotation, meaning that the entire weight of the aircraft hurtling down the runway at speeds up to 250 mph is supported by the eight tires of the main landing gear assembly and two nose gear tires. The strain on the landing gear assembly and tires is so great that during the aircraft's initial certification test campaign from 1969-1975 the entire main landing gear assembly had to be redesigned and reinforced to withstand stresses which were well beyond what engineers had predicted.</span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-YHNMJuzOQ0g/T4jLSzy9zyI/AAAAAAAACjk/DOvJMgCb5cc/s1600/12-20-10+02.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-YHNMJuzOQ0g/T4jLSzy9zyI/AAAAAAAACjk/DOvJMgCb5cc/s1600/12-20-10+02.png" height="539" width="640" /></span></a></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"> </span><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small; text-align: center;">Illustration from concordesst.com</span></div>
</div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">The main landing gear assembly of the aircraft is under its greatest strain at the moment of rotation when the the aircraft traveling 250 mph rotates its nose up to a very steep angle of attack of 18 degrees. During this time the full weight of the aircraft is supported by the main under carriage up until the aircraft achieves enough lift to become airborne. By comparison a 747 rotates to an angle of about 10 degrees nose up attitude on takeoff and its wings begin to generate a significant amount of lift, thereby transferring a much greater percentage of the aircraft's weight from the undercarriage to the wings well before the aircraft actually leaves the ground.</span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi8YuJ9KTlDJ5WqwCIPS_QtFSAYRQ1oU3sBo0C79pjoAcOVmSlw7eU-SIUd6EFRUfwIRkhR0mJ8qHOrm3cIa-mxOrL3HYYJWGpjV-JZRnqBQYfRPlJljx8IavxeC_FdxD6zB6f4N4l0_6T5/s1600/12-20-10+03.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi8YuJ9KTlDJ5WqwCIPS_QtFSAYRQ1oU3sBo0C79pjoAcOVmSlw7eU-SIUd6EFRUfwIRkhR0mJ8qHOrm3cIa-mxOrL3HYYJWGpjV-JZRnqBQYfRPlJljx8IavxeC_FdxD6zB6f4N4l0_6T5/s1600/12-20-10+03.png" height="296" width="640" /></span></a></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">As a result of the stress imparted on Concorde's main undercarriage components, these parts reach their useful flight cycle limit relatively quickly and must be replaced. On July 18, 2000 that is exactly what had happened to the Concorde's left main gear undercarriage beam. The beam is the horizontal tube through which the two wheel axles pass at each end. In the middle is a low-friction pivot which connects the beam to the vertical leg extending down from the underside of the wing. The pieces of the pivot that bear the greatest extent of the load are two steel shear bushes. A spacer made of anodized aluminum about five inches in diameter and twelve inches long sits between the shear bushes to keep them in proper alignment. When Concorde F-BTSC left the hangar after the completion of repairs on July 21, it did so without the spacer on its front left main gear axle, as the Air France maintenance technicians had failed to follow their own company procedures for replacing the part and the final inspection of the job was either not conducted or the inspector missed the mistake. </span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">The missing wheel spacer was not an immediate issue and would have gone unnoticed by the crew at first as the shear bushes would have remained in place as designed while Concorde was on the ground with the load bearing shear bushes being positioned horizontally on either side of the beam. But when the gear was retracted into the wheel well the position of the bushes changed to a vertical alignment with the right hand bush lying on top of the left where normally a spacer in between would keep the two parts separated. Between leaving the maintenance hangar and the fateful flight of July 25 the Concorde flew two round trip flights to New York and back. </span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">In that time after each gear retraction the right hand shear bush began to slide down into the gap left by the missing spacer. By the day of the accident the shear bush had moved a full seven inches out of alignment to the point where the two washers were almost touching. The movement of the shear bush allowed the beam and wheels to wobble up to three degrees in any direction. This meant that as the AF4590 taxied out to the runway its front wheels on the left main undercarriage were out of alignment which could potentially have caused the aircraft to pull to the left much like the steering in your car being out of alignment. Worse still like a supermarket shopping cart there was noting to keep the wheels from jamming and sending the aircraft hurtling off the side of the runway.</span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-1jqDEESFx6Q/T0FyNy6bfmI/AAAAAAAABoI/ixh_RoDRZM4/s1600/12-20-10+04.png" imageanchor="1" style="background-color: #f3f3f3; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-1jqDEESFx6Q/T0FyNy6bfmI/AAAAAAAABoI/ixh_RoDRZM4/s1600/12-20-10+04.png" height="640" width="466" /></a></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;">Photo from BEA Accident Report</span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">That is exactly the conclusion that long time Air France Concorde pilot Jean-Marie Chauve and flight engineer Michel Suaud reached in their independent investigation. The two pilots believe that the left front wheels were already dangerously out of alignment before AF4590 began its takeoff roll and that the wobbling of the wheels and potential skidding retarded the aircraft's acceleration during its takeoff roll and caused the aircraft to veer to the left side of the runway. As evidence to this fact they point to photos taken on the runway shortly after the accident, as seen above. In the photo at least three independent tire tread marks can be seen on the runway up to the impact with the taxiway light on the edge of the runway. This would seem to suggest that the front and back wheels were not in alignment. If the wheels were in alignment then only two wheel tracks would be visible. </span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">French investigators conclude that the impact with the metal strip was what caused the aircraft to pull to the left and that the resulting tire blow out and damage not the missing spacer caused the wheels to go out of alignment. We will probably never know what the exact sequence of events was but it seems highly probable that the missing spacer played a larger role in the accident than French investigators are giving it credit for.</span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">Concorde's tires are not designed and manufactured like ordinary airline tires. The tires are specially designed to support the weight of the aircraft as it accelerates at a very high rate of speed during a typical takeoff run. The tires are under a high degree of strain and as a result the tires don't last very long, requiring replacement after 35 cycles on average, as opposed to a typical jet airliner which can usually go anywhere between 90-300 flight cycles before requiring a tire replacement.</span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-M3hybqmshH0/T0F6uTUR_MI/AAAAAAAABos/bYa_LQ84Jv8/s1600/12-22-10+01.png" imageanchor="1" style="background-color: #f3f3f3; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-M3hybqmshH0/T0F6uTUR_MI/AAAAAAAABos/bYa_LQ84Jv8/s1600/12-22-10+01.png" height="640" width="518" /></a></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;">Photo from concordesst.com</span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><b><u>Tire Blowout Issue</u></b></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">It is easy to understand given the stresses how tire blowouts would be more common on Concorde than other airliners. But given the unusual operating regime of the airplane and the stress placed on the tires one would expect that the designers would have considered the foreign object debris (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_object_damage" style="color: #249fcc; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">FOD</a>) created by a tire blowout in the design of the aircraft wing. </span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">Given the close relationship of the landing gear to the engines and the complex arrangement of fuel tanks Concorde would seem vulnerable to damage from a disintegrating tire. In fact Concorde did have a problem with tire blowouts throughout its service life. The aircraft between its introduction to service in 1976 and its retirement in 2003 experienced at least 57 documented tire failures. Six of those tire failures caused serious damage to wing fuel tanks, engines and or the airframe, which resulted in an uncontrolled release of fuel and hydraulic fluid in several cases as well as cutting electrical wires in the process.</span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">Severe Tire Blowout Events</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both;">
<b style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">June 14, 1979</b></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">Concorde 101 Air France, F-BVFC</span><br /><span style="line-height: 18px;">While taking off from Washington two </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">tires</span><span style="line-height: 18px;"> on the left hand main gear blew. The gear could not be retracted, so the crew elected to return to Washington. Some circuitry was damaged after having been hit by debris from the tires. Debris also caused a fuel and hydraulic leak.</span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><b><br /></b></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><b>July 21, 1979</b><br />Concorde 101 Air France, F-BVFD<br />On takeoff from Washington-Dulles, a tire blew. At FL270 a compressor stall was experienced probably due to foreign object damage.<b></b></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><b><br /></b></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><b>September 16, 1980</b><br />Concorde 102 British Airways, G-BOAF<br />A tire blew on takeoff from Washington-Dulles Airport. Upon landing, pieces of tire damaged the engine and airframe. </span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><b><br /></b></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><b>February 19, 1981</b><br />Concorde 101 Air France, F-BTSD<br />During takeoff from Washington-Dulles Airport a tire on the left hand main gear blew. The flight diverted to New York-JFK with one engine shut down due to vibration.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><b style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></b></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><b style="line-height: 18px;">July 15, 1993</b><br /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Concorde 102 British Airways, G-BOAF</span><br /><span style="line-height: 18px;">During landing roll at London-Heathrow, the right hand main gear </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">tire</span><span style="line-height: 18px;"> burst due to brake seizure. Debris caused damage to the wing and hydraulic problems. The no.3 engine was damaged as well, becoming stuck in the reverse position.</span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><b></b><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><b>October 25, 1993</b></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">Concorde 102 British Airways, G-....<b></b></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">While taxing for takeoff (London-Heathrow - Washington) the aircraft suffered a brake lock. This caused a main gear tire to burst. Fragments of the water deflector caused some holes in the fuel tank.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-size: 12px; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both;">
</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">Reading through the incident reports it is plainly obvious that not only had Concorde had dozens of previous tire blowouts before the Paris accident in July of 2000, but at least six of these accidents caused damage to the wing fuel tanks or engines. The only difference being the tire failure and resulting puncture of the fuel tank did not trigger a fire. </span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><b>Dulles Incident</b></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">But of all the incidents the most serious by far was the June 14, 1979 incident at Washington Dulles Airport (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington_Dulles_International_Airport" style="color: #249fcc; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">KIAD</a>). The aircraft involved, registered <a href="http://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-ssc-209.htm" style="color: #249fcc; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">F-BVFC</a>, was operating <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France" style="color: #249fcc; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">Air France</a> flight <a href="http://jet-age.net/Documents/Accident_Reports/NTSB_AF54.pdf" style="color: #249fcc; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">AF54</a> the daily Washington-Paris Charles de Gaulle (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LFPG" style="color: #249fcc; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">LFPG</a>) flight. As the aircraft accelerated towards takeoff speed the number five and six tires of the left main landing gear burst sending tire debris up into the underside of the aircraft's wing. The tire fragments and metal shrapnel from the wheel components punctured three separate fuel tanks, severed numerous hydraulic lines and electrical wires. Worse still several of the fragments passed all the way through the wing and exited the upper skin, ripping a large hole above the landing gear wheel well. Miraculously the arcing wires and leaking fuel and hydraulic fluid did not cause a fire. </span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">The crew was not immediately aware of a problem until passenger, Bill Lightfoot, seated in row 23 of the airplane alerted the crew to the large hole in the wing. Lightfoot had flown previously on Concorde and was familiar with the unique sights and sounds of Concorde. But he said he knew something was wrong shortly after the aircraft began its takeoff roll on runway 19L. He stated that shortly into the takeoff roll he felt the aircraft shudder and then he saw something fly vertically past his window. He leaned over so that he could get a better view out of the very small Concorde windows and could not believe what he saw. There was a large hole about the size of a coffee table ripped through the top of the wing and fluid was streaming out of the hole. Up to that point the aircraft had continued accelerating on climb out, and as the aircraft flew faster, more of the top wing skin peeled off. Once the flight crew saw the extent of the damage they immediately turned the aircraft around and landed back at Dulles.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-nUo8oc1IN5E/T0F7D3dWjrI/AAAAAAAABo0/zTbv_QKLdmM/s1600/12-22-10+02.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-nUo8oc1IN5E/T0F7D3dWjrI/AAAAAAAABo0/zTbv_QKLdmM/s1600/12-22-10+02.png" height="370" width="640" /></span></a></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;">Photo from NTSB Accident Report of AF54 Showing the large hole in the top of the wing caused by the tire blowout</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">The incident was investigated by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (<a href="http://www.ntsb.gov/" style="color: #249fcc; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">NTSB</a>) and the agency was in the process of developing its final report and issuing safety recommendations when a similar incident occurred to another Air France Concorde again at Washington Dulles. This time parts of the exploding tire were ingested by one of the engines causing a compressor stall. The similarities between the two accidents resulted in immediate voluntary corrective action by the appropriate authorities. An <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airworthiness_Directive" style="color: #249fcc; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">Airworthiness Directive</a>, issued by the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Directorate_General_for_Civil_Aviation_(France)" style="color: #249fcc; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">Director Generale de 1’Aviation Civile</a>, and a Technical Information Update, issued by Air France, revised procedures. </span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">To deal with the tire blowout problem a series of corrective measures were implemented in the early 80's and the rate of tire failures declined. But the exact number of tire blowout incidents after 1981 are not known by the NTSB as it has been unable to locate incident reports on Concorde between 1988-1996. <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Airways" style="color: #249fcc; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">British Airways</a> says it recorded 12 tire events during that time period.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">So although it appears the tire issue was corrected to some degree through design changes to the tires themselves and operational procedures to deal with a failure, the core issue of how to mitigate damage to the wing and engines from tire debris after a blowout was never addressed. It is hard to fathom that the near accident at Dulles did not raise alarm bells at <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A%C3%A9rospatiale" style="color: #249fcc; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">Aerospitale</a>-<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Aircraft_Corporation" style="color: #249fcc; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">BAC</a> or with the <a href="http://www.faa.gov/" style="color: #249fcc; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">FAA</a> or its French counterparts. In many ways the damage sustained by Concorde F-BVFC in the June, 1979 incident at Dulles was probably as severe if not worse than that sustained by sister ship <a href="http://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-ssc-203.htm" style="color: #249fcc; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">F-BTSC</a> on that fateful flight in July of 2000.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-XOWC0kwrNV8/T0F7MiiwJxI/AAAAAAAABo8/rhQxNojm-ZU/s1600/12-22-10+03.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-XOWC0kwrNV8/T0F7MiiwJxI/AAAAAAAABo8/rhQxNojm-ZU/s1600/12-22-10+03.png" height="506" width="640" /></span></a></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">Illustration from concordesst.com</span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">The Dulles incident clearly exposed Concorde's flawed landing gear/tire design and the vulnerability of the wing and fuel tanks to withstanding impact from tire debris during a blowout. But yet nothing was done to fix the issue. One has to wonder why was it that Aerospitale-BAC didn't see this issue as a serious threat to the aircraft and redesign it to armor critical components like the fuel tanks against FOD damage. In this context the metal wear strip from the </span><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continental_airlines" style="color: #249fcc; line-height: 18px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">Continental</a><span style="line-height: 18px;"></span><a href="http://www.boeing.com/commercial/dc-10/" style="color: #249fcc; line-height: 18px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">DC-10-30</a><span style="line-height: 18px;"> seems to have served only as the catalyst for the tire failure, but it along with Continental can't be blamed for a design flaw that had existed in the aircraft since 1976.</span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><b>Pre-Flight</b></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">July 25, 2000 began like any other day for the staff of Air France responsible for preparing the Concorde for its journey across the Atlantic to New York. Preparations for the flight began at 9:12 in the morning with the dispatcher logging onto to the computer system to discover that the aircraft originally scheduled to operate AF4590, Concorde F-BVFC, had been reallocated to operate the company's daily flagship AF002 Paris-New York flight, after F-BVFA had been removed from service overnight due to a maintenance issue. As a result the reserve aircraft, F-BTSC was pressed into service to operate the afternoon charter flight AF4590.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">The dispatcher was also made aware of a technical issue with the new aircraft, F-BTSC, when his computer indicated that the thrust reverser on the number two engine was inoperative due to an issue with the secondary nozzle. The aircraft could be safely operated in this condition but the issue would reduce the aircraft's maximum operating weight by 2.5%.</span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-1VmLMPUwxgY/T0F9bKIG-jI/AAAAAAAABpY/3NFIhel51CE/s1600/12-22-10+05.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-1VmLMPUwxgY/T0F9bKIG-jI/AAAAAAAABpY/3NFIhel51CE/s1600/12-22-10+05.jpg" height="480" width="640" /></span></a></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;">Concorde's Secondary Thrust Reverser Nozzle in the Fully Closed Position</span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">Based on this information and an anticipated headwind of twelve knots, an atmospheric pressure of 1008 hPa, a higher than normal temperature and the usable runway length of 13,828 feet the dispatcher calculated the aircraft's maximum takeoff weight for this flight to be 177,930 kg (392,268 lbs). However the anticipated weight with 100 passengers checked in was calculated to be 184,400 kg (406,532 lbs).</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">At approximately 9:30 the dispatcher informed the duty officer of the weight issue with the aircraft. The duty officer considered three options to resolve the issue. First, substitute another aircraft for the flight, secondly to try to resolve the problem with the thrust reverser, third to load the passenger luggage onto another Air France flight to New York. For his part the dispatcher studied flight plan alternatives which included making an en-route technical stop for fuel or changing the aircraft's load and choosing an alternative routing that would hopefully make the flight feasible.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Following this conversation the dispatcher received a call from the flight crew just before 10:00 am during which he informed them of the weight problem and his attempts to resolve it. The flight crew said they would submit an order to have the pneumatic motor on reverser number two replaced and asked the dispatcher to file a direct ATC flight plan. The crew also informed the dispatcher that they were going to take over the flight preparations themselves.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">Because the flight was delayed to fix the technical fault with the thrust reverser the aircraft manager did not commence provisioning and loading of the flight until 11:13. By 11:34 the one hundred passengers and their seventy nine bags had been checked in. The checked baggage represented a total weight of 1,651 kg (3,639 lbs), but since the loading had not been complete the aircraft manager estimated the final weight of luggage to be 1,700 kg (3,747 lbs). </span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">In reality the actual weight of the baggage was closer to 2,525 kg (5,566 lbs) a difference of 825 kg (1,819 lbs). The reason for the discrepancy can be traced to the fact that there was a disagreement of 19 bags between Air France's baggage reconciliation system (GAETAN) and the Baggage Reconciliation System (BRS) which is a security system which ensures that only bags that can be matched to a passenger on the aircraft are loaded. In total the two systems showed a disagreement of 29 checked bags, but only 19 were eventually loaded onto the aircraft.</span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;"><u><span style="font-family: inherit;">The process for clearing the bags at Air France was as follows:</span></u></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">1. The baggage is checked in by the passenger, agents print the bag tags and the tags are identified in the Air France GAETAN system.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">2. The GAETAN system sends the passenger baggage information to the BRS system which cross checks the information for security purposes.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">3. The information is then stored in the BRS and the GAETAN system is updated in real time.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">4. The bags are then scanned by the aircraft manager during loading. The BRS system then authorizes it to be loaded on the aircraft.</span></div>
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></span>
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">
</span><span style="line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In the case that a bag tag number is not recognized by the BRS system the aircraft manager's display returns a message of "tag unknown". In the case of AF4590, the BRS system could not reconcile 29 bags. The bags were not in the BRS system and were unknown to GAETAN because the bags had only been registered in the Air France system for the connecting flight from Dusseldorf to Paris, but not onward to New York. This oversight required the Air France agents in Paris to manually enter the bag weight and tag number into the system prior to loading onto Concorde. It appears that this reconciliation of bags by Air France personnel was not done in a systematic manner explaining why the 29 pieces of luggage did not show up in the BRS system. </span></span></span><br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Nineteen of the remaining twenty nine pieces of luggage were loaded after the aircraft manager confirmed the passengers were in fact on board the aircraft. However because the 19 bags had not been entered into the system they were not accounted for by GAETAN nor the computerized load sheet used by the aircraft manager to calculate the final weight of the baggage loaded onto the aircraft. More importantly the luggage having been put on the aircraft last after all the other bags hand been loaded were placed in the larger rear bulk luggage compartment which affected the aircraft's center of gravity (CG).</span></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-K25tkXaj2Pg/T0F9h8ZnVuI/AAAAAAAABpg/IazKS_w3-zc/s1600/12-22-10+06.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-K25tkXaj2Pg/T0F9h8ZnVuI/AAAAAAAABpg/IazKS_w3-zc/s1600/12-22-10+06.jpg" height="560" width="640" /></span></a></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;">Cutaway Illustration showing the rear baggage compartment in the tail of the aircraft - from concordesst.com</span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-niKNntm4ck8/T0F9mVaTn6I/AAAAAAAABpo/aX4fF5d0qG0/s1600/12-22-10+07.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-niKNntm4ck8/T0F9mVaTn6I/AAAAAAAABpo/aX4fF5d0qG0/s1600/12-22-10+07.jpg" height="640" width="622" /></span></a></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;">Cargo Being Loaded into the Rear Baggage Compartment of Concorde</span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">During this time Concorde took on a total of 94,853 kg (209,115 lbs) of fuel for the projected 3 hour 30 minute flight to New York. This total included 1 ton of fuel which would presumably be burned off during taxi to the runway. The individual 13 tanks on the aircraft were considered to be full by the fuel system when they reached 95% of their capacity, or 94% in the case of fuel tank number five, which corresponded to the upper limit of the fuel tank sensors. However the tanks could be overfilled by a maximum of 1,631 liters between the 13 tanks total. In the case of AF4590 an overfill of 300 liters of fuel corresponding to roughly 237 kg (522 lbs) was loaded onto the aircraft. The overfill amount was observed to have been pumped into tanks 1, 2, 3 and 4. The fuel loader's paper work showed a total fuel weight of 94,800 kg. The decision to overfill the tanks while a common practice would play a significant role in propagation of the disaster chain after the aircraft impacted the titanium wear strip during its takeoff run.</span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-2_nQ0P5pcII/T0F9uVteLqI/AAAAAAAABpw/oGdCFefZHm8/s1600/12-22-10+08.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-2_nQ0P5pcII/T0F9uVteLqI/AAAAAAAABpw/oGdCFefZHm8/s1600/12-22-10+08.jpg" height="298" width="640" /></span></a></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;">Concorde Fuel Tank Schematic - from BEA Accident Report</span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The combination of overfilling the number 1, 2, 3 and 4 fuel tanks and the extra unaccounted weight in baggage meant that as AF4590 prepared to depart the gate at Charles De Gaulle Airport it was at least 2 tons over the maximum takeoff weight. While aircraft can safely takeoff above their maximum takeoff weight the practice is generally avoided. Most takeoffs that occur with the aircraft in a configuration beyond its maximum takeoff weight occur because passenger weights and baggage are not exact figures, bur rather are calculated from averages. </span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">There are industry accepted average weights for passengers and luggage that are used to establish the taxi and takeoff weight for a specific flight. Since the figures are not exact there are occasions when the aircraft may depart 50 or 100 pounds over weight but taking off more than a ton over an airplanes certified maximum takeoff limit is very unusual and should generally be avoided as this is well beyond the weights considered by the manufacturer during the aircraft's certification program.</span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><b>Taxi Sequence</b></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">As AF4590 pulled away from the gate on July 25, 2000 and taxied slowly towards runway 26R it weighed 186,880 kg (412,000 lbs) as reported by the flight engineer. The actually weight of the aircraft at taxi, due to the discrepancy in the load sheet caused by the unreconciled bags in GAETAN and the extra fuel loaded onto the airplane was slightly different by about two tons.</span></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">The exact difference in weight of Concorde F-BTSC between what the flight engineer reported and the actually taxi weight will never be known as the baggage and passenger weights as stated before are calculated based on averages. However the BEA in its investigation was able to establish a range between which the actual taxi and takeoff weights most likely fell. The difference between the BEA's high and low calculated taxi and takeoff weights were about 494 kg (1,089 lbs). It is important to note that the maximum structural takeoff weight of Concorde is 185,070 kg. (408,009 lbs) The chart below explains the weight calculations in detail as established by the BEA.</span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-AzpxIebYAgM/T0F_qUJ7J1I/AAAAAAAABqU/MNSeIpX8PRI/s1600/12-29-10+01.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-AzpxIebYAgM/T0F_qUJ7J1I/AAAAAAAABqU/MNSeIpX8PRI/s1600/12-29-10+01.png" height="164" width="640" /></span></a></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-8pj1kCu17Jk/T0F_xj7lfXI/AAAAAAAABqc/yuzDKWXETZU/s1600/12-29-10+02.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-8pj1kCu17Jk/T0F_xj7lfXI/AAAAAAAABqc/yuzDKWXETZU/s1600/12-29-10+02.png" height="204" width="640" /></span></a></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;">(1) There were 122 items of baggage loaded, average estimated weight of 20.7 kg each, making a total of 2,525 kg.<br /> 19 items of baggage loaded on board were not taken into account, only 103 items appearing on the load sheet.<br />(2) Allowing that the aircraft consumed a ton of fuel during taxiing.<br />(3) By applying the fixed average for passengers: one passenger = 84 kg, one child = 35 kg.<br />(4) By applying the fixed average for men and women: one man = 88 kg, one woman = 70 kg, one child = 35 kg.<br />(5) The EIC corresponds to 60 kg of newspapers.</span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">This means that regardless of which of the two weight calculation scenarios are applied F-BTSC as it stood at the end of runway 26R was overweight by between 1,181 kg (2,603 lbs) and 687 kg (1,514 lbs), or about 1 ton. The fact that AF4590, was overweight by 1 ton was not considered to be critical when investigators calculated the aircraft's takeoff acceleration rate and projected profile, and I would agree with this assessment.<br /><br />But between the time the aircraft pushed back from the gate and taxied to the end of runway 26R something significant happened which drastically changed the weight calculations. The wind which was reported as calm at the time of push back had now increased to an 8 knot tailwind. Pilots don't generally choose to takeoff with a tailwind as the presence of one increases the amount of runway required for an aircraft to get airborne. The increase in takeoff runway length is proportional to the speed of the tailwind.<br /><br />On the surface 8 knots may not seem like much to be worried about, and in most conventional airliners it wouldn't be. But Concorde due to its high takeoff speed of 250 mph and the tremendous stress placed on its tires and landing gear, meant that even a small tailwind could have a severe impact on the aircraft's takeoff performance especially at maximum takeoff weight. The major problem with increasing the takeoff length is that it also increases the takeoff speed of the aircraft. The stronger the tailwind the more runway the aircraft will consume and the faster it must travel down the runway. At some point the tailwind component will result in the Concorde exceeding the available runway length or its tires will exceed their maximum speed limit and potential fail before the aircraft obtains enough speed to takeoff. Besides increasing the takeoff length and speed required for rotation a tailwind also reduces the Regulated Takeoff Weight (RTOW) of the aircraft.</span><br />
<div style="line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">This is a very important point, as F-BTSC was already 1,000 kg (2,204 lbs) overweight before factoring in the 8 knot tailwind. The RTOW is unique to each Concorde in the Air France fleet and is set according to detailed tables for the specific aircraft, given the temperature, and wind conditions at the time. When you factor in a tailwind of 8 knots the aircraft was actually almost 6,000 kg (13,227 lbs) over its regulated takeoff weight on that day of 180,300 kg (396,832 lbs). Just as important to note is the fact that the aircraft was already at its rear Center of Gravity (CG) limit of 54% as announced by the flight engineer prior to takeoff.<br /><br />Every Concorde has a CG limit gauge which is positioned on the flight engineers fuel management panel. It indicates the aircraft's current center of gravity as well as the forward and aft limits. The center of gravity of the aircraft changes during the flight as the aircraft expands due to the heat of supersonic flight and as fuel is burned off from the wing tanks. Concorde's center of gravity and trim is adjusted by pumping fuel between the 13 individual tanks. Generally after takeoff fuel is pumped towards the rear of the aircraft to move the center of gravity back to prepare it for supersonic flight as well as throughout the supersonic flight regime. Upon initiation of descent the fuel is pumped into the forward tanks to shift the aircraft's CG forward to aid the descent. Upon taxi out F-BTSC's CG was actually at 54.2%, which was beyond the rear limit. To correct this the flight engineer proceeded to transfer fuel from tank 11 into the forward feeder tanks 1, 2, 3 and 4 until the CG shifted inside the rear limit of 54% and the red "out of limits" warning light on the CG gauge extinguished.</span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-lSPfBZ_DSC0/UtmglT7vlaI/AAAAAAAAFG8/B5TsV_dqq9Y/s1600/CG+Gauge.png" imageanchor="1" style="background-color: #f3f3f3; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-lSPfBZ_DSC0/UtmglT7vlaI/AAAAAAAAFG8/B5TsV_dqq9Y/s1600/CG+Gauge.png" height="400" width="180" /></a></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;">CG Gauge on Concorde's Flight Engineer Panel, Red Light Indicates the CG is Currently out of Limits</span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><b>Takeoff and Accident Sequence</b></span></div>
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:34:38 - ATC cleared the aircraft to taxi to runway 26 right via the Romeo taxiway. When the “post engine startup” checklist was complete, the crew began taxiing and started the “taxi” checklist.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:37:10 - A short time afterwards, the checklist was interrupted by the PFC alarm. The FO stated that the rudder control had already switched from Blue electrical mode to Green electrical mode on two occasions, and he proposed leaving it in the latter mode. Blue electrical mode was nevertheless re-selected.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:38:53 - The PFC alarm appeared again and the FE indicated that they should expect a switch to Green electrical mode during takeoff. He proposed that in that case they would continue the takeoff, knowing that it was possible to re-arm the Blue electrical mode. The “taxi” checklist was continued.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:38:14 - The FE announced that fuel transfer was under way, which meant that the CG changed from 54.2 to 54%. This transfer was made from tank 11 directly to feeder tanks 1, 2, 3 and 4. When the checklist was again interrupted by the PFC alarm, the crew decided to leave with the rudder in Green electrical mode, which is in accordance with the minimum equipment list.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:40:01 - The Concorde was cleared to line up as the crew were finishing the “taxi” check list. At the request of the Captain, the FE indicated that eight hundred kilograms of fuel had been consumed, which in fact corresponds to the expected consumption by the engines since startup. Based on the final load sheet handed over by the aircraft manager and knowing that the aircraft took off two minutes later, which</span></span><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">corresponds to an additional estimated consumption of two hundred kilograms, it can be deduced that, for the crew, the aircraft weight at which the takeoff was commenced was 185,880 kg, for a MTOW of 185,070 kg. </span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:40:37 - The “pre-takeoff” check list started and finished about forty seconds later.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:41:55 - The FE announced that the CG was 54%. The transfer of fuel was complete.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:42:17 - The Concorde was cleared to line up and take off. The controller announced a wind of 090°/8 kt. This announcement did not result in any comment on the part of the crew, even though, with those wind conditions, the takeoff weight should be reduced to 180,300 kg because of the “</span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">tire</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">” speed limit.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:42:30.4 - The characteristic clicking of the thrust levers in maximum thrust position is heard. The Captain gave the takeoff “top” one second later. The aircraft’s </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">center</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"> of gravity was around ninety </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">meters</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"> from the threshold of the runway.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:42:54.6 - In accordance with procedures, the FO announced 100 kt. The recorded airspeed (CAS) was in fact at 100 kt and, as the recorded Nz variation shows, the aircraft had just passed over the asphalt/concrete join on the runway located six hundred </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">meters</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"> from the runway threshold. Its track was </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">centered</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:42:57 - The FO announced four greens. This announcement refers to the “GO LIGHTS” and confirms correct engine function, including reheat. The CAS is recorded as 108 kt.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:03.7 - The V1 callout was made. The acceleration and the distance run were then entirely in accordance with the simulation calculated for the MTOW, and the value of longitudinal acceleration shows full thrust on all four engines, which is confirmed by the parameters on engines 1 and 2 recorded at 14 h 43 min 08 s and 14 h 43 min 09 s.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:09.5 - (FDR time 97600), a slight variation in Ny, uncommanded by the rudder, is noticeable. The aircraft was then about 1,700 </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">meters</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"> from the threshold, in the area where the first parts of the water deflector were found. It was probably at that moment that </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">tire</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"> No 2 ran over the metallic strip. In the following half-second, a clean, short noise is recorded on the CVR. The CAS was 175 kt, the distance from the threshold about 1,720 </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">meters</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">. It is likely that this noise resulted from the damage to the </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">tire</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">. It was</span></span><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">in fact in this area that the metallic strip and the large piece of </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">tire</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"> were found.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:11 - A very clear change in the background noise is heard, the CAS being 178 kt and the distance run 1,810 </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">meters</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">. The first marks from </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">tire</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"> No 2 were noticeable on the runway. The piece of the lower part of tank 5 then the kerosene stain were found at 1,820 </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">meters</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">. At 1,850 </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">meters</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">, the first marks of very dense soot were noted. These observations allow the conclusion to be drawn that a large quantity of fuel leaked out</span></span><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">before the fire broke out and </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">stabilized</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">. With detailed analysis of the sequence, it appears that the change in the background noise resulted from the ignition and the </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">stabilization</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"> of the flame.</span></span></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-o37rVsTYMkw/T0GADZSK5KI/AAAAAAAABqs/roPlQUxcac8/s1600/12-29-10+04.png" imageanchor="1" style="background-color: #f3f3f3; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-o37rVsTYMkw/T0GADZSK5KI/AAAAAAAABqs/roPlQUxcac8/s1600/12-29-10+04.png" height="640" width="490" /></a></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-size: x-small;">Photo of Runway 26R at Charles de Gaulle, Taken Shorty after AF4590 Departed - from BEA Accident Report</span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:13.4 - This is consistent with the controller’s comment which indicated extensive flames at the rear of the aircraft. A few tenths of a second after the change in the background noise, the heading began to diminish at a rate of 1°/s, without there being any observable significant variation in longitudinal acceleration, which</span></span><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">confirms that the aircraft had not yet suffered any significant loss of thrust. This heading change was probably the result of a combination of the </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">tire</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"> burst and the aerodynamic disturbance due to the fuel leak and the fire.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:11.9 - Something unintelligible is heard whose origin it has been impossible to identify. The CAS was then 182 kt and the distance from the threshold was 1,885 </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">meters</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">. It was at that moment that the Captain began to deflect the rudder to the right, a slight deflection (8° at first followed by </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">stabilization</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"> at an average value of 5°), in reaction to the aircraft’s slight movement to the left. The last nominal Nx value, at 0.268 g, was recorded at FDR time 97602.5.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:12 - 14:43:13, engines 1 and 2 suffered their first loss of thrust. This loss of thrust is confirmed by the Nx recording at its minimal value of 0.133 at 97603.5, while the FO said “watch out”. The “GO LIGHTS” for engines 1 and 2 went out. The absence of any significant damage leads to the explanation that the high loss of thrust on engine 2 was due to ingestion of hot gases whilst the loss of thrust on engine 1 can be explained either by ingestion of debris due to the damage to the </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">tire</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"> or by ingestion of hot gases.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:12.2 - The Captain began to pull back on the control column in a moderate way while the CAS was 183 kt and the distance from the threshold was 1,915 </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">meters</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">. It was in this area that many people noticed an intense luminous phenomenon accompanied by a strong surge noise.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:13.4 - The side slip to the left noted at this time at a rate of 2°/s, resulted directly from yaw movement caused by the high loss of thrust from engines 1 and 2. The recorded thrust was then no more than 50% and was mainly delivered by engines 3 and 4. There was no fire alarm in the cockpit at that time. The lift-off of the nose gear, which occurred a few tenths of a second later, when the CAS was 187 kt and the distance from the threshold was 2,045 </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">meters</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">, is entirely consistent with the elevon deflection. This could be the result of the crew taking into account an abnormal unidentified situation. It should be noted that the rate (1°/s) was lower than normal, which suggests that the crew were conscious of the lack of speed.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:15.7 - At the moment when the side slip to the left occurred, a further rudder deflection is recorded. It reached 20° to the right, when the side slip reached its maximum of 5° (heading = 264°), then it decreased towards 10° and </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">stabilized</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">. The simulations described in paragraph 1.16.13 explained this phenomenon as well as why the aircraft continued to deviate from its track. Around the same time engine 1, in a phase of re-acceleration, was producing around 80% of its nominal thrust and an exclamation by the FE can be heard. The CAS was 196 kt. Thus, during the three seconds when all the events which led to the catastrophe occurred, the crew perceived through a variety of senses a whole group of anomalies: (very) unusual noises, inertial sensations resulting from the violent kick in lateral acceleration associated with the loss of thrust and the sudden loss of longitudinal acceleration and perhaps smells and the luminous flash generated by the ignition and the leak.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:16.1 - 14:43:18.1, the engine 1 “GO LIGHT” came back on. This meant that the fuel flow in the engine P7 were, respectively, above 20.5 t/h and 39.1 psi and that it was approaching its nominal thrust. On the other hand, the engine 2 parameters recorded after its loss of thrust show that it was producing thrust hardly any higher than idle, around 3% of its nominal thrust.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:20.4 - The FE announced the failure of engine 2, in accordance with the appropriate procedures, the speed was 203 kt, the distance was 2,745 </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">meters</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"> and the pitch attitude was + 9°. In the following second, readout of the parameters shows that engine 2 re-accelerated slightly and delivered thrust of around 15% of nominal thrust. The “GO LIGHTS” on engine 1, then on engines 3 and 4 went out, as a normal reaction to the relaxation of the shock absorber on the left main landing gear.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:20.9 - 14:43:21.9, engine 1 suffered a second surge, caused by the ingestion of hot gases and/or kerosene, aided by the change in the aircraft’s angle of attack. It was producing thrust that was scarcely above the idle level. As for engine 2, which was re-accelerating, its auxiliary air intake began to re-open, which caused further intake of hot gases and a further surge. The aircraft was again powered mainly by the thrust from engines 3 and 4. Around the same time, an edge light on the left of the runway was broken by the passage of wheel No 6. The track deviation continued, the aircraft then being about 22.5 metres from the runway center line. No components from this light were identified in the debris found during disassembly of the engine.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:21.3 - Movement of a selector is heard, identified as being the switching of a TCU, probably that of engine 2, from MAIN to ALTERNATE. This procedure carried out by the FE was intended to regain normal function by switching the computers.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:21.9 - Aircraft takeoff was effective. The speed was 205 kt, the distance from the threshold was 2,900 </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">meters</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"> and the pitch attitude was + 10°. In the following second, the fire alarm was heard, followed by a gong, and the Engine Warning parameter was recorded. On the radio, “(?) it’s really burning, eh” is heard, probably coming from a crew in a waiting aircraft, and a few seconds later “(?) it’s burning and I’m not sure it’s coming from the engine”. The first sample of the parameters on engine 1 after the second surge shows that it was only producing thrust slightly above that corresponding to idle.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:24.7 - As for the parameters on engine 2 recorded they confirm its engine surge and also show that it was at idle.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:24.8 - The FE said, “shut down engine 2”. In the same second, the Captain called for the engine fire procedure. Less than two seconds later, a noise is heard, which spectral analysis and examination of the HP selectors has shown to be the movement of the thrust lever to the stop position. Pulling of the engine 2 fire handle, found in the pulled position in the wreckage, occurred in the following seconds.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:27 - The FO drew attention to the airspeed. The speed was then 200 kt for a V2 of 220 kt (Vzrc on three engines with the gear extended is 205 kt). In the following second, a selector sound is heard, identified as being the fall of the electrical pitch trim compensator switches. This is explained by the fact that, since the aircraft had a high angle of attack, the pitch trim compensator was beyond its normal operating range to</span></span><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">counter this angle. A gong, identified as the alarm caused by the fall of the switches, is also heard. Subsequently, there was no further movement of the pitch trim compensators. The engine 2 N2 went below 58%, leading to automatic switching to CONTINGENCY mode for engines 1, 3 and 4. Engine 1, in a recovery phase after the second surge, only achieved CONTINGENCY rating seven seconds later. The thrust it was then producing was 5% less than nominal thrust with reheat in CONTINGENCY mode. This thrust deficit can be explained by damage resulting from the initial ingestion of solid fragments, since ingestion of hot gases or of kerosene would not have led to the later stability of the engine parameters at a reduced level.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:30 - The Captain requested gear retraction. The speed was still 200 kt, the radio altimeter indicated 100 feet and the calculated rate of climb was 750 ft/min. In the following seconds, the controller confirmed that there were extensive flames behind the aircraft. Engine 1 was then producing 75% of its nominal thrust and the reheat had just cut in. The FE repeated “the gear” for the FO, who was acknowledging receipt of the</span></span><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">transmission from the controller. The aural alarm indicating detection of smoke in the toilets was recorded by the CAM. This alarm can be explained by the fact that the burnt mixture ingested by one of the left engines was used for the air conditioning and circulated to the cabin and the forward toilets, though the possibility of a false alarm cannot be excluded. The fact that this alarm was recorded by the CAM also shows that the cockpit door was open during the takeoff, which is common practice on Concorde.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:35.5 - The FE repeated “the gear”. In the following second, a gong is heard which very probably corresponds to the alarm caused by low oil pressure due to the shutdown of engine 2. The Engine Warning</span></span><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">parameter appeared again on the FDR.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:37.7 - The FE repeated “the gear” and the FO answered “no”. The red WHEEL light, situated above the landing gear retraction controls probably came on following detection of under-pressure resulting from the damage to </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">tire</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"> No 2 and the procedure requires in this case that the gear not be retracted, except where the needs of safety require it.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:39 - The Captain ordered “gear retraction” while the FO acknowledged receipt of a message from the control tower. Three seconds later, the engine 2 fire alarm was reactivated with its associated gong. It stopped a few seconds after the FE fired the fire extinguishers (the two extinguishers located in the left wing were found fired in the wreckage).</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:45.6 - The FO probably answered “I’m trying” to the order given by the Captain, which can be interpreted as an attempt to retract the landing gear. At the same time the FE said, “I’m firing”. The System parameter overseeing the integrity of the under-pressure system activated, which indicates that the system was functioning up to that moment. In the following second, the Captain asked “(are) you shutting down</span></span><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">engine two there” and the FE replied “I’ve shut it down”.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:49.9 - The FO repeated “the airspeed”. This warning, repeated again about ten seconds later, is explained by the fact that the speed remained at about 200 kt, lower than the normal climb out speed of 220 kt with a failed engine.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:49.5 - 14:43:54.5, the first differences between the aircraft’s attitude and the attitude which should result from inputs on the flight controls can be noted (small roll/pitch and pitch/roll interactions). These</span></span><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">differences seem to be explained by the consequences of the fire on the left wing, in particular on the inner elevon. The angle of attack was then 13°.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:56.7 - When the CAS was 211 kt, the FO noticed and reported that “the gear isn’t retracting”. This statement would confirm the interpretation of “I’m trying”. Breakdown analysis showed that the non-retraction of the gear was due to the non-opening or non-detection of complete opening of the left main landing gear door. The flame had then been established for thirty-five seconds. A fluctuation of Nx is observable which might result from a large and brief surge on engine 1, not visible because the parameters were not registered at that moment.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:58.6 s - The engine 2 fire alarm sounded again. It continued to sound until the end of the flight. In the following second the GPWS “Whoop Whoop Pull Up” warning was heard on three occasions, with the following parameters: nose up at 5°, radar altimeter at 165 feet, rate of descent of about 160 ft/min.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:43:59.5 - 14:44:11.5, a first disturbance on the engine 1 FF and EGT parameters is noted. A second disturbance was recorded eight seconds later, the CAS being 207 kt.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:44:01 - The rudder switched to mechanical mode, which led to the loss of yaw auto-</span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">stabilization</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">14:44:11.5 - The engine 1 parameters show a clear deceleration, due to a severe surge. Only engines 3 and 4 remained in operation.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">The angle of attack changed in twelve seconds from 12° to over 25°, the bank to the left went from 2° to 113° (figure recorded four seconds before the end of the recording) and the magnetic heading decreased from 270° to 115°. Spectral analysis showed that the selector noises which were then heard could be attributed to the movement of the thrust levers to idle stop position. This reduction in thrust on engines 3 and 4 was probably intended to decrease the strong bank to the left caused by the significant thrust asymmetry and by the destruction of vital control surfaces by fire. </span></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">The decrease in thrust on these two engines was accentuated by a surge due to airflow distortion caused by the angle of attack and the level of yaw reached at that moment. In these extreme conditions, the combination of lateral and thrust asymmetry and the major thrust/drag imbalance, which could not be compensated for by a descent, led to a loss of control. This loss of control was probably accelerated by the structural damage caused by the fire. In any event, even if all four engines had been operating, the serious damage caused by the intensity of the fire to the structure of the wing and to some of the flight controls would have led to the rapid loss of the aircraft.</span></span></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><b>Accident Chain</b></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">The origins of the AF4590 accident actually go back several decades to that serious tire blow out incident at Washington Dulles Airport in 1979, detailed in Part 2 of this piece. The investigation into the accident conducted by the FAA uncovered a serious design deficiency in the aircraft's tires which were prone to blowouts. The incident also uncovered a critical vulnerability in the Concorde's wing design, in that it lacked the ability to adequately withstand impact from FOD caused by the </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">disintegration</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"> of one or more aircraft tires at high speed. Investigators were particularly concerned with the lack of reinforcement and armoring around the aircraft's wing fuel tanks, and were somewhat dumbfounded by the fact that a piece of rubber or even the composite water deflector could penetrate and pass cleanly through both the lower and upper surface of the wing and impart such critical damage. It was only by sheer luck that the leaking fuel caused by the puncture to to the tank did not ignite a fire in the Dulles accident. </span></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">Yet even with these known deficiencies and the recommendations issued by the NTSB, Aérospatiale-BAC took no significant action to better armor the wings to protect the fuel tanks from impact damage by FOD. The history of tire blowouts was considered and steps were taken which helped reduce the rate of tire blowouts on future Concorde flights. The Dulles incident was almost identical to the fateful AF4590 flight, with the key exception being the leaking fuel didn't ignite and the pattern of damage was more confined than the Paris accident. </span></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">None the less the Dulles incident should have served as a wake-up call to Air France, Aérospatiale-BAC and regulators but the lessons of that accident were not applied to ensure the safety of future Concorde passengers. Had they been it is likely the AF4590 accident would not have occurred. The Dulles accident was without a doubt the first key link in the accident chain.</span></span></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-nUo8oc1IN5E/T0F7D3dWjrI/AAAAAAAABo0/zTbv_QKLdmM/s1600/12-22-10+02.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-nUo8oc1IN5E/T0F7D3dWjrI/AAAAAAAABo0/zTbv_QKLdmM/s1600/12-22-10+02.png" height="370" width="640" /></span></a></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-size: x-small;">Photo from NTSB Accident Report of AF54 Showing the large hole in the top of the wing caused by the tire blowout</span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">The next critical link occurred several days before the accident when Concorde F-BTSC entered the Air France maintenance hanger at Charles de Gaulle Airport to have the left main undercarriage beam replaced. This critical maintenance item was not performed according to established Air France procedure, as documented by manufactures Aérospatiale-BAC in the Concorde maintenance manual. Not only was proper procedure not followed but the senior mechanic either did not inspect the maintenance work performed or his examination of the work was insufficient in that the missing wheel spacer went undetected. </span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">Either way the Concorde was released from the maintenance shop and placed back into line service with a progressive deficiency in its landing gear system. One which with each takeoff and landing cycle placed the tire and entire landing gear under increasing levels of stress as the tire wobbled at high speed and moved further and further out of alignment. While the exact contribution of the missing wheel spacer will never be know, the premature wear it likely caused on the tire should be considered as it probably </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">weakened</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"> the tire's structural integrity which made it more vulnerable to a blowout. For its part the BEA says its investigation concluded the missing wheel spacer had no effect on the aircraft, nor did it in anyway contribute to the accident.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">Fast forward to the day of the accident, July 25, 2000. As the aircraft sat on the tarmac being prepared for its flight to New York/JFK two critical events took place which directly influenced the accident chain. First there was a discrepancy in the baggage manifest between what was registered in GAETAN and cleared in the BRS systems. The issue had been introduced by agents in Dusseldorf who didn't properly register 19 pieces of luggage in the Air France system. The bags were properly tagged through to New York but were registered in GAETAN only for the Dusseldorf-Paris segment of the flight, and not the connecting flight to New York/JFK. As a result these extra bags were not accounted for in the computerized load sheet used by the flight supervisor and flight crew in establishing the aircraft's taxi and takeoff weights. Perhaps more critically the 19 pieces of unaccounted luggage were placed in the rear bulk luggage hold which shifted the aircraft's center of gravity event further back.</span></span></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-S-L6_DXuaQE/T0GOiejrE8I/AAAAAAAABsY/RHGIgQDYdok/s1600/01-20-11+04.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-S-L6_DXuaQE/T0GOiejrE8I/AAAAAAAABsY/RHGIgQDYdok/s1600/01-20-11+04.png" height="558" width="640" /></span></a></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-size: x-small;">Aircraft Weight Data from BEA Accident Report</span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">While the baggage issue was being sorted out the aircraft was being fueled for its flight to New York. During this time the crew made the decision to overfill the number 1, 2, 3 and 4 fuel tanks. The process of overfilling the tanks was a according to the BEA report a manual process that could only be conducted by the fueling personnel while the aircraft was on the ground. Page 27 of the BEA Report contains the following statement about the capacity of the Concorde's 13 fuel tanks.</span></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">"The capacity of the thirteen tanks is shown in the table below. These represent maximum capacities, without exceeding the upper level sensors, corresponding to real fill of around 95% (94% for tank 5). The overfill procedure allowed loading of a maximum of 1,630 liters (431 gallons) extra </span></span><span style="line-height: 18px;">fuel</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">, compared to the quantities mentioned below. This operation can only be performed on the ground."</span></span></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-2_nQ0P5pcII/T0F9uVteLqI/AAAAAAAABpw/oGdCFefZHm8/s1600/12-22-10+08.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-2_nQ0P5pcII/T0F9uVteLqI/AAAAAAAABpw/oGdCFefZHm8/s1600/12-22-10+08.jpg" height="298" width="640" /></span></a></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjHksAVo87QojVC8B57LWp14avfGBvTXrLYwR2Un74JbTmfnwqym9Bm9mmZzPmkNEzC47-r58W0Tzwi0Nntb_gI3ziFaQlUW38DOZi7PCeioTX-ju_gusLpLlw2xLwgP5_lM9d3QTNV-VDV/s1600/01-20-11+04.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjHksAVo87QojVC8B57LWp14avfGBvTXrLYwR2Un74JbTmfnwqym9Bm9mmZzPmkNEzC47-r58W0Tzwi0Nntb_gI3ziFaQlUW38DOZi7PCeioTX-ju_gusLpLlw2xLwgP5_lM9d3QTNV-VDV/s1600/01-20-11+04.png" height="324" width="640" /></span></a></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;">Concorde Fuel Capacity Table and Aircraft Fuel Tank Schematic - from BEA Accident Report</span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;">The fuel loader's filling order showed a total loaded fuel weight of 94,800 kg. (208,998 lbs) including the 300 liters (79 gallons) of overfill which were loaded into tanks 1, 2, 3 and 4 according to witnesses on the ground. The flight supervisor based on fuel load, number of passenger and reported baggage weights from the load sheet calculated the aircraft CG to be 54.2% at Zero Fuel and 54.25% for taxi. The rear CG limit as previously established for the Concorde was 54.0%. In order to bring the CG inside the rear limit a fuel transfer of some 800 kg. was required from tank 11. Later in the report on page 159, as part of the accident scenario reconstruction the following conversation is reported from the CVR.<br /><br />At 14 h 38 min 14 s the flight engineer announced that the fuel transfer was under way to correct the out of limits indication on the CG meter. During this time the fuel was reportedly transferred from tank 11 direct to feeder tanks 1, 2, 3 and 4. Page 144 of the BEA report contains a detailed explanation of the fuel transfer procedure followed by the crew of F-BTSC.<br /><br />"Before takeoff, the transfer procedure allows the center of gravity to be moved to 54% in case of completely full tanks. To do this the STAND BY INLET VALVES of feeder tanks 1 to 4 are positioned on OPEN and the electric pump selectors for tank 11 are positioned on ON. This allows topping up of the fuel consumed from the feeder tanks during start-up and taxiing with the fuel contained in tank 11. A center of gravity of 54% on takeoff is only authorized if all of the front tanks are full (R1 to 10 and 5A, 7A). This limits the fuel ballast to tank 11 only. The only transfer possible to adjust the center of gravity to 54% is thus a transfer from this tank towards the feeder tanks."<br /><br />It is important to note that only 800 kg (1,764 lbs) of fuel, equivalent to the amount burned during taxi from the gate to the runway threshold, was able to be pumped forward from tank 11 into feeder tanks 1, 2, 3 and 4. This means that as the Concorde began its takeoff roll its forward feeder tanks were completely full. In fact the BEA report makes special mention of the fact that a takeoff with a center of gravity of 54% is only authorized if all the front tanks are full. This statement from the Concorde Operations Manual clearly underscore's that operations at the rear CG limit should be avoided when ever possible. The decision to overfill the fuel tanks, at the gate most certainly had an effect on the pattern and severity of the damage caused by the pressure wave from the pieces of tire impacting the underside of the wing during the takeoff roll.<br /><br />The next key event in the accident chain occurred just minutes after the fuel transfer as Concorde F-BTSC was holding short of the runway awaiting takeoff clearance.<br /><br />"At 14 h 40 min 02 s, the Loc Sud controller cleared 4590 to line up. At 14 h 42 min 17 s, he gave it takeoff clearance, and announced a wind from 090° at 8 kt. The crew read back the takeoff clearance. The FE stated that the aircraft had used eight hundred kilos of fuel during taxiing."<br /><br />While the BEA in the final report references the 8 knot tail wind they do not seem to have accounted for this when modeling the aircraft's takeoff performance and theoretical runway length used to reach rotation and takeoff speed. The final report contains the following notation in Section 1.6.6 Takeoff Performance.<br /><br />pg 33 - "Since the wind readings at different recording sites show a light and variable wind, the calculations are made with calm wind conditions."<br /><br />pg 34 - "For a tailwind of 8 kt, the takeoff weight is reduced to 183,300 kg. (404,107 lbs) due to a tire speed limitation." (This appears to be a typo in the report and should read 180,300 kg. or 397,493 lbs)<br /><br />This statement is not clear, but seems to imply that under the conditions present a tailwind of 8 knots would reduces the regulated takeoff weight to 180,300 kg (404,107 lbs). However according to the BEA's own calculations from the aircraft weight table in Section 1.6.5 Weight and Balance on page 31 the aircraft's takeoff weight was between 186,251 kg (410,613 lbs) and 185,757 kg (409,524 lbs). So the BEA based on their own calculations concluded F-BTSC was significantly overweight given an 8 knot tail wind, but they concluded that the data from various wind sensors on the airfield averaged to calm winds so they did not model any takeoff scenarios which included the aircraft taking off almost 6,000 kg (13,228 lbs) over its RTOW with an 8 knot tailwind. Investigators didn't model this scenario even though the controller given the live wind speed information available to him at the time noted the presence of a tail wind. For the investigators not to consider, or even model the presence of an 8 knot tailwind given the advisory by the tower controller is something I find hard to understand.<br /><br />Also of importance is the statement that the takeoff weight must be reduced to 180,300 kg (397,493 lbs) due to a tire speed limitation. This implies that given the conditions any takeoff commenced by F-BTSC at a takeoff weight in excess of 180,300 kg (397,493 lbs) would result in the aircraft reaching its tire speed limit before rotation. The decision by the investigators not to model the 8 knot tailwind in their takeoff simulations is not supported by the time line of the flight as printed under Section 1.1 History of the Flight on page 17 of the final accident report.<br /><br />Additional statements are contained in Section 2.1.2 The Flight Until Engine Power-Up on page 159 of the report.<br /><br />"At 14 h 42 min 17 s, the Concorde was cleared to line up and take off. The controller announced a wind of 090°/8 kt. This announcement did not result in any comment on the part of the crew, even though, with those wind conditions, the takeoff weight should be reduced to 180,300 kg (397,493 lbs) because of the “tire” speed limit. In reality, the wind was practically zero, as is shown by the Météo France readings and analysis of the track. However, even if the crew had previously noticed this absence of wind, for example by observing the indication given by the windsock near the threshold of runway 26L around a thousand metres away, it is difficult to understand the absence of any comment on their part."<br /><br />The BEA clearly seems puzzled as to why the controllers statement about the wind conditions, resulted in no reaction from the crew. The crew were well aware that they were taking off a maximum takeoff weight, with the CG at the rear limit of 54%. The revelation of the tailwind should at a minimum have caused them to review their performance data again to ensure they were within legal limits to takeoff. Had they done this and delayed the takeoff it is very likely they would have requested to change runways. But probably due to time pressures, owing to the fact that they were already a full hour behind schedule the crew commenced the takeoff roll and didn't pause to think about the tailwind.<br /><br />The impact with the titanium wear strip was without a doubt the next major link in the accident chain. When the Concorde's left main landing gear ran over the wear strip it sliced through the tire causing it to blow out. As was shown previously in Part 2, Concorde had a history of tire blow outs. A handful of these blowouts had even caused serious damage to the fuel tanks, engines and other critical components. But even the most serious of these incidents, the 1979 blowout at Dulles, in which the aircraft sustained serious damage to one of the wing fuel tanks, in much the same way as AF4590 didn't result in the loss of the aircraft. The main difference between the two accidents is the severity of the damage. So why did the impact from tire debris cause so much more destructive damage in the Paris accident?<br /><br />The answer can be traced back to the fact that unlike the Dulles incident in the Paris accident AF4590's forward fuel tanks were completely full and highly pressurized. This meant that when the tire blew out, liberating large pieces of rubber, a 4.5 kg chunk of which impacted the underside of the wing and tank 5, there was no free space in the tank to absorb the impact forces. When the fuel was displaced by the impact shock wave the force of the impact was transferred from the liquid fuel to the tank structure, causing an explosive blowout of a portion of the bottom of tank 5. The piece of wing skin and tank structure separated with explosive force from the aircraft leaving a sizeable hole in the tank from which the fuel was ejected under tremendous force.</span></div>
<div style="line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-4Ha_JG0a9uk/T0GPEolyskI/AAAAAAAABsw/ebEh0SiFtfs/s1600/01-20-11+05.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-4Ha_JG0a9uk/T0GPEolyskI/AAAAAAAABsw/ebEh0SiFtfs/s1600/01-20-11+05.png" height="424" width="640" /></span></a></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><br /></span>
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;">Diagram Showing Tire Impact with Fuel Tank 5 and Resulting Shockwave Sequence - from BEA Accident Report</span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Arial Unicode MS, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-size: 12px; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">The fracture in the tank caused two serious problems. First it sparked a fire which weakened the structural integrity of the wing structure as the fire propagated unchecked, secondly it caused a dangerous shift in the aircraft's CG, which was already operating at the absolute rear legal limit of 54%. As the airplane struggled to stay in the air its CG would have moved further and further aft with each passing second as fuel continued to leak from the tank. This change in the CG would ultimately contribute to the loss of control of the aircraft in its final seconds of flight before entering an aerodynamic stall and crashing to the ground. </span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">The BEA investigators established the following about the fuel level in tank 5. </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">The quantity loaded was 7.2 tons and the gauge indicated two tons after the accident. The flight time between the estimated rupture of the tank and impact was around eighty-one seconds. The estimated fuel flow rate, apart from the leak due to the small puncture and (the) consumption by engines 1 and 2 (around 350 kg) was therefore around 60 kilograms per second. In conclusion, the overall flow rate of the leak is several dozen kilograms per second, thus about ten times greater than in the Washington event. The high rate of flow from this leak contributed to the ignition of the fuel since it led to a fuel/oxidizer mixture, which was almost a stoechiometric mixture, thus perfectly flammable. The smaller rate of fuel leakage in the Washington case is almost certainly what prevented the fuel from igniting.</span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-svZ7M71DZPw/T0GPKrO4bMI/AAAAAAAABs4/1SVfZsO355Q/s1600/01-20-11+06.png" imageanchor="1" style="background-color: #f3f3f3; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-svZ7M71DZPw/T0GPKrO4bMI/AAAAAAAABs4/1SVfZsO355Q/s1600/01-20-11+06.png" height="640" width="550" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;">Piece of Wing Underbody and Attached Fuel Tank Skin Blown Out by Shockwave from Tire Debris Impact</span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">The last link in the accident chain was the crew's reaction to the emergency situation. The puncture of tank 5, absent the fire would not have resulted in the loss off the aircraft. Even the fire with all its destructive heat energy couldn't bring the aircraft down without some help. The crew and their actions in response to the emergency also played a critical role in deciding the ultimate outcome of the flight. When the leaking fuel ignited and the fire took shape and stabilized it produced a localized area of very hot air which was charged with gasses from the fire and unburned fuel. </span></span><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">Some of these gases were ingested by both the #1 and #2 engines causing them both to surge multiple times at various points during the brief flight. The surges occurred both in response to changes in the aircraft's pitch, which affected the airflow into the engine and the quantity of hot gases ingested. </span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">The first surge in the #1 engine could also possibly be associated with FOD ingestion. </span><span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">The crew's first sign that there was a problem with the #1 and 2 engines came at 14:43:12, when the, "GO LIGHTS", on both port engines went out. The aircraft had just seconds before accelerated normally through V1 and was committed to the takeoff. At this point both engines experienced a surge, mostly likely caused by the ingestion of hot gases from the raging fire or in the case of the #1 engine ingestion of FOD material from the disintegrating tire. Engine #1 experienced a power loss of about 50% while engine #2 was producing power no greater than idle. </span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">The loss in thrust caused F-BTSC to yaw violently towards the left edge of the runway. Sensing the aircraft was going to depart the paved surface due to the asymetric thrust condition the captain made the only sensible decision he could, to takeoff. The captain begins the rotation at 183 knots, or about 15 knots before the scheduled rotation speed. As the aircraft struggled into the air the left main gear struck a taxiway light on the runway's edge. Shortly after rotation the flight engineer announced that engine two had failed, in reality the engine was still functioning but it had been producing only idle power for the previous 10 seconds. Three seconds later, and after being informed of the presence of fire behind the aircraft by the tower controller, the engine fire warning light and associated bell triggered on the panel, causing the flight crew to shut the engine down in accordance with the engine fire/failure checklist. </span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">The decision to shut the engine down came at a critical time in the flight, when the Concorde was still below the engine out safety speed and below 400 feet in altitude. Air France Concorde operating procedure specifically required the crew to wait until the aircraft has reached 400 feet before shutting down and engine. The 400 foot requirement was in place to ensure that the aircraft has reached the engine out safety speed and has established a normal climb out. Below that altitude any engine issue, including a fire is considered a secondary issue next to flying the airplane. After all an engine on fire is still producing thrust and any thrust is better than no thrust. </span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">While the condition experienced was highly unusual and not something for which any crew had been trained to deal with the crew failed to follow one of the most basic responsibilities of a pilot. No matter what happens, no matter how many alarm bells or warning are going off, your chief responsibility is to fly the airplane. An engine fire can be dealt with, but only after a stable climbout has been achieved. By shutting the #2 engine down the crew eliminated any available margin that might have kept the aircraft in the air long enough to reach Le Bourget.</span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><b>Final Conclusions</b></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">So in the final analysis who is to blame for the crash of AF4590? That is the question French prosecutors in the course of their criminal investigation of the accident attempted to determine. However the chief concern of any accident investigation should not be to find fault and assign blame but rather understand why the accident occurred and prevent future accidents from occurring. Attaching liability to an individual or company does nothing to advance the cause of safety. </span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">The case of AF4590 is simple in that it was a tragic accident, one in which not a single party to the accident, not Continental, Air France, </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">Aéroports de Paris, or Aérospatiale-BAC did anything criminal to bring about the crash of Concorde F-BTSC. Instead a series of mistakes, lost opportunities and circumstance combined to bring about the accident.</span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="background-color: #f3f3f3; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">The most important resolution to come out of the investigation of AF4590 was the weaknesses in the design of Concorde that had been identified so clearly in the wake of the Dulles incident and tragically repeated in Paris were corrected. The fuel tanks received kevlar linings to protect them from impact damage, the Concorde's tires were strengthened so they were better able to withstand impact with FOD. Air France and British Airways both used lessons from the accident to improve their pilot training and make their crews better prepared to deal with situations like this. The Paris Airport Authority improved its process for inspecting and maintaining the movement areas at Charles de Gaulle Airport and Continental improved its maintenance oversight and processes to ensure a mistake like this was not repeated.</span><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><br style="line-height: 18px;" /><span style="line-height: 18px;">In the end the BEA did its job and the findings of their report helped make the traveling public safer. The lessons to be learned from the accident have been shared with the global airline community and the industry and regulators have moved forward applying the wisdom gained from this accident to make commercial aviation safer for everyone.</span></span></div>
<span style="background-color: #eef1f1; font-family: Arial, 'Arial Unicode MS', Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small; line-height: 18px;"></span><br />
<div class="separator" style="background-color: #eef1f1; clear: both; font-family: Arial, 'Arial Unicode MS', Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12px; line-height: 18px; text-align: center;">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
Gregory Maxwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14018544410005482774noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-339348712464762588.post-51249358999465767292014-01-13T19:51:00.001-08:002014-01-15T12:50:45.995-08:00The Life and Times of the Boeing 747SP<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-jB5QnkpSF2Y/UtSjVlI8BGI/AAAAAAAAEYw/ewHOG0Ns9J0/s1600/Boeing+747SP.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-jB5QnkpSF2Y/UtSjVlI8BGI/AAAAAAAAEYw/ewHOG0Ns9J0/s1600/Boeing+747SP.png" /></a></div>
<br />
The <a href="http://www.boeing.com/boeing/commercial/747family/index.page?">Boeing 747</a> is perhaps the most iconic and famous commercial aircraft to ever take to the skies; recognized the world over by its unique shape and distinctive upper deck hump. To date <a href="http://www.boeing.com/">Boeing</a> has delivered 1,474 jumbo jets across 16 different models since production began at the Everett factory in 1967. According to Boeing the <a href="http://www.boeing.com/boeing/commercial/747family/pf/pf_facts.page?">747 fleet</a> over the course of its 40+ years in service has traveled 48.3 billion miles and transported 5.6 billion people around the globe. By all accounts the aircraft has been a runaway financial and commercial success.<br />
<br />
The <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/747-400">747-400</a> during its 20 year production run from 1988-2008 was responsible for 694 orders, making it far and away the most successful of the 19 commercial 747 models offered by <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing">Boeing</a>. To date the 400 series has accounted for roughly 47% of total program deliveries. But lost amid the 747's long list of accolades, unparalleled sales success and decades of faithful service with the world's airlines is the interesting and obscure story behind the development of the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/747SP">747SP</a>.<br />
<br />
The <a href="http://www.747sp.com/">747SP</a> is a brief, and largely forgotten page in the 747's proud history. Not many books or articles have been written about this fascinating aircraft, largely because it never realized the commercial success of its larger siblings. This stubby 747 model was by many measures a commercial failure, with Boeing only managing to sell <a href="http://www.747sp.com/production-list/">45</a> during the aircraft's eight year production run from 1976 to 1982, 1987. The line did reopen again briefly in 1987 so that Boeing could produce one final aircraft.<br />
<br />
Yet despite its lackluster sales the aircraft filled a very important niche market for Boeing at the time and pioneered the concept of ultra long range flights, paving the way for the 400 series that followed. The SP's exceptional performance and long range opened up new routes, making nonstop flights between city pairs like Sydney-Los Angeles, Johannesburg-London and New York-Tokyo a practical reality for the first time. The 747SP over the course of its airline career set many performance benchmarks for its class including the fastest round the world flight from pole to pole. Unfortunately the airplane never truly found widespread acceptance in the market outside of its ultra long range niche. So just how did this curious aircraft come to be and what were the market factors that led Boeing to design this unusual aircraft in the first place?<br />
<br />
The year was 1971 and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell-Douglas">McDonnell-Douglas</a> had just successfully delivered the first <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DC-10">DC-10</a> to launch customer American Airlines. The DC-10 had been conceived largely in response to a specification issued by American Airlines for a wide body jet that was smaller in capacity than the 747 but had equivalent range and could operate from shorter runways where it was not feasible to operate a 747. The tri-jet design that emerged was enthusiastically embraced by American which launched the aircraft in 1968 with an order for 25 airplanes, United followed closely behind ordering 30 DC-10s.<br />
<br />
At the same time <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_Corporation">Lockheed</a> which had been largely absent from the commercial airline market since launching the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L-188_Electra">Lockheed L-188 Electra</a> turboprop which suffered through a spate of headline grabbing crashes shortly after entering service in the late 1950's. The negative press and passenger avoidance of the aircraft had greatly affected sales of the troubled airliner and had caused the manufacturer to shy away from the commercial market. With the American requirement Lockheed was eager to jump back into the game and begin development of its own tri-jet the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L-1011">L-1011</a>. After failing to win over American, Lockheed launched the aircraft with firm orders from TWA and Eastern.<br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em; text-align: left;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-wFwHZrr7iTY/Us9MczFHK-I/AAAAAAAAEPc/8n-LXjrgQpY/s1600/Lockheed+L-1011-1+McDonnell-Douglas+DC-10-10+Comparison.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-wFwHZrr7iTY/Us9MczFHK-I/AAAAAAAAEPc/8n-LXjrgQpY/s1600/Lockheed+L-1011-1+McDonnell-Douglas+DC-10-10+Comparison.png" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">Technical/Performance Comparison of the L-1011-1 and DC-10-10 </span><span style="font-size: x-small;">© Gregory Maxwell, 2014</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
McDonnell-Douglas and Lockheed were on a similar trajectory with the DC-10-10 and L-1011-1 both scheduled to enter commercial service in 1971. Unfortunately for Lockheed Rolls-Royce's revolutionary new <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolls-Royce_RB211">RB211</a> engine which made use of composite materials to save weight and reduce operating costs ran into serious development issues. The issues became so severe that they eventually forced <a href="http://www.rolls-royce.com/civil/products/largeaircraft/index.jsp">Rolls-Royce</a> to shut down and seek government protection. Unlike McDonnell-Douglas which offered DC-10 customers the choice of <a href="http://www.geaviation.com/engines/">General Electric</a> or <a href="http://www.pw.utc.com/Commercial_Engines">Pratt & Whitney</a> engines Lockheed had opted for an exclusive agreement with the British engine manufacturer. Rolls-Royce was eventually bailed out by the British Government after assurances were received from the United States government, over the objections from then California governor Ronald Reagan, that the U.S. would guarantee the loans Lockheed needed to finish the L-1011 project. After more than a year delay the first L-1011-1 was delivered to launch customer Eastern Airlines in April of 1972.<br />
<br />
Meanwhile in Seattle Boeing had been closely following the development of the DC-10 and L-1011 and soon realized that the new tri-jets exposed a large hole in the company's product line between the aging 169 seat <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_707">707-300</a> and the much larger 380 seat <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_747">747-200B</a>. Boeing had no effective product in the long range, mid capacity segment of the market. The DC-10 and L-1011 had carved out a niche that was costing Boeing potential customers. Not only were new customer flocking to order the new tri-jets but existing 747 operators were placing orders as well. The initial models of both the L-1011 and DC-10 didn't have intercontinental reach but both manufactures were hard at work developing long range derivatives which would hit the market in a few short years.<br />
<br />
Since the late 1960's Boeing had been studying various concepts involving shortened and modified two and three engine 747 designs to match the capacity requirements of the DC-10 and L-1011 proposals. The major problem with any four engine 747 derivative was overcoming the 33% fuel burn deficit a four engine airplane would have when compared to a three engine jet. Very simply the more engines an aircraft has the heavier the airplane is, the more fuel it burns and correspondingly the more costly it is for an airline to fly and maintain.<br />
<br />
Airplanes are delicately balanced machines and the wing design of an aircraft is largely predicated on the placement and weight of the engines. While wing mounted engines add weight and increase drag, they also help to dampen wing movement and limit the wing's twisting tendency. The problem for Boeing engineers was the wing on the 747 like the 707 before it had been designed and balanced for the weight of four engines. In the 747's case the four engines and their associated components represented 57,000 lbs of weight. By removing an engine from each of the 747's wings and thus reducing the weight on each wing by 14,250 lbs. the natural dampening effect provided by the weight of the 2nd engine was lost which upset the precise balance of wing bend and twist built into the design; this negatively effected its performance and flight profile. Boeing realized that any twin or tri-jet design concept that incorporated two wing mounted engines would require significant redesign of the wing structure.<br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em; text-align: left;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-PP385sWp8nk/Us7nQu0ambI/AAAAAAAAEOc/oDydSbWd694/s1600/747-300+Tri-Jet.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="236" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-PP385sWp8nk/Us7nQu0ambI/AAAAAAAAEOc/oDydSbWd694/s1600/747-300+Tri-Jet.jpg" width="640" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">Boeing Tri-Jet Concept Model (Boeing Archives)</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
On paper a 747 twin-jet concept seemed to have real promise. It would cut fuel burn and operating costs dramatically over the existing 747 as well as the competing Lockheed and McDonnell-Douglas tri-jets but there were significant regulatory and engineering problems that proved difficult to overcome. First a twin jet 747 would need bigger more powerful engines. The problem, they didn't exist and it would take years for General Electric, Pratt & Whitney and Rolls-Royce to develop a new class of engine suitable for a 747 twin-jet. Some engineers were doubtful that the technology even existed to develop such an engine in the near term. <br />
<br />
Secondly and more problematic was the regulatory problem of convincing the FAA and other global aviation agencies to certify a twin-engine aircraft for trans-oceanic flight. Up to this point largely due to the distant memories of unreliable piston aircraft the FAA limited twin engine commercial aircraft to flying a maximum of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ETOPS">60 minutes</a> from the nearest suitable diversionary airport, while ICAO recognized a 90 minute limit. The FAA believed at the time that four engine aircraft were most suitable for trans-oceanic flights. McDonnell-Douglas and Lockheed had convinced the FAA that three engine aircraft could perform this mission just as safely as a four engine jet, but two engines was a leap of faith that the FAA was not ready to embrace in 1971. Without certification for trans-oceanic flight from the FAA any twin-jet would be severely limited in the types of routes that it could be deployed on thus making it very unattractive to airlines. A reality that would severely blunt early sales of up-start <a href="http://www.airbus.com/">Airbus Industries</a> revolutionary <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airbus_A300">A300</a> widebody twin jet.<br />
<br />
The tri-jet tail mounted engine concepts were also problematic as they added considerable weight in the tail which effected the aircraft's center of gravity and changed the delicate balance of the airplane, not to mention the massive structural modifications required to the tail to accommodate a third engine. While a tri-jet concept was more desirable from an operating cost standpoint the company was also cognizant of passenger surveys which indicated an overwhelming preference for a four engine airplane for trans-oceanic flights.<br />
<br />
No one in <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_Everett_Factory">Everett</a> was interested in building an all new aircraft. That would simply take too much time and cost too much money to develop and would place Boeing well behind Lockheed and McDonnell-Douglas in the market. Boeing didn't have six or seven years to launch a competitive answer they need something that could be built cheaply and be brought to market quickly. Eventually led by <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joe_Sutter">Joe Sutter</a>, the father of the 747, it was agreed that the best course of action was to shorten the existing 747 fuselage and retain the aircraft's existing wing and four engine arrangement. Sutter reasoned that while the shortened 747 might not be able to match the DC-10 or L-1011's fuel burn or operating costs it would retain commonality with existing 747's which would reduce manufacturing and production costs for the company. The parts and systems commonality with existing 747's would also save current 747 operators considerable money in training and maintenance expenses and this just might be enough to sway them from purchasing the DC-10 or L-1011. <br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhw-jslHwnRtYBrsEhcoLKY3uk07yThD9xtYTTc3yCbv0SPndjGcL-aWFWknZ5ZQmc4WdbplwTu-P-5p5NRUyC27RJF1fC5ksqPwOxgXMXEjhl1leCw-dpRJ9Vhr2SS47GaScZBLEGLP9cy/s1600/Boeing+747-200B+Boeing+747SP+Comparison.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhw-jslHwnRtYBrsEhcoLKY3uk07yThD9xtYTTc3yCbv0SPndjGcL-aWFWknZ5ZQmc4WdbplwTu-P-5p5NRUyC27RJF1fC5ksqPwOxgXMXEjhl1leCw-dpRJ9Vhr2SS47GaScZBLEGLP9cy/s1600/Boeing+747-200B+Boeing+747SP+Comparison.png" /></a></div>
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em; text-align: left;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-Y0NiiJVqM80/Us8U3C2zvmI/AAAAAAAAEPA/dNa4vCZJ1PI/s1600/Boeing+747-200B+Boeing+747SP+Left+and+Top.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-Y0NiiJVqM80/Us8U3C2zvmI/AAAAAAAAEPA/dNa4vCZJ1PI/s1600/Boeing+747-200B+Boeing+747SP+Left+and+Top.png" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">Technical/Performance Comparison of the 747SP and 747-200B </span><span style="font-size: x-small;">© Gregory Maxwell, 2014 </span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<br />
With a concept in place Boeing set about optimizing and tweaking the design of the 747SB or "Short Body" as it was then called. The existing 747 fuselage was shortened by 48 feet to accommodate around 280 passengers in a two class arrangement which closely matched the competing DC-10 and L-1011's capacity and placed it 100 seats under the existing 747-200B. The new aircraft retained the standard 747 wing, in combination with a 2 ft. taller tail and 10 ft. longer horizontal stabilizer span. The shortened aircraft, with its reduced structure and components enabled Boeing to lighten the airplanes gross weight by 125,000 lbs when compared to the standard 747 air frame. A lighter airplane led to a 20% reduction in fuel burn, which in combination with the 747's speed and the projected 4,000-6,000 foot higher cruise altitude gave it the exceptional capability to fly 270 passengers and cargo almost 7,000 miles! A distance well beyond the reach of the DC-10 or L-1011. The aircraft's performance if it penciled out would give it the lowest seat mile costs of any aircraft of its size class, besting both its tri-jet competitors.<br />
<br />
Despite the aircraft's promise on paper the Boeing board was not entirely convinced of it's commercial potential, giving the project only incremental approval in June, 1973. Around that same time Pan Am issued a firm requirement for an aircraft to deploy on long range routes with demand too thin to support a full size 747. Both Lockheed and McDonnell-Douglas pitched long range derivatives of the DC-10 and L-1011.<br />
<br />
To highlight the new 747's performance advantage over the competition Boeing re-designated the aircraft as the 747SP for Special Performance. Two months later in August of 1973 the Boeing board formally approved the aircraft launch, believing that a launch order from Pan Am was inevitable. The company took a substantial risk by green lighting the SP before receiving a minimum order commitment, but by this time most inside the company had been won over by the SP's impressive economics. Furthermore Joe Sutter had thrown his full support behind the project and that was enough to convince most skeptics that the aircraft would be embraced by airline customers around the world. <br />
<br />
Boeing's marketing department had identified a potential market for 214 SP airplanes with all but 31 frames being for new aircraft. The remaining orders would likely come from order conversions from the larger 200B model. This data helped convince Boeing brass that the derivative aircraft would not cannibalize the existing 747 market, but instead enhance the appeal of the existing 747 to both new and current customers. Top sales targets were Pan Am with a requirement for 20 aircraft followed by El Al, Japan Airlines and Qantas which combined Boeing believed would generate demand for another 28 aircraft. With these potential order the 747SP would quickly surpass the predicted break even point of 45 aircraft. <br />
<br />
While the primary market for the aircraft was long range trans-oceanic routes, the company also felt the aircraft had the potential to replace aging 707s and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DC-8">DC-8s</a> on short to medium range routes. Boeing also envisioned a small market for the aircraft as a VIP transport for heads of state from countries around the world and as a potential replacement for the current <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VC-137">VC-137s</a>. Engineers also studied a combi version which could accommodate 194 passengers and 1,512 cubic feet of cargo on the main deck in a similar arrangement to the popular 747-200M.<br />
<br />
Pan Am signed on as the launch customer at the end of September, ordering 10 aircraft and securing options on an additional 15 aircraft. The order including spares was valued at $280 million, with a per unit cost of approximately $27 million per aircraft, which was $3 million less than the standard 200B model at the time. Boeing established a very aggressive two year development, production, and testing schedule with delivery of the first 747SP to launch customer Pan Am contracted for the first quarter of 1976. The compressed schedule was necessary to try to make up lost ground to Lockheed and McDonnell-Douglas. The long range DC-10-30 derivative had already been in service with launch customer Swissair for almost a year and the L-1011-500 was scheduled to enter service by 1977.<br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em; text-align: left;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-c_1-uGeV4zM/Us9Oxw3K2kI/AAAAAAAAEPo/lt5g5U9Y0Kc/s1600/Lockheed+L-1011-500+McDonnell-Douglas+DC-10-30+Boeing+747SP+Comparison.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-c_1-uGeV4zM/Us9Oxw3K2kI/AAAAAAAAEPo/lt5g5U9Y0Kc/s1600/Lockheed+L-1011-500+McDonnell-Douglas+DC-10-30+Boeing+747SP+Comparison.png" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">Technical/Performance Comparison of the L-1011-500, DC-10-30 and 747SP © Gregory Maxwell, 2014</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<br />
Well before the project received approval from the board, engineers were hard at work in the wind tunnel refining the SP's design. Over the course of 19 months from April 1973 to November of 1974 utilizing both high and low speed wind tunnels the team established the aircraft's drag ratio, investigated the airframe's flutter characteristics and validated predictions of aerodynamic loading on the wings and vertical and horizontal stabilizers. By the close of testing the team determined the low speed drag of the SP was less than anticipated and aerodynamic loads carried by the wing were lower than expected which provided an opportunity for Boeing to shave more weight out of the wing support structure.<br />
<br />
The aircraft that emerged form the wind tunnel was much more complex than just a short bodied 747. The entire fuselage from the wing's trailing edge to the tail of the aircraft was redesigned specifically for the SP. The tail section received particular attention with the entire fuselage section under the vertical stabilizer being re-contoured. These changes effected the vertical position of the tail fin, making it's base 38 inches lower than the standard 747. To compensate for the reduced moment arm of the shortened fuselage the vertical stabilizer's height was increased by five feet and a double hinged rudder was added. Addition of the new rudder required internal stiffing of the tail to withstand the higher aerodynamic loads imposed on it. In order to counteract changes in the aircraft's pitch characteristics both horizontal stabilizers were lengthened by five feet. The additional fuselage structure, taller tail and increased span of the horizontal stabilizer combined to make the <a href="http://www.boeing.com/assets/pdf/commercial/airports/acaps/7471sec2.pdf">747SP</a> fuselage weight 1,500 lbs greater than the standard 747.<br />
<br />
While Boeing chose to retain the standard 747 wing on the SP the internal structure was significantly modified to reduce weight. These changes were possible because the wing loading on the 747SP was about 20 lbs per square foot less than the 747-200B. To save weight Boeing employed reduced gauge metals in the wing spars, ribs, skin and stringers in the wing box and center fuselage sections. In an effort to further reduce the weight of the wings engineers designed a single-slotted variable pivot flap system. The single-slot design was much less complex than the triple-slotted flap system employed on the standard 747 and removed 12,000 lbs in weight from the wing structure. The final results of the SP's weight savings initiative were impressive as the finished aircraft was 45,000 lbs lighter than a comparable 200B model.<br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em; text-align: left;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-72c9bfg1aLk/UtSDsEuZzzI/AAAAAAAAEX4/WyzJmOyQ_7U/s1600/747SP+Single-Slotted+Flap+Design.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-72c9bfg1aLk/UtSDsEuZzzI/AAAAAAAAEX4/WyzJmOyQ_7U/s1600/747SP+Single-Slotted+Flap+Design.png" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">747SP Single-Slotted Flap Design © Gregory Maxwell, 2014</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-K1WXz_rXqsE/UtSD3nECbfI/AAAAAAAAEYE/QpY6veJ3jAI/s1600/747-200B+Triple-Slotted+Flap+Design.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; display: inline !important; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-K1WXz_rXqsE/UtSD3nECbfI/AAAAAAAAEYE/QpY6veJ3jAI/s1600/747-200B+Triple-Slotted+Flap+Design.png" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">747-200B Triple-Slotted Flap Design © Gregory Maxwell, 2014</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<div style="text-align: left;">
The final configuration was frozen in April of 1974 and by that time customer specifications for the Pan Am and Iran Air aircraft had been complete. To this point no additional customers had formally announced orders for the 747SP although Japan Airlines had signaled an intent to purchase the aircraft.</div>
</div>
<br />
To ensure the 747SP retained maximum commonality with the rest of the 747 family and thus reduce the hours of training required for a current 747 pilot to transition to the aircraft, Boeing went to great lengths to ensure the SP's flight handling characteristics and aircraft systems closely matched its larger and heavier siblings. To achieve this goal they used an advanced engineering simulator which compared the flight characteristics of the the SP to the standard 747. A sophisticated computer program analyzed the response of both the SP and the standard 747 in different flight regimes through the entire flight envelope. Of particular interest was the handling difference of the SP in a low speed, high drag configuration such as approach and landing. The information collected was then processed and used by the design and engineering team to make adjustments to the control system before the aircraft ever left the ground.<br />
<br />
The original 747 static test frame was brought out of storage to serve as the engineering mockup. The airframe was cut down to the 747SP specifications with sections being removed in front of and behind the wing and a new aft body section was manufactured and installed. Using the actual airframe allowed engineers to test fit everything from wiring, rigging of flight controls and fitting of insulation and ducting. The right wing was also attached to test the configuration of the new, lighter single slotted flap system.<br />
<br />
Meanwhile in <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_Renton_Factory">Renton</a> designers were busy working with the interior mockup of the 747. The original full length 747-100 interior mockup just like the engineering frame was modified to meet the exact specifications of the 747SP. Cabin mockups even to this day play an important roll as they allow airline customers the opportunity to test fit different interior configurations and see how they work from a practical standpoint and effect crew work flows. In addition the mockups are used to stage promotional sales photos and develop other marketing materials that are used to sell the aircraft to perspective customers.<br />
<br />
In order to maximize the interior space of the 747SP Boeing partnered with customer airlines and the long time Boeing consultant <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walter_Dorwin_Teague">Walter Dorwin Teague Associates</a>. One product of this collaborative team was the innovative longitudinal (side facing) arrangement of the forward galley. The design allowed flight attendants from both the first class and forward section of coach to work and serve simultaneously from the same galley space. The arrangement also provided the crew increased privacy, more working space and caused less interference with passenger boarding. A self contained lift was built into the galley to allow flight attendants to transfer food and beverage carts easily between the main deck galley and the upper deck service station. A second coach service galley was located just forward of the rear pressure bulkhead at the back of the passenger cabin. This rear galley retained the standard forward facing arrangement.<br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em; text-align: left;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-U4yeB4J2cfk/UtCZu5XyJZI/AAAAAAAAEQ0/IOB_Lc0h5h8/s1600/747SP+Seating+Layout.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="456" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-U4yeB4J2cfk/UtCZu5XyJZI/AAAAAAAAEQ0/IOB_Lc0h5h8/s1600/747SP+Seating+Layout.png" width="640" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">Graphic depicting standard cabin layout of the 747SP, inset photo shows longitudinal galley © Gregory Maxwell, 2014</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
The main deck passenger cabin was arranged into four service zones, with each zone corresponding to one of the four main fuselage body sections brought together during final aircraft assembly. Zone A incorporated the first class cabin in fuselage body Section 41 in the nose of the airplane and had space for 18 first class passengers. Zone B in body Section 42, between the nose and wing join was designed to accommodate 16 additional first class seats or 30 coach seats in a 3-3 layout as well as the galley and four lavatories. Zone C comprised the main coach cabin in body Section 44 where the wings were joined to the fuselage. This space contained room for 136 passengers in a traditional 3-4-3 layout with space for three lavatories, with one forward and two aft. Zone D encapsulated in body Section 46 from behind the wing back to the rear pressure bulkhead, contained the rear coach cabin with seating for 86 passengers again in a 3-4-3 layout and two lavatories were located in the forward section of this cabin.<br />
<br />
Assembly of the first 747SP began in earnest at the Everett factory in early November of 1974, when pieces of the aircraft's wings were loaded into the initial position of the 747 line. A short three months later in February of 1975 the wings were joined to the center wing box. All the while work continued on the five major body sections that would make up the 747SP fueslage in other parts of the factory. The sequence of assembly for the 747 required that the center wing box and completed wings be joined to the center fuselage (Section 44) before the nose (Section 41), forward (Section 42) aft fuselage (Section 46) and tail (Section 48) were joined to the center fuselage. Following the completion of the center fuselage Section 44 the major components including the ailerons, engine pylons, outboard flaps, spoilers and leading edge were installed on the wings. With all pieces of the fuselage joined and aligned the horizontal stabilizer, tail and landing gear were subsequently installed and the aircraft for the first time began to roll down the line its weight supported by the five landing gear assemblies and 18 tires.<br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em; text-align: left;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-k-TkbEtiW4k/UtSCMofE5fI/AAAAAAAAEXs/DkppxJapFtM/s1600/747SP+Final+Assembly+with+Chart.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-k-TkbEtiW4k/UtSCMofE5fI/AAAAAAAAEXs/DkppxJapFtM/s1600/747SP+Final+Assembly+with+Chart.png" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">Photo of first 747SP on Everett production line, inset shows major component assemblies (Boeing Archive)</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
As the aircraft entered the last stages of final assembly the guts of the airplane including flight deck instrumentation, wiring, hydraulic lines and environmental controls along with the APU, inboard flaps, tail cone, landing gear doors and radome were all installed. One of the last and most delicate steps was the hanging of the rudder on the tail. Installation of an airplane rudder is a very precise and slow process, as the rudder must be balanced exactly to ensure its proper function and alignment. Even the added weight of the paint of the customer livery is important to consider when hanging the rudder and for this reason the rudder is painted in an airline's full colors prior to installation.<br />
<br />
With assembly complete the first 747SP was rolled out of the factory and into the paint hanger to receive its eye catching red, white and blue scheme specially designed by Boeing for the new 747 model. Boeing announced the official roll out of the airplane would occur on May 19, 1975 with the first flight anticipated to occur in early July.<br />
<br />
As the big day finally arrived thousands of Boeing employees, invited guest, political dignitaries and airline representatives from Pan American, South African Airways and Iran Air all gathered in front of the massive 747 factory doors eagerly awaiting the grand entrance of the newest member of the 747 family. Vice President and General Manager of the 747 Division Kenneth F. Holtby described the 747SP as "a real winner," and praised the team for delivering the aircraft under budget and ahead of schedule. He was confident once flight testing began that the aircraft would prove out its performance and easily meet and exceed its performance targets. Pan Am Senior Vice President of Technical Operations John M. Wolgast added that he believed the 747SP would reign supreme in its class forever.<br />
<br />
When the doors finally opened and the first SP entered the daylight carrying Pan Am registration N530PA it was a sight to behold. Boeing had arranged especially for the roll out ceremony for the first 747-100 test aircraft <a href="http://airchive.com/html/memorabilia/boeing-everett-factory-historical-images/1968-september-30-1st-boeing-747-ra001-roll-out-ceremony-boeing-everett-factory/28394">RA001</a> to be parked next to the 747SP to provide a since of scale and highlight the size difference of the two aircraft.<br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em; text-align: left;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ1n4i8TXfFu1hyphenhyphenR8Em4-tyXFpu1o2qADIUD03OfksKs5X4p7tktwmrGVn0VnoXJABxYAhPSFl-qJPc6UODIIOgKDIbTUsSmHtbh0RcbSOiS7T_WiPMlJoVbzfeOZ7wYsHLrSdpLvivmqr/s1600/747SP+Rollout+v2.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjQ1n4i8TXfFu1hyphenhyphenR8Em4-tyXFpu1o2qADIUD03OfksKs5X4p7tktwmrGVn0VnoXJABxYAhPSFl-qJPc6UODIIOgKDIbTUsSmHtbh0RcbSOiS7T_WiPMlJoVbzfeOZ7wYsHLrSdpLvivmqr/s1600/747SP+Rollout+v2.png" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">Photo of the 747SP's Official Rollout Ceremony on May 19, 1975 (Boeing Archives)</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
Following the pomp and circumstance of the roll out, engineers went back to work preparing the aircraft for its ambitious test program. 365 hours of flight testing were planned for the three aircraft test program. Because the 747SP was not a new aircraft but rather a derivative the number of test hours required by the FAA in order to receive certification was much lower than the 1,440 required of the original 747.<br />
<br />
For the purposes of the test program aircraft number one (N530PA) slated for delivery to launch customer Pan American Airways was re-registered <a href="http://www.747sp.com/production-list/21022-265/">N747SP</a>. The second test aircraft <a href="http://www.747sp.com/production-list/21023-268/">N247SP</a> was expected to join the test program in August with the third <a href="http://www.747sp.com/production-list/21024-270/">N347SP</a> to follow in October. A fourth 747SP, <a href="http://www.747sp.com/production-list/21025-273/">N40135</a> due to be completed in November would serve as a reserve aircraft to help maintain the flight schedule in the event that one of the three primary aircraft experienced a technical fault. Until the other aircraft came online N747SP would serve as the sole test aircraft and following the ceremonial first flight was scheduled to perform a full battery of tests in its first month, including stability of flight, control response, stall recovery and low speed airplane drag tests. <br />
<br />
Over 250 Boeing employees were directly involved in the aircraft's flight test program, including pilots, flight test engineers, instrument specialist, photographers, mechanics and a slew of technicians who recorded and analyze the results of each flight test sorties. Captain Jack Waddell, Boeing's Chief Test Pilot and 747 project pilot since the program's inception in 1966 was chosen as captain for the 747SP's first flight. Waddell had also been at the controls of the first 747, RA001 on its very first flight in 1969. The first officer was none other than Lew Wallick, then director of the 747SP Flight Test Program. Flight Engineer Kenneth R. Storms, Boeing's chief Flight Engineer rounded out the crew.<br />
<br />
On July 4, 1975, ten days ahead of schedule the three man crew boarded N747SP and prepared the aircraft for its maiden flight. By all accounts the flight was routine for a derivative aircraft as the crew worked through the initial handling and control tests, airspeed calibration and fuel burn measurements. Feeling confident in the aircraft's performance captain Waddell decided to push the aircraft a little, performing a full stall, something that was usually not done on an aircraft's maiden flight. In addition the crew flew the airplane up to its maximum operating speed of 0.92 mach, reaching 630 mph and over 30,000 feet in altitude. The aircraft handled so well and experienced so few problems that after a quick check out and data read out it was cleared by engineers for a second test flight later in the day. <br />
<br />
N247SP, the second test aircraft made its initial flight on August 14th and was quickly integrated into the test plan. With FAA test pilots on board to observe the certification process the aircraft demonstrated up to its maximum design speed of 445 knots that it was flutter free. The stall tests were also completed, with the airframe being subjected to over 80 stalls in various weight and cg positions as required. The airplane was flown up to 46,000 feet to test the engine performance at high altitude cruise. To the flight test crew's surprise the aircraft still maintained a 600 foot per minute rate of climb. 46,000 feet was 1,000 feet above the airliner's certified in service maximum cruise altitude of 45,100 feet.<br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em; text-align: left;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-l57K9BHS7u8/UtSADPJlYTI/AAAAAAAAEXI/99ExYqi7IlQ/s1600/747SP+Minimum+Unstick.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-l57K9BHS7u8/UtSADPJlYTI/AAAAAAAAEXI/99ExYqi7IlQ/s1600/747SP+Minimum+Unstick.png" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">Test Airplane N747SP performing Velocity Minimum Unstick Test at Edwards AFB, CA © Gregory Maxwell, 2014</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<br />
By October the two 747SP aircraft N747SP and N247SP had accumulated 160 flight hours and the test program was ready to move into the second phase of testing at <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edwards_Air_Force_Base">Edwards AFB</a>. N747SP was flown to the isolated California base to prove out the aircraft's takeoff and landing performance. As part of these test the pilots also performed the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BWwUTJM3jbA">Velocity Minimum Unstick Test</a>, deliberately over-rotating the airplane onto its tail to determine the minimum flying speed required to achieve takeoff. During brake testing a lightly loaded 747SP accomplished a full stop landing in only 1,600 feet, without the use of a primary (turbine) reverse thrust system which had been removed during the aircraft's design phase to save an additional 1,100 lbs of weight.<br />
<br />
While the three primary aircraft carried out the bulk of the flight test plan aircraft number four, N40135, fresh from its maiden flight on November 3, 1975 embarked on a grand world tour to introduce the 747SP to perspective customers, the media and flying public. The aircraft outfitted with a finished Pan American interior departed from Boeing Field in the early morning hours of November 11th bound for New York. A day later the airplane with 200 passengers on board departed on the first leg of its trip flying nonstop from New York JFK to Tokyo's Haneda Airport. 13 hours and 33 minutes later N40135 touched down on Japanese soil having flown 7,015 miles without refueling. The 747SP over the course of the flight reached a cruise altitude of 46,000 feet and a speed of Mach 0.86. Remarkably upon landing in Tokyo the jet still had 30,000 lbs of fuel in its tanks. <br />
<br />
Among the invited guests on the flight was a contingent from Japan Airlines. JAL had yet to order the 747SP and was currently operating the DC-8-62 on the New York-Tokyo route. With insufficient range to make the flight nonstop the DC-8-62 required an en-route refueling stop in Anchorage which added several additional hours to the total trip time. Boeing was quick to point out to JAL the 747SP's 27% fuel burn advantage over the DC-8-62.<br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em; text-align: left;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-8RbOL9lQk5w/UtNMtXnEjJI/AAAAAAAAEUc/fX8rTlNDahU/s1600/Boeing+747SP+World+Tour+Map.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="348" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-8RbOL9lQk5w/UtNMtXnEjJI/AAAAAAAAEUc/fX8rTlNDahU/s1600/Boeing+747SP+World+Tour+Map.png" width="640" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">Map Generated by Gregory Maxwell using the Great Circle Mapper </span><span style="font-size: small;">© </span><span style="font-size: x-small;">Karl L. Swartz</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<div style="text-align: left;">
Following the stop in Tokyo the SP flew on across Asia stopping in Taipei, Singapore, Kabul and Bombay before turning east towards Sydney. After a brief stay in Sydney the jet flew nonstop 7,143 miles to Santiago, Chile. Further stops on the South American continent included LaPaz, Quito and finally Caracas before heading on to Mexico. The next leg was the longest of the entire trip with the globe hopping airplane flying 7,205 miles between Mexico City and Belgrade, in the process becoming the first airliner to fly nonstop between Mexico City and the European continent. A feat which is all that more impressive when you consider the 7,341 foot altitude of Mexico City's airport. From Belgrade the team flew on to Athens, Lusaka, Nairobi and Abidjan.</div>
</div>
<br />
The 747SP made the trip home to Seattle with a single stop in Kingston Jamaica. When it was all said and done N40135 had traveled 72,152 miles and visited 18 cities on six continents and safely transported more than 2,300 passengers on 20 demonstration flights over the course of its 29 days journey. Not only was the aircraft's remarkable range on display but the aircraft proved to be extremely reliable requiring minor maintenance on the APU only twice during the entire trip, and neither occurrence delayed a scheduled departure.<br />
<br />
The 747SP test program officially concluded on December 22nd two weeks ahead of plan, with the three dedicated test aircraft collectively logging 544 hours and 27 minutes of flight time. A further 140 hours were logged by the number four aircraft N40135 over the course of its world wide demonstration tour. Despite completing the certification tests, the receipt of the official FAA type certificate was delayed by several months until two deficiencies found during flight test could be corrected. The first involved a localized shock wave that manifested around the new fuselage fillet, requiring Boeing engineers to redesign the fillet. A second more serious issue was discovered on a test flight when the lower rudder on N747SP separated from the tail after experiencing greater than expected aerodynamic loads. Amazingly due to the split rudder design the flight crew didn't even notice the absence of the lower rudder, and were not aware it had departed the aircraft until the chase pilot informed them. To fix the issue the lower rudder and the attachment points were strengthened to prevent a re-occurrence. <br />
<br />
With award of the FAA type certification slipping into early 1976, Boeing was forced to inform launch customer Pan Am that delivery of its first aircraft would be delayed. Finally after a two month delay the FAA now fully satisfied with the airworthiness of the aircraft officially delivered the 747SP's supplemental type certificate on February 4, 1976, paving the way for delivery to Pan Am and the types introduction into commercial service. A month later on March 5th Boeing handed over the keys to <a href="http://www.747sp.com/production-list/21025-273/">N533PA</a> "Clipper Freedom" to eager launch customer Pan American Airways. The airplane formerly, N40135 the globe trotting 747SP was the fourth production airplane built but first to be finished in Pan Am's full customer configuration. <br />
<br />
After testing N747SP was returned to Everett to be refitted into Pan Am's configuration, joining N742SP and N743SP which were also being reconfigured prior to customer delivery. Pan Am received their second SP "Clipper Constitution" <a href="http://www.747sp.com/production-list/21024-270/">N532PA</a> a few weeks later on March 29th and by the end of July Boeing had delivered 12 total aircraft to customers.<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
Pan Am inaugurated commercial service with the aircraft on April 25, opening the new nonstop Los Angeles-Tokyo route. A day later the first nonstop New York-Tokyo flight departed for the 13.5 hour flight west. The 747SP cut more than 3.5 hours off the normal route time, due to the lack of the requisite fuel stop in Anchorage required on the 200B. Initially the New York-Tokyo flight was offered on a weekly frequency but within 12 months was upgraded to daily frequency due to its overwhelming popularity with passengers. With the first few months of commercial service under its belt, Pan Am was delighted with the stubby 747's performance and its excellent dispatch reliability of 97%. The Pan Am SP fleet was averaging 10.9 block hours per day and steadily climbing.<br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em; text-align: left;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-ad_aPZql4nE/UtNo681R0-I/AAAAAAAAEU8/j-vHE3-HsyA/s1600/Pan+Am+747SP+Route+Map.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="540" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-ad_aPZql4nE/UtNo681R0-I/AAAAAAAAEU8/j-vHE3-HsyA/s1600/Pan+Am+747SP+Route+Map.png" width="640" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">Map Generated by Gregory Maxwell using the Great Circle Mapper </span><span style="font-size: small;">© </span><span style="font-size: x-small;">Karl L. Swartz</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
In December Pan Am upped its game again by introducing one stop service between New York and Australia and New Zealand via San Francisco. Flight PA815 departed San Francisco flying nonstop to Auckland, New Zealand, a distance of 6,516 miles. The return flight PA816 departed Sydney flying 7,475 miles nonstop to San Francisco and then on to New York. Flight 816 held the title of the world's longest scheduled nonstop commercial flight for several years.<br />
<br />
South African Airway was the second airline to receive delivery of the 747SP and on its delivery flight, <a href="http://www.747sp.com/production-list/21132-280/">ZS-SPA</a>, the airline's first SP, flew from Everett nonstop to Cape Town South Africa covering a unbelievable distance of 10,290 miles in 17 hours and 22 minutes. When the aircraft landed it still had 38,500 pounds of fuel in its tanks enough for a further 2 hours and 27 minutes of flying. To make the ultra long flight extra fuel was carried in temporary rubber-nylon bladders secured in the lower deck cargo holds. At takeoff the aircraft weighed 713,300 lbs a full 50,000 more than it would during normal line service. The flight easily bested the previous World Record for the longest flight by a commercial aircraft set by a DC-8-53 in 1962 on a flight from Tokyo to Miami which covered 8,792 miles.<br />
<br />
Following its record breaking delivery flight South African Airways pressed the 747SP into service on its flagship Johannesburg-London route. The airplane proved to be ideally suited to the route given <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O._R._Tambo_International_Airport">Johannesburg Airport's</a> 5,580 foot elevation and warm temperatures. While the airline's 747-200B fleet could make the flight nonstop on cooler days, when the temperature elevated in the summer months a mandatory fuel stop was required. In addition the 200B's massive capacity routinely outstripped passenger demand on the route. The 747SP provided the ideal mix of capacity and range that South African needed on its long and circuitous <a href="https://picasaweb.google.com/lh/photo/zrITSChYL1pfUND1TpsQE9MTjNZETYmyPJy0liipFm0?feat=directlink">Apartheid</a> restricted routes. To further demonstrate the airplane's incredible capability South African flew an SP with 224 passengers 8,010 miles nonstop between New York and Johannesburg.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em; text-align: left;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-46OUUd8VaGw/UtR96eMfv6I/AAAAAAAAEW8/H-IFLNBOTEI/s1600/South+African+747SP.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-46OUUd8VaGw/UtR96eMfv6I/AAAAAAAAEW8/H-IFLNBOTEI/s1600/South+African+747SP.png" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">South African Airways Boeing 747SP (ZS-SPC) shown its original 1976 delivery colors © Gregory Maxwell, 2014</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<div style="text-align: left;">
Meanwhile the Boeing sales and marketing staff were hard at work trying to sell the airplane to the world's airlines. The timing of the 747SP's introduction was ideal from the standpoint that many long-range, narrow-body DC-8's and 707's in the world's fleet were aging and their rising operating costs were making them a liability for which the airlines were seeking a replacement.</div>
</div>
<br />
Boeing offered customers the choice of five gross-weight options for the 747SP. The basic SP had a 660,000 lb maximum takeoff weight, with a minimum option of 630,00 lbs and a maximum of 700,000 lbs.<br />
<br />
Customers had the choice of either the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Electric_CF6">General Electric CF6</a>, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JT9D">Pratt & Whitney's JT9D-7</a> or <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RB211">Rolls-Royce RB211-524</a> engines to power their aircraft. Pratt & Whitney offered a variety of thrust ratings on the JT9D from 46,950 lbs up to 50,000 lbs. Rolls-Royce's RB211-524 engines were the most powerful engines offered for the 747SP with a maximum thrust rating of 51,600 lbs. Pratt & Whitney engines were far and away the most popular choice for 747SP operators, being selected for 39 of the 45 total 747SP's built. The remaining six aircraft were powered by Rolls-Royce RB211-524 engines, while General Electric's CF6 gained zero orders over the course of the program.<br />
<br />
Despite its shortened size the 747SP had an impressive lower deck cargo capacity with room for 20 <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unit_load_device">LD-1 containers</a>, ten less than the standard 747. In total the SP's lower hold could accommodate 3,460 cubic feet of cargo with 400 cubic feet of additional space available for bulk cargo. Both lower deck cargo doors were identical in size to the standard 747 allowing for seamless transfer of cargo between the SP and other 747 variants. Importantly, this also meant that all existing standard unit loading devices were compatible with the 747SP.<br />
<br />
The 747SP was grabbing headlines around the world, and smashing world records everywhere it went. Customers like Pan Am and South African were publicly lauding the aircraft for its performance, efficiency and profitability, but for some reason this wasn't translating into new customer orders. From Boeing's perspective the SP appeared to have everything an airline could want. It was cost effective, offered great performance, and had incredibly long range that enabled airlines to fly a sizable number of passengers and cargo nonstop between just about any two points on the globe from almost any jet-capable airport in the world.<br />
<br />
For operators who didn't need the capacity of the standard 747 and couldn't afford the price tag the SP offered a foot in the door of the 747 club. The smaller SP had less seats to fill and had the range to connect major centers in Africa, Asia, Middle East and Oceania to North America and Europe through nonstop service for the first time.<br />
<br />
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em; text-align: left;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-leg9b24qzuU/UtRU82X517I/AAAAAAAAEWE/nsC2xAQLpZc/s1600/747SP-Unsuccessful-Sales-Campaigns.gif" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-leg9b24qzuU/UtRU82X517I/AAAAAAAAEWE/nsC2xAQLpZc/s1600/747SP-Unsuccessful-Sales-Campaigns.gif" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">Depictions of the 747SP in Perspective Customer Liveries © Gregory Maxwell, 2014</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<div style="text-align: left;">
But for many of these operators the 747SP proved to be too much airplane. Most airlines simply didn't need the SP's globe spanning range for their modest sized route networks where a 707 sized airplane was the ideal fit for the market demand. There was a very limited niche market where the SP's impressive range and performance were truly needed. All the while the standard 747-200B's fuel economy and range were steadily improving with refinements to the aircraft and engines allowing the 200B to progressively fly routes of similar length to the SP. The 200B's incremental improvements made the 747SP less attractive to existing 747 operators who could now exploit the larger 747's capacity to maximum benefit.</div>
</div>
<br />
The SP's sticker price of $28 million was also prohibitive to many carriers and placed it at the top of its class, $1.5 million above the competing long range McDonnell-Douglas DC-10-30. Boeing pitched the 747SP to 40 different airlines, among them Air New Zealand, BWIA, British Airways, Cathay Pacific, Delta, El Al, Iberia, JAL, Singapore and Zambia Airways.<br />
<br />
The battle for orders between Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas and Lockheed was fierce, with the DC-10-30 proving to be the biggest competitive threat to the 747SP. In order to counter the sales success of McDonnell-Douglas's tri-jet Boeing armed its sales staff with a handbook that detailed exactly how the SP was superior to the DC-10-30. Among the points in Boeing's favor the SP had a higher maximum gross takeoff weight, greater fuel capacity, it had a higher seat count across all configurations from a single class all economy layout to a three-class arrangement. The 747SP could transport its larger payload a much greater distance nonstop than the DC-10-30. The cabin was wider and provided more room for passengers and their cabin luggage. The lower deck cargo capacity of the 747SP was comparable to the DC-10's when you took into account the 30 series need for auxiliary fuel tanks in the belly of the aircraft which displaced cargo. The DC-10 couldn't match the SP's takeoff, landing and climb performance nor its service ceiling. The SP's 6,000 foot higher cruise altitude translated to significantly less turbulence for passengers and an increase in fuel efficiency. Boeing's short body 747 was also noticeably quieter than the DC-10 on takeoff and approach. Boeing also claimed the 747SP's seat mile costs were 11% lower than the DC-10 and that the aircraft had a 9-12% higher revenue potential due to its larger seating capacity.<br />
<br />
But in both the domestic and international short and medium haul markets the 747SP was overkill and its range and performance advantage over the DC-10 and L-1011 was a moot point. The fuel efficiency of the tri-jets proved to be a huge advantage and something the 747SP struggled to overcome in sales campaigns.<br />
<br />
Despite all of the data and statistics that validated the superiority of Boeing's 747SP the DC-10 proved a tough competitor to best. Unlike the 747SP which had been specifically designed and optimized for very long range routes with limited demand, the DC-10 platform had been designed from the outset with flexibility in mind. McDonnell-Douglas was able to optimize the aircraft to a variety of routes and mission requirements. The short range 10 series was an ideal aircraft for U.S. domestic trunk routes for airlines like United and American. While the longer range 30 series had the endurance to fly trans-oceanic routes as well as intercontinental flights between Africa, Asia and Europe. In all McDonnell-Douglas produced 446 aircraft across 9 different variants of the DC-10 through out its 18 year production run from 1971 to 1989.<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
A Comparison of 747SP, A300, DC-10 and L-1011 Deliveries from 1971-1989</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-4r03OQiPTpc/UtST5By4oqI/AAAAAAAAEYc/l9oWoDCRPbo/s1600/747SP+A300+DC-10+L-1011+Comparison+Chart.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="298" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-4r03OQiPTpc/UtST5By4oqI/AAAAAAAAEYc/l9oWoDCRPbo/s1600/747SP+A300+DC-10+L-1011+Comparison+Chart.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
Sales of Lockheed's long range L-1011-500 series were hurt tremendously by the airplanes significantly delayed development and entry into service due to engine maker Rolls-Royce's financial problems. While competitors General Electric and Pratt & Whitney quickly developed uprated versions of their engines to power longer range versions of the DC-10, Rolls-Royce was slow to develop higher thrust variants of the RB211 for the L-1011. This delay to market cost both Rolls and Lockheed dearly. The first L-1011-500 aircraft did not enter revenue service with launch customer British Airways until May of 1979 a full three years behind the 747SP and seven years behind the competing DC-10-30 tri-jet. By the time the L-1011-500 finally entered service the DC-10 had already captured a large portion of the market. However despite its development problems with the L-1011 program Lockheed still managed to sell 249 airplanes during the course of the program's 13 year production run from 1972 through 1985.</div>
<br />
By 1979 Airbus had also begun to make serious headway with the A300-B4, the long range variant of its A300 widebody twin jet. Enjoying particular sales success in Asia with a landmark order for the airplane coming from Korean Air Lines. This order served as the catalyst for other airlines in the region with Airbus booking new orders from Thai Airways, Singapore, Malaysia, Garuda Indonesia and China Airlines in short order. <br />
<br />
Most countries in Asia had adopted ICAO's less restrictive 90 minute regulation regarding twin jet operations which allowed the A300 to operate unimpeded on routes throughout the region. The A300's inroads in Asia further hurt the sales prospects of the 747SP, especially as this was one of the key markets targeted by Boeing full of major existing 747 operators. <br />
<br />
Of the four widebody aircraft the A300 would eventually enjoy the greatest sales success. Made possible by the FAA and ICAO relaxing restrictions on twin engine commercial jet transports in the 1980's and the formation of the <a href="http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero_04/textonly/fo01txt.html">ETOPS program</a> to allow twin jets to prove their reliability and expand their reach. Sales of the A300 remained steady while interest in the DC-10 and L-1011's began to flag after 1985. With Airbus committed to producing new and improved models of the aircraft Airbus went on to sell 561 of the airplanes during the 33 years it was in production.<br />
<br />
By this point the writing was on the wall, and Boeing began to realize that the SP just wasn't going to be the great seller they envisioned. Despite the company's best efforts only forty-five 747SP aircraft were eventually built and delivered over the course of the airplane program's brief eight year production run from 1976-1982 and 1987. The line was briefly re-opened in 1987 to produce one additional aircraft for the Government of Abu Dhabi.<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-tOWJCTB_mOs/UtR19fNnTUI/AAAAAAAAEWk/TD8eKkeN0do/s1600/747SP+Production+Customers.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; display: inline !important; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-tOWJCTB_mOs/UtR19fNnTUI/AAAAAAAAEWk/TD8eKkeN0do/s1600/747SP+Production+Customers.png" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">747SP Customers with (Total Aircraft Ordered and Delivered) </span><span style="font-size: small;">© </span><span style="font-size: x-small;">Gregory Maxwell, 2014</span><span style="font-size: small;"> </span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<div style="text-align: left;">
But even with limited success in the airline market the 747SP proved in one small but prestigious segment it was the only aircraft for the job. The government VIP transport market which Boeing had targeted early in the aircraft's development turned out to be tailor made for the SP's capabilities. For both small and medium sized countries the 747SP was an outstanding <a href="http://www.747sp.com/operators/">VIP transport</a>, where its exceptional performance and range could be put to full use. Many governments in The Middle East and Asia purchased the aircraft for use by their respective heads of state.</div>
</div>
<br />
The 747SP provided the cachet that comes with being a member of the 747 club, but its size and price tag were more manageable for smaller governments than the larger 200B. Three aircraft were purchased outright as VIP transports including the last aircraft built <a href="http://www.747sp.com/production-list/23610-676/">A6-ZSN</a> in 1987, with a further 9 airplanes to date have been converted after being purchased on the second hand market.<br />
<br />
It is easy to say given the 747SP's less than stellar sales that it was a failure, after all both McDonnell-Douglas and Lockheed sold far more trj-jets. But from a cost perspective the derivative aircraft was relatively cheap for Boeing to design and build and it ended up just about breaking even for the company. The SP also allowed Boeing to retain key 747 customers and thwarted a number of potential sales of the DC-10 and L-1011. <br />
<br />
For the small niche market that the aircraft was designed and built for there was no equal. You either had to buy a 747SP or loose high yield customers to your competitor who could get there faster and nonstop. Ultimately neither the DC-10 or L-1011 came close to matching the 747SP's incredible top end range and payload uplift.<br />
<br />
At the end of the day, Boeing was probably a little over ambitious in its sales projections but the airplane did exactly what it was designed to do and continues to soldier on today. Perhaps there is no greater testament to the aircraft's tremendous capability an appeal than the fact that of the 45 aircraft built 18 (almost half) are still in active service today.<br />
<br />
Resources:<br />
<a href="http://www.amazon.com/Boeing-747SP-Great-Airliners-Series/dp/0962673072/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1389818960&sr=8-1&keywords=Great+Airliners+volume+3">Great Airliners Volume 3 - Boeing 747SP by Brian Baum</a><br />
<a href="http://www.amazon.com/Boeing-747-100-200-300-SP/dp/1580070264/ref=sr_1_8?ie=UTF8&qid=1389818999&sr=8-8&keywords=Airliner+Tech+Series">Airliner Tech Series Volume 6 - Boeing 747-100/200/300/SP by Dennis R. Jenkins</a><br />
<a href="http://www.747sp.com/">747SP Website</a><br />
<a href="http://www.boeing.com/boeing/commercial/747family/index.page?">Boeing 747 Website</a>Gregory Maxwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14018544410005482774noreply@blogger.com11tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-339348712464762588.post-24620841751276017282012-04-08T16:57:00.000-07:002012-04-08T16:57:33.591-07:00PSA's L-1011 Experiment<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-fu-NRKEvI6s/T4HJ1RqIDnI/AAAAAAAACgQ/Nkvx9Jdr6B8/s1600/04-09-12+01.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="296" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-fu-NRKEvI6s/T4HJ1RqIDnI/AAAAAAAACgQ/Nkvx9Jdr6B8/s640/04-09-12+01.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
In 1970 California intrastate carrier Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) was flying high. From its humble beginnings in 1949 with a single DC-3 the airline had grown to become the dominate carrier in California, posting 15 straight years of profits. PSA was the original pioneer of the low cost, high frequency model, which Southwest Airlines later made famous.</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
PSA Founder Ken Friedken believed that he could carve out a very successful niche providing passengers with low cost, high frequency flights between California's major cities. Because all of the flights would take place within the state of California, his airline would not be tied to the restrictive policies of the Civil Aeronautics Board, which set prices and regulated all interstate carriers in the United States at the time. Friedken theorized that if the airline priced its fares low enough it could attract passengers away from the railroads and provide an alternative to the automobile.</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
The formula was a smashing success, unfettered by the CAB, PSA was free to set its own ticket prices and start new routes as it saw fit. In order to expedite the passenger boarding process the carrier didn't assign seats, and it also maximized daily aircraft utilization through quick ground turnarounds, all of these measures helped to keep costs down.</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
The airline branded "The World's Friendliest Airlines," developed a reputation for unmatched customer service. It even went so
far as to paint smiles on the noses of all its aircraft, nicknaming them "Grinningbirds". Passengers flocked to the airline, attracted by the low fares, but they stayed because of the airline's legendary service. </div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
By 1970 PSA served 7 destinations across the state of California from its base at San Diego's Lindbergh Field earning a profit of $3.6 million and transporting over 5 million passengers that year. The core of the airline's business was shuttling travelers up and down the coast between San Diego, Los Angeles and San Francisco.</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-ckXJyiaBJlM/T4H6RKnENRI/AAAAAAAACgc/FtTFWAZcVQk/s1600/04-09-12+02.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="400" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-ckXJyiaBJlM/T4H6RKnENRI/AAAAAAAACgc/FtTFWAZcVQk/s640/04-09-12+02.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
Passenger traffic throughout the previous decade had grown rapidly so much so that airline terminals were becoming overwhelmed and airlines worried that if the pace of growth continued the whole system might grind to a halt under the weight of the demand. The 747 whose entry into service in 1969 heralded the arrival of the wide body area, seemed to be the ideal solution to meet the increasing demand and reduce the strain on overwhelmed airport facilities. With the added capacity that widebody aircraft like the 747, DC-10 and L-1011 provided airlines could consolidate several narrowbody flights into one, thus reducing airport congestion. </div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
PSA agreed, and in 1970 signed a contract with the Lockheed Corporation for two L-1011-1's, which was still undergoing certification testing at the time. The airline planned to introduce the aircraft on its high density commuter routes between SAN-LAX-SFO, with delivery of the first aircraft slated for 1972. However shortly after signing the contract, the airline learned that the L-1011's sole engine supplier Rolls-Royce had gone bankrupt. With the future of the aircraft program now in doubt PSA canceled its order, and re-evaluated the competing Airbus A300 and McDonnell-Douglas DC-10
products.</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-7bNbn27g3vE/T4IJE0ykCQI/AAAAAAAACg8/Cpln4W6oIiU/s1600/04-09-12+05.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="418" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-7bNbn27g3vE/T4IJE0ykCQI/AAAAAAAACg8/Cpln4W6oIiU/s640/04-09-12+05.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
Rolls-Royce had greatly underestimated the development time of the RB211, a complex new engine design which included use of revolutionary composite fan blades. Unfortunately the light weight composite blades suffered quality control issues and were prone to fracture. To remedy this situation Rolls-Royce was forced to redesign the fan to incorporate traditional titanium blades which increased the weight of the engine significantly. The resulting production delays and cost of the redesign placed the company in a tenuous financial position. The added costs meant that the unit purchase price of the engine agreed upon by Lockheed was below breakeven for Rolls-Royce. The British government was forced to take control of the insolvent company and eager to continue development of the RB211 engine tried to renegotiate a higher unit price for the RB211 with Lockheed. </div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
Lockheed had its own financial problems, oweing to development of the C-5A Galaxy, which was based on a fixed price contract, with all cost overruns having to be payed out of pocket by the manufacturer. Eventually the government, not wanting to loose a front line military aerospace company bailed the company out, guaranteeing loans of up to $250 million.</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
Lockheed and Rolls-Royce finally settled on a price for the redesigned engine which would put the company back in the black and allow Lockheed to avoid a costly delay to certification while it redesigned the the aircraft to accommodate a competing engine from General Electric or Pratt & Whitney.</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-flerYtOEE4I/T4ICAKgNu7I/AAAAAAAACgo/TokGHtOip3c/s1600/04-09-12+03.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="296" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-flerYtOEE4I/T4ICAKgNu7I/AAAAAAAACgo/TokGHtOip3c/s640/04-09-12+03.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">PSA's first L-1011-1, at Lockheed's Palmdale plant awaiting delivery, note the stairs leading to the lower level lounge</span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"> </span> </div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
In 1972 PSA convinced that the L-1011 was the right aircraft for its future, recommitted to the L-1011 signing a contract for five aircraft, with two scheduled for delivery in 1974 and one each in 1975, 1976 and 1977. The airline opted for a high density single class cabin configuration seating 296 passengers. PSA also became the only airline customers to select the lower level lounge option offered by Lockheed on the L-1011.</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
The lower level lounge in PSA's configuration offered 16 saleable seats and was connected to the main passenger cabin by a staircase. In order to meet FAA certification standards to allow passenger occupation during takeoff and landing extra structure had to be added to the belly of the fuselage in case of a wheels up landing. The lounge occupied part of the lower cargo compartment and galley space, which was the main reason no other L-1011 customer selected the option.</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-2fRm4diKqKY/T4IIy2acClI/AAAAAAAACg0/Myv-ES5daM8/s1600/04-09-12+04.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="418" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-2fRm4diKqKY/T4IIy2acClI/AAAAAAAACg0/Myv-ES5daM8/s640/04-09-12+04.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Artist Rendition of the L-1011 lower deck lounge option, from a Lockheed Corporate sales brochure</span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"> </span> </div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
For PSA though the lower level lounge held one key advantage the entry door contained an integral air stairs which allowed for ramp loading of passengers at airport's in its system that were not equipped to service widebody aircraft. Passengers could enter the aircraft through the lounge and climb the stairs to the main passenger cabin. The carrier felt this option would help expedite the boarding of the airplane and reduce ground turn times.</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
However before the airline could take delivery of its first aircraft the 1973 Oil Crisis hit, and fuel prices which had been hovering around 11 cents/gallon shot up to 33 cents/gallon almost overnight.</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
PSA's first L-1011 named "Mother Grinningbird" entered service on August 1, 1974 while the second aircraft was loaned to Lockheed to be used for sales purposes at the Farnborough Air Show, being placed into regular service at the end of October. It quickly became apparent to the airline that the L-1011 was not built for its high density commuter operation.</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-Ut_BS3LL1PA/T4IUoft_nHI/AAAAAAAAChI/R3Ddx6GzpTw/s1600/04-09-12+06.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="418" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-Ut_BS3LL1PA/T4IUoft_nHI/AAAAAAAAChI/R3Ddx6GzpTw/s640/04-09-12+06.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Interior shots of PSA's first L-1011 taken at the delivery ceremony</span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"> </span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
For one the airplane just wasn't designed for quick turn arounds like the 727. The L-1011's size and height meant that everything from provisioning the aircraft, fueling and unloading the baggage compartments took longer. The airline also found that by reducing flight frequencies on its key trunk routes between San Diego, Los Angeles and San Francisco they lost customers. It turned out that passengers especially business travelers prefered having the flexibility its previous schedule had offered and weren't willing to wait three to four hours between flights to fly on the larger L-1011.</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
All of the airline's cost models that supported the decision to purchase the L-1011 were predicated on fuel prices in the 9-11 cents/gallon range, but by the time of the airplane's first revenue flight in August of 1974 the price of fuel was hovering around 33 cents/gallon which represented a 200% increase in cost for the airline. At these prices there was just no way to make the numbers work for the L-1011 and the airline realized it needed to dispose of the aircraft and quickly.</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
But PSA wasn't the only airline to realize this as airline's around the world in response to the rising fuel costs began to dump fleets of almost new widebody 747s, DC-10s and L-1011s on the market. The excessive supply of airplanes, hurt the resale value of the aircraft. The problem for PSA was exasurbated by the airline's decision to opt for the lower lounge option. This feature which occupied a good portion of the forward cargo hold along with the lack of a full galley made these aircraft very unattractive to potential buyers as the loss of revenue cargo space made it difficult for airlines to make money with the aircraft. The costs of reconfiguring the airplane could not be justified given the ready supply of other suitable widebodies.</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-GMF4OmUNGqc/T4IchMFuvaI/AAAAAAAAChU/rfgDZKLRMjc/s1600/04-09-12+07.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="296" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-GMF4OmUNGqc/T4IchMFuvaI/AAAAAAAAChU/rfgDZKLRMjc/s640/04-09-12+07.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
The last PSA L-1011 was withdrawn from service in April of 1975, and with no buyer headed off to the desert for storage. The airline planned to return the aircraft to service in June of that year to cover the anticipated increased summer travel demand but those plans never came to fruition and the aircraft continued to gather dust in Arizona. The airline also proceeded to cancel the remaining three aircraft on order, which by that time were in various stages of production. Lockheed sued PSA for breach of contract. The parties eventually came to terms with PSA agreeing to send one of its L-1011s on a world wide promotional tour on behalf of Lockheed, while German customer LTU eager to standardize its L-1011 fleet traded in 2 ex-Eastern airplanes for the three undelivered PSA aircraft. </div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
The two original aircraft were subsequently leased to Lockheed who subleased them to AeroPeru until their new L-1011-500s could be delivered. The ex-PSA aircraft were then returned to Marana in 1982 where they sat until finally three years later in 1985 PSA found a willing buyer in Worldways Canada who purchased both aircraft.</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
In the end PSA's widebody experiment lasted only nine months. While it ultimately proved to be a failure, without the spike in fuel prices one wonders whether the experiment may have lasted a little longer if not proven itself to be profitable at least for a time.</div>
</div>Gregory Maxwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14018544410005482774noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-339348712464762588.post-43750401177854241842012-03-25T23:21:00.000-07:002014-01-28T13:11:23.604-08:00The History Behind Washington Reagan National's Perimeter Rule - Part 3<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Gf69EzAhW00/T2_ovonmevI/AAAAAAAACa4/smxt-mmFziY/s1600/03-26-12+02.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Gf69EzAhW00/T2_ovonmevI/AAAAAAAACa4/smxt-mmFziY/s640/03-26-12+02.png" height="296" width="640" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Boeing 727-100 at Washington National Airport, photo copy write Steve Williams</span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br />
</span></div>
National Airport officially opened to jet aircraft on April 24, 1966 but within a few months it became clear to the FAA that airlines were not adhering to the spirit of the CAB agreement. It was determined that carriers were in fact circumventing the 650 mile perimeter rule and flying long haul jet operations by scheduling interim stops at an airport within the existing perimeter in which originating National passengers remained on the aircraft during its very short time on the ground before the flight continued on its transcontinental journey.<br />
<br />
The noise problem also did not improve as the ORI study had suggested instead residents called in greater numbers as the high pitched tone of the new jet aircraft was far different, and in fact more disturbing to a great number of residents than the usual piston and turboprop aircraft. So many people complained that the FAA set up a noise complaint call center which recorded and plotted citizen noise complaints, a practice that continues to this day.<br />
<br />
Further instead of reducing operations at National as the study had suggested, the introduction of jets only served to intensify the pressure on National, which by then was bursting at the seams having absorbed an additional 16,000 passengers while Dulles’s passenger total dropped off by 15,000 during the same time period in 1967.<br />
<br />
The FAA, convinced the airline’s could not be counted on to live up to the previous agreement issued a Notice of Proposed Rule making (31 Fed. Reg. 9148) which established a hard perimeter of 500 miles and revoked the previous grandfathered routes under the existing CAB agreement this was later revised to allow the existing 650 mile perimeter rule and grandfathered routes to continue, but it was decided that the director of National Airport would hold final approval over aircraft scheduled on a given airline’s route.<br />
<br />
Then in the summer of 1966 the FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Rule making: “Limitations Governing Number of Air Carrier Operations Each Hour at Washington National Airport” (14 Code CFR, Part 159, Docket 7526;Notice 66-29) which established a cap of 60 hourly flight operations, reserving 40 of those operational slots for commercial airline operations. Unfortunately the cap did not adequately reduce congestion at the airport and so the CAB began to explore additional avenues to resolve the overcrowding problem at National, including forcing the relocation of some existing flights to either Friendship or Dulles.<br />
<br />
By this time the DOT was in the midst of developing the so called “<a href="http://jet-age.net/Documents/FAA_Legislation/14_CFR_93.123_High_Density_Traffic_Airports.pdf">High Density Rule</a>,” that capped hour flight operations at five of the country’s most congested airports: National, La Guardia, JFK, Newark and Chicago O’Hare. The High Density Rule imposed the following specific restrictions on National operations:<br />
<br />
1. Air Carriers operating under IFR conditions were limited to 40 scheduled flights per hour, with<br />
the exception of extra sections of the same flight, a concession demanded by Eastern Airlines to<br />
protect its lucrative New York-Washington shuttle operation.<br />
2. General aviation operations would be limited to 12 operations per hour during IFR conditions<br />
and air taxi operations to 8 per hour (U.S. DOT 1971, 7).<br />
<br />
In 1968 in an effort to expand and modernize National's piston era facilities the FAA announced that it had hired an architect to draw up plans to redesign the terminal to meet the demands of the jet age. The plan met with stiff opposition from residents concerned about increased noise, as well as both Friendship and Dulles supporters who were convinced that an enhanced National would increase the popularity of the airport at the expense of the region’s other two airports.<br />
<br />
There was also a debate in Congress over who exactly should own and manage Dulles and National, with some questioning whether the FAA/DOT should be in the airport business at all. In the end the differences were just to great to overcome and no federal funding was approved and the FAA was forced to shelve its modernization plans for National.<br />
<br />
Despite the setback the FAA was able to establish a clear vision for the future of National Airport built on voluntary agreements with the airlines and the DOT’s High Density Rule, which emphasized the following objectives:<br />
<br />
1. To provide the optimum utilization of Washington national Airport<br />
2. To emphasize its role as a short haul airport<br />
3. To reduce undue congestion at the airport<br />
4. To maintain efficient runway operations<br />
5. To improve serve to the traveling public (Federal Register, 9148, 1966).<br />
<br />
During the 1970’s the FAA continued to pursue an operating policy which adhered to these strict objectives and later added two additional criteria, to reduce the aircraft noise and congestion associated with the prevailing use of Washington National and to prescribe a role for both Washington National and Dulles International airport in order to permit the orderly planning for the future at both these facilities. The need to promote better utilization of Dulles Airport and emphasize its role as the long haul domestic and international airport was seen as the key component to reducing congestion at National.<br />
<br />
The passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1970 helped push the FAA to establish separate operating plans and policies for both National and Dulles. But the road to establishing these procedures would be a long and winding one over the course of the next decade, necessitating countless environmental impact statements and proposals which were all submitted for public review and comment, before a final compromised solution could be reached.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/--qd2UyEtM3w/T2_vYPJiueI/AAAAAAAACbE/FM53E7hCmiE/s1600/03-26-12+03.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/--qd2UyEtM3w/T2_vYPJiueI/AAAAAAAACbE/FM53E7hCmiE/s1600/03-26-12+03.png" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Boeing 727-200 "Whisperjet," copy write Kenny Ganz</span></div>
<br />
In April of 1970, the FAA under the direction of Administrator Jack Shaffer lifted the ban on the stretched 200 series of the popular Boeing 727 at National, approving its use on an interim basis until a complete evaluation of the aircraft’s effect on airport capacity and air traffic congestion could be completed. The FAA sponsored study concluded that the 727-200 had no adverse effect on either air traffic or airport congestion and permanent approval was given to airline operators to deploy the aircraft on routes in and out of National.<br />
<br />
However supporters of Dulles and Baltimore’s Friendship airport did not agree stating that by allowing the stretched 727 to operate at National, Dulles had lost 20,000 and Friendship 200,000 passengers in the first full year of 727-200 operations at the airport. During that same time period National’s passenger count had grown by 550,000.<br />
<br />
In response a coalition of citizen groups filed suit against the FAA in an effort to preserve air traffic at Dulles and reduce noise and air pollution from jets operating at National Airport. The suit stated that the FAA was in violation of NEPA for failing to file an environmental impact statement in relation to its decision to allow the stretched 727-200 to operate at National and its operating plans for each airport. The plaintiff’s intended outcome was to force the FAA to redirect a portion of the jet traffic to either Dulles or Friendship airports.<br />
<br />
The case was heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit, which ruled that the FAA was indeed required under NEPA to submit an EIS in relation to its operations plan for the two Washington Airports under its direct control, but the court further stipulated that the decision to lift the restriction on the 727-200 did not require an EIS or public review. On August 15, 1980 the FAA issued its Final EIS and Operating Policy for National Airport which emphasized the need to cap operations at National and continued enforcement of the perimeter rule to further limit access to the airport to short haul jet aircraft.<br />
<br />
The 1977 extension of the Metro rail system to National Airport only exacerbated the inconvenience of Dulles and led to a further decline in passengers, as the METRO extension meant that National Airport was only a short 15 minute train ride away which further enhanced its appeal to passengers and helped to reduce land side congestion in and around the airport.<br />
<br />
The following year Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, which had an almost immediate negative effect on traffic levels at Dulles, so pronounced was the decline in operations and passengers in the five years preceding deregulation that by 1983 the long term viability of the airport was being questioned. In the face of increased competition from the flurry of start-up airlines as the result of deregulation, established carriers quickly abandoned less profitable flights into Dulles in order to consolidate their position at National.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-EbdnfjWDyQI/T3ABgTxFrJI/AAAAAAAACbQ/K0R7DjTqMck/s1600/03-26-12+04.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-EbdnfjWDyQI/T3ABgTxFrJI/AAAAAAAACbQ/K0R7DjTqMck/s1600/03-26-12+04.png" /></a>The FAA tried in vain to stem the tide of airline defections at Dulles through a series of actions in 1980, including the waiver of all landing fees and cessation of charges to airlines for use of the mobile lounges. But these measures proved ineffective and so the FAA proposed even stricter regulations which were encapsulated in the final August 15, 1980 plan for National which was later superseded in November of 1981 by the Metropolitan Washington Airports Policy of 1981. The plan included the following regulations regarding operation of National Airport:</div>
<br />
1. An annual ceiling of 16 million passenger enplanements<br />
2. A nonstop perimeter of 1,000 miles with no exceptions<br />
3. An allocation of takeoff and landing slots up to 37 scheduled operations per hour for air<br />
carriers utilizing aircraft with 56 or more passenger seats (except for extra sections which need<br />
not obtain a slot), 11 per hour for commuter air carriers using aircraft with less than 56<br />
passenger seats and 12 per hour for general aviation.<br />
4. Wide-body aircraft are banned from operating at National unless otherwise directed by the <br />
administrator of the FAA and director of the airport on a case-by-case basis.<br />
5. A night time noise limitation on aircraft operated after 9:59 PM and before 7:00 AM, such that<br />
no aircraft generating more than 72 dBA on takeoff may depart and no aircraft generating more<br />
than 85 dBA on approach may land during these hours except for aircraft scheduled to arrive<br />
before 10:00 PM that have received an approach clearance before 10:30 PM.<br />
<br />
The proposed 1,000 mile perimeter at DCA did not set well with elements of the Texas Congressional delegation and on September 22, 1980 the City of Houston and American Airlines filed a petition asking for the FAA to extend the nonstop perimeter to 1,250 miles which would allow nonstop flights to National from Houston Intercontinental Airport which was just a few hundred miles beyond the existing 1,000 mile limit. In July of that year the Federal Appeals Court upheld the FAA’s decision and denied the petition to extend the perimeter.<br />
<br />
By 1983 quieter Stage III aircraft such as the Boeing 757-200 and MD-80, which met the 1981-82 noise thresholds established for night time jet operations began to be deployed on routes into National, which further exacerbated the noise issue for residents living near the airport who were not expecting these operations. In that same year the FAA also attempted to pass more rules which further restricted access to DCA, by reducing the yearly passenger enplanement cap and revising the 1981 slot allocations at the airport. Congress intervened passing legislation which prevented the FAA from implementing the new rules until September of 1985.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-UNhFwDQxUJ0/T3ADFuVp7FI/AAAAAAAACbY/WqMWthYvtP0/s1600/03-26-12+05.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-UNhFwDQxUJ0/T3ADFuVp7FI/AAAAAAAACbY/WqMWthYvtP0/s640/03-26-12+05.png" height="296" width="640" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Boeing 757-200, first new narrow body Stage III airplane, copy write Bob Garrard</span> </div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
In June of 1984, then Secretary of Transportation, Elizabeth Dole announced that she would seek to introduce legislation in the 99th Congress to transfer ownership of Washington National and Dulles Airports to a regional authority or private sector entity. The Holton Commission, a 15 member advisory panel was established to study how best to reorganize the Metropolitan Washington Airports and outline the process to facilitate transfer of ownership to the new controlling party.<br />
<br />
The Holton Commission, comprised of representatives from the District of Columbia, the states of Virginia and Maryland, Congress, the Air Transport Association, National Business Aviation Association and the Regional Airline Association issued its final recommendation in December of 1984, concluding that:<br />
<br />
1. The airports should be transferred to an independent authority created jointly by the<br />
Commonwealth of Virginia, and the District of Columbia, and that the authority have the ability<br />
to issue tax-exempt revenue bonds to finance improvements at the airports<br />
2. The transfer of ownership should be accomplished through a long-term lease whereby the<br />
authority would make payments over a period of not more than 35 years<br />
3. The authority would be governed by a board of 11 members with five appointed by the<br />
Governor of Virginia, three by the Mayor of the District of Columbia, and two by the Governor<br />
of Maryland and one by the President of the United States.<br />
<br />
On October 16, 1986 Congress approved leasing the airports to a regional authority, passing the Metropolitan Washington Airports Act which effectively ended federal ownership and control of both Washington Airports by the FAA, a position the agency had maintained for 45 years. <br />
<br />
The compromised bill included many concessions which essentially revoked the 1980 and 1981 regulations adopted by the FAA concerning capacity at National Airport. It also froze the number of hourly slots to levels established in the 1981 FAA Notice of Proposed Rule making. The major concessions of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Act regarding National Airport included:<br />
<br />
1. Passenger Ceiling (CAP): The bill eliminated the yearly passenger enplanement cap<br />
2. Perimeter Rule: The existing perimeter at DCA was extended from 1,000 to 1,250 miles to<br />
allow nonstop flights from Houston, TX<br />
3. Widebody Aircraft: The Act repealed the 1981 regulation prohibiting the operation of such<br />
aircraft at National<br />
4. Nighttime noise: The Authority was given authority to change the 1981-82 restrictions<br />
5. High Density Rule: The Act froze the number of slots and provided that the rule may not be<br />
changed except for reasons of safety.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.jet-age.net/2012/03/history-behind-washington-reagan_21.html">PART 2</a>Gregory Maxwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14018544410005482774noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-339348712464762588.post-68698212697449215812012-03-21T07:00:00.001-07:002012-04-11T00:51:30.653-07:00The History Behind Washington Reagan National's Perimeter Rule - Part 2<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-jUg99kmRztM/T2l0jQygNvI/AAAAAAAACYo/zbQAq5pjriM/s1600/03-20-12+04.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="296" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-jUg99kmRztM/T2l0jQygNvI/AAAAAAAACYo/zbQAq5pjriM/s640/03-20-12+04.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Artist Impression of National Airport in 1941</span> </div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
In just under 10 years from its opening in 1941 congestion at National had increased to the point that both the landside roadways and airside pavement were often overwhelmed by the sheer volume of traffic. In addition the airspace over the District of Columbia was becoming increasingly crowded as traffic from National Airport mixed with military aircraft from surrounding airfields. As a result Congress grew increasingly concerned about the potential for a major air disaster over Washington D.C. and eventually in September of 1950 they were moved to action, passing the Second Washington Airport Act. The act appropriated funds for the construction of a second larger international airport to reduce the congestion and overcrowding at National. <br />
<br />
However as like the previous debate over the location of National Airport, Congress could not immediately agree on a suitable location for the new airport. It would take seven years of political wrangling before the final site selection was made by the President and approved by Congress. Construction of the new airport named "Dulles International" on 10,000 acres of land in rural Chantilly, Virginia some 26 miles from the Capitol finally began in 1957.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-yxAY1WlgbHU/T2l5pNzGrhI/AAAAAAAACY0/DsjH_XVYR2w/s1600/03-20-12+05.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="296" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-yxAY1WlgbHU/T2l5pNzGrhI/AAAAAAAACY0/DsjH_XVYR2w/s640/03-20-12+05.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Dulles Airport's Iconic Terminal Building pictured shortly after opening in 1962</span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"> </span> </div>
Dulles International Airport officially opened for business on November 20, 1962 with six airline tenants: American, Braniff, Delta, Eastern, TWA and Northwest Orient. The airport was the first airport to be built in the United States specifically to handle jet airplanes. However the airport proved a tough sell to passengers, who preferred the convenience of congested National Airport to the modern and spacious but inconvenient Dulles. In response to weak demand and the airport’s remote location air service options at Dulles would remain limited for the next several decades.<br />
<br />
In 1959 the newly established Federal Aviation Agency enacted a ban on all pure jet operations at Washington National Airport. It was the agency’s belief that National's runways were too short and structurally unable to support repetitive operations by four engine intercontinental jets like the DC-8 and 707. Secondly the FAA which owned and operated National and the then uncompleted Dulles airport wished to prohibit jet use at National to force airlines to move those operations to Dulles to help spur growth at the new airport once it opened. The state of Maryland also objected to the use of jet aircraft at National as they felt that action would inhibit growth at Baltimore's Friendship Airport. Last the residents living around National were becoming increasingly vocal about the noise generated by piston engine aircraft landing and departing the airport, and there was much public outcry against allowing even louder jet airplanes to use the facility.<br />
<br />
By 1960 the noise problem at National had become such a large concern, that then FAA administrator Elwood Quesada, tired of the continuous calls from residents moved to establish specific noise abatement procedures for arriving and departing aircraft. As a result National Airport became the third airport in the country to have prescribed noise abatement procedures, the first of which went into effect in the fall of 1960.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-xk4U-GR5OhE/T2l7fhDy5yI/AAAAAAAACY8/5KWlXxRSb3M/s1600/03-20-12+06.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="296" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-xk4U-GR5OhE/T2l7fhDy5yI/AAAAAAAACY8/5KWlXxRSb3M/s640/03-20-12+06.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Aerial View of Dulles Airport circa 1966, notice the desolate commercial airline ramp</span> </div>
<br />
But even with the prohibition on jet aircraft, National was still the fourth busiest airport in the country in 1962 averaging a takeoff or landing every minute. The new Dulles Airport simply was not having the desired effect of reducing congestion at National as the FAA had hoped, which was reflected by the fact that by 1965 the three year old airport was averaging less than 90 flights a day compared to National’s 600 daily flights. While Dulles was losing money National was generating over $100 million a year in revenues for the federal government. In short the situation at National had become untenable and the FAA realized that Dulles at least in the short term was not the solution to reducing congestion at DCA and they would have to explore other options to curb the growth at National Airport.<br />
<br />
By 1965 the prohibition on jet aircraft at National was making life increasingly difficult for airlines, and presenting serious challenges to aircraft scheduling. The proliferation of small to medium sized commercial jets led by the Boeing 727 and Douglas DC-9, was wide spread by this point with more than 70 U.S. airports having regularly scheduled jet service.<br />
<br />
Advancements in jet engine technology in the 1960’s created an entirely new class of short haul narrow body jets beginning with the French built Caravelle which made its American debut with United Airlines in 1961. These new lighter short haul jets were more than capable of operating from National’s short runways and produced noise levels equivalent to those of existing piston engined and turboprop aircraft currently servicing the field. <br />
<br />
The airlines were shedding expensive and unreliable piston engine aircraft in great numbers by this time and began to turn up the heat on the FAA to try to force the agency to repeal the ban on pure jet aircraft at National. The outcries from the airlines were soon joined by voices from Congress and the media, both of which detested the long arduous drive to Dulles just to fly on a jet.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-Xg7-P1JD0ks/T2l-kwO6iFI/AAAAAAAACZI/2xGHvbT8a1Y/s1600/03-20-12+07.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="296" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-Xg7-P1JD0ks/T2l-kwO6iFI/AAAAAAAACZI/2xGHvbT8a1Y/s640/03-20-12+07.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">The new generation of short haul jets, led by the 727-100, 737-200 and DC-9, photo copy write George W. Hamlin</span></div>
<br />
In response the FAA commissioned Operations Research Inc. (ORI) in 1966 to conduct a study to explore the Economic Feasibility of Alternative Programs for Washington National Airport. The study was focused primarily on the feasibility of opening National to jet operations and investigating the effects the jet aircraft would have on the growth of the airport, subsequent effect on both Dulles and Baltimore Friendship airports and the noise impact on residents living around National. The conclusions of the ORI study are summarized below.<br />
<br />
1. Dulles and Friendship’s growth would not be hampered by allowing jet aircraft into national.<br />
2. 1.5 million hours of travel time would be saved over the course of the next 15 years, resulting in<br />
a savings of approximately $15 million a year for the next 15 years.<br />
3. The potential monetary benefit of allowing jets into National should be supported by an<br />
investment by the federal government of up to $150 million to enhance and expand the airport to<br />
accommodate these aircraft.<br />
4. The introduction of higher capacity jet aircraft would likely cause an overall reduction in noise<br />
for residents, as aircraft operations would decline with the added capacity until 1970 when the<br />
study forecasted that the noise influence zone would begin to grow.<br />
5. The noise level of short and medium haul jets was predicted to be similar in level to existing piston<br />
and turboprop aircraft using the airport and due to their higher performance and speed the jet<br />
aircraft would be able to climb higher and faster which would reduce the noise impact to residents<br />
around National.<br />
<br />
Satisfied that the introduction of jet aircraft would not negatively impact the two other regional airports and encouraged that these new aircraft might actually help reduce congestion at National the FAA announced on January 11, 1966 that it would open DCA to two and three-engined jets the following spring.<br />
<br />
In order to help ensure the future growth of Dulles as a hub for international and long haul domestic air travel in the Washington D.C. market and to reduce the pressure on National the FAA worked out an agreement with the airlines that voluntarily limited nonstop flights to and from DCA to a radius of 650 miles. <br />
<br />
The subsequent agreement (CAB order E-23743) was filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board in May of 1966. Seven existing routes to airports outside the 650 mile perimeter from National were given grandfather rights. The agreement became known as the perimeter rule and was the first in a series of measures that served to restrict flight operations at DCA. As part of the agreement commercial airlines also agreed to voluntarily refrain from scheduling jet flights between 10:00 PM and 07:00 AM at National in order to reduce the noise imposed on communities around National airport.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><a href="http://www.jet-age.net/2012/03/history-behind-washington-reagan.html">PART 1</a>
<a href="http://www.jet-age.net/2012/03/history-behind-washington-reagan_25.html">PART 3</a> </span></div>Gregory Maxwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14018544410005482774noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-339348712464762588.post-39996139315919062252012-03-19T22:36:00.002-07:002014-01-28T13:09:36.511-08:00The History Behind Washington Reagan National's Perimeter Rule - Part 1<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Lw52HXhyjxE/T2gJF-UeWvI/AAAAAAAACXQ/fQ7EhgNE1-E/s1600/03-19-12+02.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Lw52HXhyjxE/T2gJF-UeWvI/AAAAAAAACXQ/fQ7EhgNE1-E/s640/03-19-12+02.png" height="296" width="640" /></a></div>
<span style="color: black;">March 12th was the filing deadline for new entrant/limited incumbent carriers to submit applications to claim their share of the beyond perimeter slot exemptions created as a result of the <a href="http://jet-age.net/Documents/Congressional_Legislation/FAA_Modernization_and_Reform_Act_of_2012.pdf" target="_blank">FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012</a>. In total Congress authorized 16 slots or 8 total slot pairs for flights beyond the existing 1,250 mile perimeter. The issuance of beyond perimeter slot exemptions at Washington Reagan National Airport (DCA) is rare with a total of only 24 previous slot exemptions having been issued in two separate proceedings since 2000. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="color: black;">Washington Reagan is one of only two airports in the United States to have flight operations artificially restricted by a perimeter rule, New York LaGuardia is the other with a prohibition on nonstop flights beyond 1,500 miles. But what is the history of the perimeter rule and why exactly was it established at National Airport?</span><br />
<br />
<b>Origins of National Airport</b><br />
<span style="color: black;">The <a href="http://jet-age.net/Documents/Congressional_Legislation/Air_Commerce_Act_of_1926.pdf" target="_blank">Air Commerce Act of 1926</a> charged the Secretary of Commerce with fostering development of the nation's aviation system by centralizing oversight, control and enforcement of aviation regulations, including pilots licensing, aircraft certification, as well as establishment and maintenance of airways and their associated navigation aids. To execute the duties outlined in the act, Congress directed that a new Aeronautical branch of the Department of Commerce be created. This department was the forerunner to the Civil Aeronautics Authority which became the Federal Aviation Agency which was later renamed the Federal Aviation Administration.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="color: black;">One of the provisions of the Air Commerce Act expressly prohibited the federal government from owning and operating commercial airports. This meant that construction and operation of an airport to serve the nation's capital fell under the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia. However due to the circumstances surrounding the creation of the District of Columbia, Congress held final approval rights over the District's budget, therefore any money's allocated to the establishment of an airport within the district's jurisdiction would have to ultimately be approved by Congress.</span><br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-HnbDd0OW7ug/T2gM2EUaydI/AAAAAAAACXc/a3Z9X9PcamQ/s1600/03-19-12+03.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-HnbDd0OW7ug/T2gM2EUaydI/AAAAAAAACXc/a3Z9X9PcamQ/s640/03-19-12+03.png" height="296" width="640" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Aerial overview of Hoover Field</span><span style="color: black;"> </span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<span style="color: black;">Washington's first two commercial airports, the predecessors to National Airport were built adjacent to each other on the current day sight of the Pentagon in Arlington, VA. The first named <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hoover_Field" target="_blank">Hoover Field</a>, after then Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover opened in 1926, having been constructed in just five days. The second field named <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington_Airport" target="_blank">Washington Airport</a> opened a year later. </span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br />
<span style="color: black;">Both airports were poorly sited and suffered from significant safety deficiencies such as the active road that intersected the single sod runway and numerous obstructions on the approach path to the airport which often made landings dangerous. By 1930 the two airfields had merged into one single facility under the combined name Washington-Hoover Airport. Congress was quick to recognize that the existing airport was unsuitable and ill equipped to meet the future needs of the District of Columbia. However despite its many deficiencies Washington-Hoover Airport continued to serve as the capitol's only commercial airport until National opened in 1941.</span><span style="color: black;"> </span></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br />
<span style="color: black;">During the intervening decade between the passage of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 and the enaction of the <a href="http://jet-age.net/Documents/Congressional_Legislation/Civil_Aeronautics_Act_of_1938.pdf" target="_blank">Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938</a> Congress floundered in its attempts to settle on a site for a new airport to serve the District of Columbia. Numerous bills that would have established the location of the new airport failed to make it out of committee, including a 1927 proposal put forth by the District and supported by both Congress and the Bureau of the Budget to locate the airport at its present day location at <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravelly_Point" target="_blank">Gravelly Point</a>. President Calvin Coolidge himself vetoed the plan, stating that Congress and Congress alone should determine the location of the new airport. By 1937 Congress had narrowed the list of alternatives to three, the first proposal suggested improving the existing Washington-Hoover Airport, while the two other alternative site plans involved Gravelly Point and Camp Springs, Maryland site of present day <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrews_Air_Force_Base" target="_blank">Andrews Air Force Base</a>.</span></div>
<br />
<span style="color: black;">The passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938 which President Roosevelt signed into law that June, effectively repealed the Air Commerce Act, including the provision which prohibited the federal government from owning and operating a commercial airport. But the new law did little to spark action by Congress to finalize the site selection of the new airport. Frustrated by the lack of progress during a Congressional recess Roosevelt instructed the newly established Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) to pick a site for the airport.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="color: black;">The CAA ultimately selected Gravelly Point, even though the majority of the land was comprised of mud flats which were underwater most of the time. But of critical importance the site was less than four miles from Capitol Hill and the majority of the land was already owned by the federal government. Roosevelt appropriated funds from the Public Works Administration (PWA) and Works Project Administration (WPA) to pay for the new airport and in defending his decision the President stated that he was tired of waiting for Congress to act on the issue.</span><br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-_-R-RV7KC5E/T2gQjDLgbhI/AAAAAAAACXo/6pkPQMOAF6U/s1600/03-19-12+04.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-_-R-RV7KC5E/T2gQjDLgbhI/AAAAAAAACXo/6pkPQMOAF6U/s640/03-19-12+04.png" height="296" width="640" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="color: black;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">National Airport Terminal Dedication</span></span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="color: black;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"> </span> </span></div>
<span style="color: black;">In order to build the airport the Army Corps of Engineers had to fill in 325 acres of marsh land with 19.5 million cubic yards of dredge material pumped from the bottom of the Potomac River. Two years later in the fall of 1940 at the site dedication Roosevelt laid the cornerstone of what would become the main terminal building, referring to the airport as Washington National Airport. The Airport officially opened for business the following summer and within a year traffic had grown to the point that National was the second busiest airport in the United States.</span><br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.jet-age.net/2012/03/history-behind-washington-reagan_21.html" target="_blank">PART 2</a><span style="color: black;"><br /></span>Gregory Maxwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14018544410005482774noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-339348712464762588.post-90644671330976497222011-12-06T17:28:00.001-08:002012-02-19T21:37:51.000-08:00Airbus A340 Flies off Into the Sunset, was it a Failure?<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-EhWwkScq5Eo/T0HbONMPgJI/AAAAAAAAB_U/RNi_F1Igg1w/s1600/12-06-11+01.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="296" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-EhWwkScq5Eo/T0HbONMPgJI/AAAAAAAAB_U/RNi_F1Igg1w/s640/12-06-11+01.png" width="640" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div>Airbus announced this week that its was closing the A340 production line after the aircraft family failed to garner any new orders in the last two years. Hours after the announcement most journalists labeled the A340 a commercial failure, citing its inability to compete with the Boeing 777 and its higher operating costs as the chief reason the aircraft fell out of favor with airlines. Randy Tinseth, vice president of marketing for Boeing's Commercial Airplane division, stated as much on his blog. However the truth is probably somewhere in the middle. While there can be no doubt that the Boeing 777 family's runaway success contributed to the downfall of the A340. The 777 alone didn't kill the A340, instead a combination of changing market factors, evolving aviation regulations and internal competition from Airbus' own A330-300 left the A340 without a market. <br />
<br />
When Airbus designed the A300, the world's first widebody twin jet back in the 1970's it envisioned an entire family of airplanes, 9 models in all designated A300B1 through B9. The A300B4, A300-600 and A310 were part of this strategy. With the success of the A300/A310 family Airbus established a toe hold in the cut throat commercial airplane industry as a legitimate competitor to the U.S. behemoths Boeing, Douglas and Lockheed who at the time dominated the industry.<br />
<br />
Just as design work began in earnest on the next models of the A300 family, a division within Airbus developed as to whether to enter the narrowbody market and build a challenger to the Boeing 737 and Douglas DC-9 or continue forward with the original plan of constructing the next jet in the long range A300 family. The German partners favored moving forward with the four engined widebody while the French and Spanish partners preferred to build the all new narrow body. Eventually the narrow body strategy won out and design work on the A320 proceeded.<br />
<br />
As major design work on the A320 wrapped up Airbus began to return its focus to extending the family of long range widebody jets. Early design studies used the same wing as the A300 and incorporated the largest high bypass engines currently available. The design team and more importantly perspective customers were split on whether the new aircraft should be a twin or a quad jet. Most U.S. airlines favored a twin, while the majority of Asian and European airlines favored a quad. In order to satisfy both airline customer groups and meet their drastically different requirements Airbus decided it would build both a twin and a quad jet.<br />
<br />
In order to save money it was decided that the two aircraft would share the same wing and fuselage cross section as the A300 and would incorporate a common flight deck and systems to permit the aircraft to share a single type rating. The TA9 aircraft was targeted at high-capacity, medium range transcontinental routes that were currently being flown by the domestic DC-10-10 and L-1011-200. The TA9 was to have a range of about 3,300 nm and carry the same payload as the Douglas and Lockheed airplanes while consuming 25-38% less fuel. The longer range TA11 was to designed to fly up to 6,830 nm and was targeted at the DC-10-30, L-1011-500 and the yet to be built MD-11. Airbus finalized the design of the aircraft in January of 1986 and re-designated the twin jet TA9 the A330 and the four engine TA11 the A340.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgS7VN3GixQWGkDiUkQdXSitQdW0WzFGxo5dzqb-W_5lEXt9s1zY4pXvfFbhoSm2lw1LDc3Eh5rcspEnIgM-iBBj-301a3u6FufOpHfwUmAyXhy-XguEmaHBXScvuKKn7uyg8Qx9ehgnHk_/s1600/12-06-11+02.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="622" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgS7VN3GixQWGkDiUkQdXSitQdW0WzFGxo5dzqb-W_5lEXt9s1zY4pXvfFbhoSm2lw1LDc3Eh5rcspEnIgM-iBBj-301a3u6FufOpHfwUmAyXhy-XguEmaHBXScvuKKn7uyg8Qx9ehgnHk_/s640/12-06-11+02.png" width="640" /></a></div><br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div>At the time of the A340s development regulations controlling twin-engined jet aircraft were very strict making trans-Atlantic flights inpractical and expensive in such aircraft. The FAA in particular in the early 80's still maintained very strict regulations on twin jets due to legacy safety concerns about jet engine reliability. The thinking was that four engines were ideal for long over water flights and 3 engines while suitable were less than ideal and twin engine jets were entirely not suitable for trans-oceanic flights. Airlines which had an abundent supply of cheap fuel at the time and perhaps with distant memories of the unreliable piston engined days still favored four engines for long haul over water flights, as did most passengers. So it was in this regulatory climate that the four engined A340 was designed and built by Airbus.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div>At that same time in Seattle, Boeing was in the midst of its dual certification campaign for the all new 757 and 767 aircraft familes. The Boeing 767 was the company's first widebody twin jet and was designed to compete with the Airbus A300/A310. The first 767-200 entered airline service with United in September of 1982 serving on high density domestic trunk routes.<br />
<br />
During the next several years of operation the aircraft's performance helped validate the reliability of the 767's widebody twin engine design, enough so that in 1985 the FAA relaxed its 90 minute diversion rule satisfied that aircraft such as the 767 given its operational track record could safely fly trans-oceanic flights. The FAA was the first aviation agency in the world to specify ETOPS requirements allowing for a twin engine jet to fly up to 120 minutes from a suitable diversion airport, which was sufficient for twin jets to operate almost all existing trans-Atlantic routes. TWA was the first airline to be awarded ETOPS certification, when in 1985 it was granted approval to operate Boeing 767 services between St. Louis and Frankfurt.<br />
<br />
A few years later in 1988 the FAA, now with three years of safe, trouble free trans-Atlantic 767 flight operations on the books made the decision to expand ETOPS to 180 minutes, this change brought 95% of the earth within reach of appropriately certified twin jets like the 767. The stage was set for the Boeing 777.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://s1117.photobucket.com/albums/k592/ZK-NBS/Jet-Age%20Blog/?action=view&current=Diversion-Rule-Small.gif" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;" target="_blank"><img alt="Photobucket" border="0" src="http://i1117.photobucket.com/albums/k592/ZK-NBS/Jet-Age%20Blog/Diversion-Rule-Small.gif" /></a><span style="font-size: xx-small;">Map generated by the Great Circle Mapper - copyright © Karl L. Swartz</span> </div><br />
In 1988 Boeing began studies on a new aircraft which would replace the aging first generation widebody jets like the DC-10, L-1011 and its own 747SP. By that time Boeing also had a good idea of the specifications of the new Airbus A340 aircraft who's design and construction was far advanced at this point. Boeing was essentially playing catch up and it knew it couldn't afford to get the design wrong. <br />
<br />
Initial design proposals focused on a stretched version of the popular 767-300ER that incorporated larger wings. This was later refined to include an expanded fuselage cross section while retaining the 767's existing flight deck, but the proposal dubbed the 767-X received a tepid response from potential customers. Airlines wanted a larger fuselage cross section with intercontinental range and lower operating costs than the 767. Boeing soon realized that an entirely new widebody twin jet aircraft family was the only solution that would deliver the operating costs and fuel burn that operators were looking for. The highly successful track record of the 767 and the reality of 180 minute ETOPS certification helped solidify the case for the 777.<br />
<br />
A team of eight airlines came together to define the specifications for the aircraft, United in particular had very stringent performance requirements. They wanted to ensure it could fly three key routes, Chicago-Hawaii, Chicago to Europe and also handle hot and high operations from Denver to Hawaii. The Hawaii flights presented the biggest challenge for Boeing as United was pushing for ETOPS certification for the aircraft right out of the gate. To data the FAA had never granted a brand new aircraft type ETOPS certification at entry into service, let alone a 180 minute certification that would be needed to reach Hawaii. The FAA usually required aircraft reliability to be validated over the course of a year of service, using a phased in approach which culminated in full 180 minutes ETOPS only after rigorous review and a successful track record with 120 minutes. Boeing assured United that then new 777 would be approved for 180 minute ETOPS upon service entry which convinced them to sign on as the U.S. launch customer on October 14, 1990.<br />
<br />
The First 777-200 was delivered to United on May 15, 1995 and 15 days later the FAA awarded the aircraft 180 minute ETOPS clearance, making it the first ever airplane to receive 180 minute ETOPS certification upon entry into service. On June 7, 1995 United operated the world's first scheduled 777 service from London Heathrow to Washington Dulles. The following year the FAA extended the Pratt & Whitney powered 777-200 ETOPS certification to 207 minutes.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgZj3GP5SgHH5kI-l-yPV1pOLjzmSHEOkrVNa8haNtCxuFiwE2Y-T1Fcrg_7QX8njavQ7F5_OQJEQcKfocj2v9xkHj_CDKuEF5eMxblW-IdgAvyg6rtH3Mdhgr-GRKDVHwKCME-8NvVxyj5/s1600/12-06-11+04.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="622" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgZj3GP5SgHH5kI-l-yPV1pOLjzmSHEOkrVNa8haNtCxuFiwE2Y-T1Fcrg_7QX8njavQ7F5_OQJEQcKfocj2v9xkHj_CDKuEF5eMxblW-IdgAvyg6rtH3Mdhgr-GRKDVHwKCME-8NvVxyj5/s640/12-06-11+04.png" width="640" /></a></div><br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div>The A340 had a two and a half year head start on the the 777, and took clear advantage of this lead. The airplane hit a sweet spot that exploited a gap in Boeing's existing product line between the 767 and 747. Airline response to the A340 was very positive and the aircraft amassed a considerable order backlog. The first A340, a 200 model entered service with Lufthansa in February of 1993 followed by delivery of the first stretched 300 model a month later to Air France. Airbus had built the aircraft around the concept that airlines would prefer the safety and reliability of a quad jet over a twin jet on trans-oceanic flights, and at least for a while especially with European airlines this strategy held water.<br />
<br />
As the 777 gained popularity especially with the introduction of the extended range 777-200ER in 1997 and airlines compiled operational data on the aircraft it became clear that the 777 was outperforming the heavier and less fuel efficient A340 and as a result Airbus's stalwart new quad jet began to loose traction to Boeing's 777.<br />
<br />
Both Boeing and Airbus were helped tremendously by McDonnell-Douglas, which experienced a major setback with its brand new MD-11 failed to initially meet its contracted performance guarantees for range and fuel burn. McDonnell-Douglas worked with NASA for five years to correct this deficiency and eventually through the Performance Improvement Program (PIP) the company was able to recover the lost range and improve fuel burn, but by that point it was too late and many major customers had defected to Boeing's 777 and Airbus's A340. <br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div>Airbus, had the foresight in developing the A330/A340 family to realize the need for a new widebody twin jet. After all the company had created the concept of a widebody twin when it built its revolutionary A300 airliner. Airbus like Boeing was closely watching the evolution of ETOPS and correctly assessed that their was a lucrative future in large twin jets. The company took a much more cautious approach to ETOPS than Boeing, prefering not to seek 180 ETOPS certification for the A330-300 out of the box but instead favored building slowly towards that goal through in service validation with airlines. Aer Lingus and Cathay Pacific assisted in the ETOPS effort with the plan to deliver all three engine models with 90 minute ETOPS, once the in service A330 fleet accumulated 25,000 hours they would seek 120 minutes followed by 180 minutes at 50,000 hours.<br />
<br />
The first A330-300 was delivered to Air Inter on January 17, 1994, followed in the second quarter with deliveries to Thai Airways and Malaysia Airlines. While the A330 was an exceptional aircraft its initial sales were less than stellar due in part to increased market penetration of the Boeing 767-300ER and a desire from airline customers for more range and less seats. In response to this demand Airbus developed the shortened A330-200 which was a direct competitor to the 767-300ER and delivered 9% lower operating costs. <br />
<br />
Incorporating the same wing and fuselage length as its heavier for engine sibling and carrying essentially the same load but with lower operating costs due to half the number of engines Airbus customers began to turn increasingly to the A330, especially as ETOPS restrictions continued to be relaxed due to the operational performance of the 767 and 777. Despite its slow initial start the A330-300 eventually supplanted the A340-300 in total orders. The extension of ETOPS to 240 minutes put almost all trans-Pacific routes within reach of the 777 and A330 further marginalizing the utility of the four engined A340. The success of the competing 777 also put a major dent in A340 sales as more customers thrilled with the performance and customer acceptance of the aircraft lined up at Boeing's door to purchase the Triple Seven.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-wEVZ_vQBYbo/T0Hbf5GemrI/AAAAAAAAB_s/hkKjDqlNACI/s1600/12-06-11+05.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="364" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-wEVZ_vQBYbo/T0Hbf5GemrI/AAAAAAAAB_s/hkKjDqlNACI/s640/12-06-11+05.png" width="640" /></a>1998 proved to be the tipping point for Boeing, in that year the 777 effectively erased the A340s two year head start in the market cumulatively delivering more aircraft in 2.5 years than Airbus had in the previous five years of A340 production. The pace at which the 777 overtook the A340 came as a shock even to Boeing. But anyway you sliced it from that point on the A340 was at a decided disadvantage in head to head sales battles with new customers as the 777 was cheaper to operate and burned less fuel. Airline customers flocked in droves to buy the 777, with the 200ER representing the bulk of the order backlog. While the 777 continued its meteoric rise by the close of the decade the momentum behind the A340 had begun to fade and sales plateaued.<br />
<br />
Almost forgotten in the shuffle was the A330-300, whose underwhelming initial sales led Airbus to develop the A330-200, a shorter, longer range aircraft. The dash 200 proved to be an extremely popular aircraft with airlines, eclipsing the range and fuel efficiency of the top selling 767-300ER. In a matter of years the A330-200 clearly established itself as the market leader over the 767-300ER and the 767 slowly began to loose out to the more efficient Airbus aircraft in new sales campaigns.<br />
<br />
The success of the A330-200 also had the added benefit of boosting sales for the larger 300, as Airbus could now sell the two aircraft as a family given their cockpit commonality, engine and airframe similarities and their complementary capacity and range. As a result sales of the 300 model began to pick up especially with existing A340 operators who were very satisfied with the quad jet but desired the fuel efficiency and lower operating costs that the A330-300 brought to the table. Rising fuel costs also weighed heavily on the minds of airlines, making the economics of the widebody twins from both Airbus and Boeing that much more compelling. While A340 sales flagged and 777-200ER orders peaked in 2007, the A330-300 continued to sell well.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-kMoh3R1OAZc/T0HbojyOTwI/AAAAAAAAB_0/KXwWKEJfv_4/s1600/12-06-11+06.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="364" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-kMoh3R1OAZc/T0HbojyOTwI/AAAAAAAAB_0/KXwWKEJfv_4/s640/12-06-11+06.png" width="640" /></a></div><br />
The longevity of the A330-300 is a result of its exceptional design and performance, but sales have also been helped in recent years by Boeing's much delayed 787 Dreamliner program which left many airlines scrambling to fill holes in their fleet plans where the 787 was supposed to be. For many 787 operators the 777 was too much airplane and the 767 doesn't offer comparable economics to the A330. <br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div>In response to lagging sales of the A340-200/300, Airbus decided to take the existing airframe and tweak it, adding new engines and a fuselage stretch to exploit a gap in capacity and range that was beyond that provided by the 777-200ER and 777-300. The manufacturer believed that there was sufficient need for a 747 replacement, and at the time Boeing despite slowing sales of the 747-400 had no concrete plans to update the vulnerable design or replace it with an all new aircraft. The super stretched A340-600 incorporated a 39.4 ft. fuselage stretch over the baseline A340-300, which enabled the aircraft to carry 25% more cargo by volume than the 747 while providing seating for 380 passengers in a three class layout and flying up to 7,900 nm. The A340-600 power by four Rolls Royce Trent 556 turbofans each producing 56,000 lbs of thrust offered significantly lower operating costs than the 747 and by the time the first A340-600 was introduced into commercial service in 2002 early 747-400s were approaching 13 years of age. <br />
<br />
Airbus also felt that there was a market for an ultra long haul aircraft that airlines could deploy on premium routes where business passengers would be willing to pay more to fly nonstop, to save time and avoid the hassles of connecting through another airport. The aircraft incorporated a 14.1 ft fuselage stretch over the existing A340-300 and four 53,000 lbs Trent 553 jet engines. The aircraft was designed to fly ultra long haul routes transporting 313 passengers in a 3 class configuration up to 9,000 nm. Airbus targeted nonstop city pairs like Singapore-Los Angeles and Bangkok-New York with the A340-500. The first A340-500 was delivered to Singapore Airlines in 2003.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-LjyD47tmWEM/T0Hbz3C8wbI/AAAAAAAAB_8/ZCWekr1eukg/s1600/12-06-11+07.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="418" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-LjyD47tmWEM/T0Hbz3C8wbI/AAAAAAAAB_8/ZCWekr1eukg/s640/12-06-11+07.png" width="640" /></a></div><br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div>Boeing at the time was still trying to decide what to do with the 747, after producing a few still born design concepts centered around a stretch to the fuselage dubbed the 747-500 and 600 respectively. However airline interest in the stretched 747 was luke warm at best. Boeing was also working diligently on the next two models of the 777 family which would extend the baseline range and performance of the 777-200ER and 777-300.<br />
<br />
From the start Boeing designed the 777-300ER as a 747-400 replacement which due to climbing fuel prices and its age was becoming more of a liability to operators with each passing year. The 300ER used the 300's existing airframe, incorporating extended raked wingtips, a strengthened landing gear assembly, extra fuel tanks and the new 115,300 lbs thrust GE90-115B as the standard engine. The 7,930 nm range of the aircraft boosted the 300ER's range by 34% over the baseline 300 model. The 300ER offered near identical seating and more revenue payload capacity than the 747-400. Launch customer Air France accepting delivery of its first 777-300ER airplane in April of 2004.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div>The ultra long range Boeing 777-200LR followed in 2006. The 200LR nicknamed the "Worldliner" was designed with a maximum range of 9,395 miles. Developed alongside the 300ER the 200LR incorporated an increased MTOW and up to three optional auxiliary fuel tanks in the rear cargo hold of the aircraft. In order to carry the extra weight the main landing gear was strengthened, the same 12.8 ft raked wingtip extensions were added to reduce drag and boost performance in addition to structural strengthening of certain elements of the fuselage. Boeing designed the 200LR for missions that were beyond the existing range of the 200ER with a full revenue payload. The idea was that the 200LR would complement existing 200ER fleets and offer the ability for airlines to tap into longer range nonstop premium routes such as Sydney-Dallas/Fort Worth or Houston-Dubai.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-9QndqOP9MIA/T0Hb5Jl60gI/AAAAAAAACAE/H3seyQH4Zag/s1600/12-06-11+08.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="418" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-9QndqOP9MIA/T0Hb5Jl60gI/AAAAAAAACAE/H3seyQH4Zag/s640/12-06-11+08.png" width="640" /></a></div><br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div>As with the A340-300 before it initial sales of both the A340-500 and 600 were promising, with the balance of the order backlog being for the larger 600 model, which was expected by Airbus as the ultra long range 500 model was always seen as a niche aircraft with a limited market. But just like the A340-300 before it as soon as the longer range 777-200LR and higher capacity 777-300ER hit the marketplace the A340 began to loose momentum. Boeing was helped tremendously by the fact that jet fuel prices began to skyrocket which further highlighted the 8-9% operating cost advantage of the twin jet 777 over the quad jet A340. The 777-200LR, a niche airplane that never really took off with customers, still managed to outsell the A340-500 by a small margin.<br />
<br />
The real winner for Boeing turned out to be the 777-300ER. In a few quick years the 300ER's sales overtook the stagnating A340-600. The Airbus aircraft is heavier, more expensive to operate, less fuel efficient and can't match the Boeing's payload range capabilities. Many 747-400 operators like Cathay Pacific, ANA, JAL, Air France and British Airways have employed the 777-300ER as a direct replacement for the 747 just as Boeing and Airbus had envisioned.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-v-6gown_2_8/T0Hb_DuSpVI/AAAAAAAACAM/qmUlDpeQGko/s1600/12-06-11+09.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="364" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-v-6gown_2_8/T0Hb_DuSpVI/AAAAAAAACAM/qmUlDpeQGko/s640/12-06-11+09.png" width="640" /></a></div><br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div>The 777-300ER continues to be a best seller for Boeing, having recently eclipsed the 200ER to become the most ordered variant of the 777 family. To date customers have ordered 545 300ERs compared to 97 A340-600's.<br />
<br />
Meanwhile Airbus has turned its attention to the all new A350-XWB, which is set to challenge the 777-200ER/LR and 777-300ER. With the decision to build the A350-XWB Airbus is closing the book on the quad jet widebody A340. With the exception of the very large jets like the A380 and 747-8 all future widebody jets are likely to be twin jets. The economics just don't support a case for a four engined jet in the 777 and A340 aircraft class. Airbus is hoping that the XWB will lead to the same success as Boeing continues to enjoy with the 777 program.<br />
<br />
For its part Boeing is hard at work ramping up production on the 787-8 Dreamliner, and laying the foundation for the stretched 9 model, which will challenge both the A350-900 and A330. Engineers are also quietly working on a 777NG program to update the aircraft, increase its range and reduce fuel burn and improve its operating costs.<br />
<br />
The commercial aircraft business is a turbulent, capital intensive industry where timing is everything. Get it right and reap the rewards, get it wrong and potentially join a long line of distinguished yet ultimately unsuccessful commercial aircraft manufactures like Lockheed, McDonnell-Douglas and Convair. The Boeing 777 hit the market at just the right time, taking advantage of changing regulations, new engine technology and good planning. Airbus hedged its bets producing two widebody aircraft families the twin jet A330 and quad-jet A340. While the A340 never enjoyed the level of success Airbus envisioned the A330 on the other hand has been a runaway success. But since the A340 shares the same fuselage cross section, wings and major structural components with the A330 the incrimental costs of developing the two aircraft families was minimal as was the risk.<br />
<br />
The 777 proved to be a formidable competitor whose staying power in the market place has made it difficult for Airbus to counter especially on the upper capacity end of the spectrum, hence the birth of the A350-XWB. Add on top of that the cannibalization of the A340 market by Airbus's own best selling A330 and fuel prices that have spiraled out of control in recent years and the deck was stacked against the A340 almost from the start. So while the low sales figures of the A340 are certainly disappointing to Airbus, they don't represent a failure of the program. Ultimately the A340 was a successful aircraft for Airbus just not to the same degree as the A330. <br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div>Gregory Maxwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14018544410005482774noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-339348712464762588.post-41492216223975057662011-08-29T23:19:00.001-07:002012-02-19T17:59:35.371-08:00The Boeing 757-200 - Can It Ever Be Replaced?<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-tLYNJWrf5eM/T0GnpOKzTWI/AAAAAAAABy8/Hl8Suptpmxk/s1600/08-29-11+01.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="306" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-tLYNJWrf5eM/T0GnpOKzTWI/AAAAAAAABy8/Hl8Suptpmxk/s640/08-29-11+01.png" width="640" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">As the 757 reaches the twilight of its service life as a domestic workhorse for U.S. airlines many carriers are wondering what if any aircraft out there can replace its full range of capabilities. The 757-200 was built to replace the legendary 727-200 and expand upon that aircraft's capability while reducing fuel burn and operating costs for the airlines. By all measures the 757 exceeded Boeing's wildest expectations, delivering more range and better operating economic than even they expected. The aircraft's high thrust to weight ratio resulted in exceptional shot field performance, making it an ideal platform for operations into small mountainous, high altitude airports. But it is just as at home flying long thin transatlantic sectors which take full advantage of its incredible 3,900 nm range. It is this incredible versatility and performance that has made the aircraft so successful, resulting in a total of 1050 airplanes being sold by Boeing since its introduction into service with Eastern Airlines back in 1983.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;"><br />
</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-pdnBihvMSoc/T0Gnt4tjtJI/AAAAAAAABzE/0o5oNC2yqjE/s1600/08-29-11+02.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="364" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-pdnBihvMSoc/T0Gnt4tjtJI/AAAAAAAABzE/0o5oNC2yqjE/s640/08-29-11+02.png" width="640" /></a></div>The 757-200 is mainly deployed on short and medium haul routes, carrying anywhere between 178 and 208 passengers in a two class arrangement depending on the seat pitch. Delta Air Lines is currently the world's largest 757 operator with a fleet of 182 aircraft. Delta's domestic 757-200 fleet is typically configured with <a href="http://www.seatguru.com/airlines/Delta_Airlines/Delta_Airlines_Boeing_757-200_NWA_B.php">184 seats</a> in a two class layout, which is close to the industry standard. The 757-200 flies an average stage length of 1,178 nm. <br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;"><b>Typical Two Class 757-200 Configuration</b><br />
</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-JMNKh2GWytk/T0Gn5fqlIjI/AAAAAAAABzM/t3yTWQIK8QM/s1600/08-29-11+03.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="100" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-JMNKh2GWytk/T0Gn5fqlIjI/AAAAAAAABzM/t3yTWQIK8QM/s640/08-29-11+03.png" width="640" /></a></div><br />
<br />
The 757 is the one airplane that all major U.S. legacy airlines have in common in their current fleet inventory, with American, Delta, United/Continental and US Airways all operating the aircraft. In fact of the 938 aircraft currently active world wide as of August 2011, 488 or roughly 52% are being flown by U.S. domestic airlines according to <a href="http://www.airfleets.net/exploit/production-b757.htm">airfleets.net</a>. With a further 112 being flown by package carriers UPS and FedEx. Currently the largest foreign operator is the UK's Thomson Airways with 26 airplanes.<br />
<br />
The 757-200 is about 33% larger than the 727-200 it replaced and it consumes about 43% less fuel per seat, but the aircraft was designed for a vastly different domestic market in the United States, one in which legacy airlines faced very little competition from LCC's and yields were consistently high. Now with the U.S. domestic market suffering from over capacity and diluted yields the aircraft is becoming harder to fill at economic levels. In addition as fuel costs continue to escalate and with the aircraft's age becoming a significant liability both in terms of direct operating and maintenance costs the time has come for the major U.S. legacy carriers to examine the replacement options.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-FqDdKcRYEWw/T0GoDOJS_-I/AAAAAAAABzU/-idonM-QzFM/s1600/08-29-11+04.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="388" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-FqDdKcRYEWw/T0GoDOJS_-I/AAAAAAAABzU/-idonM-QzFM/s640/08-29-11+04.png" width="640" /></a></div><br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;"> <span style="font-size: x-small;">Chart Courtesy of AirInsight</span></div><br />
For US Airways this means finding an airplane that has the performance and range to allow them to fly the 2,196 nm Phoenix-Honolulu route nonstop even in the sweltering summer time heat of Arizona, something the 757 does very well. CFO Derek Kerr of <a href="http://www.thestreet.com/story/11222384/1/boeing-airbus-cant-replace-the-757.html">US Airways</a> put it this way, "The dilemma we have now is that the 757 is a great airplane that is not made anymore. That leaves a hole in the industry, and we need to figure out what to do to replace it." Airbus spokesman Clay McConnell states that the A321 NEO as currently designed will be able to cover 90% of the existing 757 missions but that last 10% represents a niche for which there is no plug-in replacement. But it isn't just the Honolulu route that concerns US Airways they also want to ensure the aircraft can cover the current 757 transatlantic sectors like Charlotte-Dublin (3226 nm) and Philadelphia-Lisbon (3,453 nm). The airline is currently working with Airbus to see if the manufacturer can squeeze additional power and range out of the A321 NEO to cover the remaining 10% of the 757's mission profile.<br />
<br />
Icelandair finds themselves in a similar position of trying to find an airplane that can replace the capabilities of its 757 fleet. But unlike US Airways who's 757's fill a unique niche for Icelandair the 757 is the backbone of its fleet. The country of Iceland is situated about 4-5 hours flying time from the United States and just under 3 from Europe. This geographic position puts the 757 in striking distance of just about every major city on both continents. Icelandair's 13 strong fleet of 757-200's (176 seats) and one streched 300 series (224 seats) cover every route in the airline's inventory including the new 3,148 nm long haul route from Keflavik to Seattle. But the airline's 757-200 fleet is becoming long in the tooth averaging 16 years in age. The time for their replacement is fast approaching with CEO <a href="http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/flightblogger/2010/09/icelandairs-757-replacement-di.html">Birkir Gudnason</a> stating the airline will have to begin replacing the fleet in the 2015-2020 time frame. Gudnason in an interview with Airline Business in July of 2010 summed up the 757 issue by saying,<br />
<br />
"Icelandair is looking at an eventual replacement for its 757s. As many 757 operators know,<br />
this is not a straight forward task. The 757 is the perfect aircraft for our network and location.<br />
Icelandair is looking at aircraft with 150 or more seats and might even split the order between<br />
two types as there is no one aircraft that can do the job it wants a present."<br />
<br />
So if the 757 must soon be replaced than what do airlines replace it with? Does an airplane currently exist that has the seating capacity, performance and range to cover the entire existing mission portfolio of the 757. The short answer is no, there isn't an airplane being produced by either Boeing or Airbus that can fully replace the 757. Even the newly launched A321 NEO, with its significant improvement in fuel burn over the 757 doesn't have the legs to match the class leading 3,900 nm range of the 757-200. So it would seem at least on paper that the Boeing 757 occupies a unique niche in the narrowbody market for which a 1:1 replacement does not exist. <br />
<br />
Understanding this reality and accepting that a 757 replacement will come with some compromise in range, payload and performance the question then becomes what aircraft comes closest to filling this gap. The answer is not universal, but instead is predicated on a variety of factors that are in someways unique to each specific airline. But objectively there are only two current viable options, the Boeing 737-900ER and the Airbus A321-200. For airlines that can afford to wait until 2016 the A321 NEO enters the discussion. But how do these three aircraft match up head to head as compared to the 757-200?<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;"><b>Comparative Aircraft Specifications</b><br />
</div><div style="text-align: center;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-0U66qrhZ-Qs/T0GoLwNTaMI/AAAAAAAABzc/bD67is1GBYA/s1600/08-29-11+05.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="370" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-0U66qrhZ-Qs/T0GoLwNTaMI/AAAAAAAABzc/bD67is1GBYA/s640/08-29-11+05.png" width="640" /></a></div><br />
</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div style="text-align: center;"><b> </b><span style="font-size: x-small;">AirInsight 757 Replacement Report</span><b></b></div><div style="text-align: left;"><b><br />
</b></div><div style="text-align: left;"><b>Range</b></div><div style="text-align: left;">As stated earlier the average 757 stage length is just under 1,200 nm which is well within the range of all three potential replacements which will allow operators to cover the majority of the existing 757 mission profile. Among the two current aircraft in production the 737-900ER with a maximum range of 3,265 nm holds a very slight edge over the A321-200 at 3,200 nm, but both fall well short of the 757's maximum full payload range of 3,900 nm. Even the A321 NEO with its new fuel efficient engines and other range boosting improvements comes up 220 nm short of matching the 757-200. While the 757's maximum range comes into play on only a handful of niche routes, primarily on long thin transatlantic flights between the U.S. and secondary European markets, these missions have become an important component of several U.S. airline's international route portfolios. These routes allow airlines like Continental to maximize the strengths of the 757-200 in markets like New York/Newark to Oslo, Hamburg and Copenhagen where the current demand can't support widebody aircraft like the 767-300ER or A330-200. These thin routes because of their strong yields and limited competition mean the 757's higher operating costs are not a significant issue and allow airlines like Continental to turn a profit with the aircraft. Taking these important niche market into consideration all three of the potential 757 replacements don't have the legs to fly many of these routes to continental Europe. Even under the best of conditions the 737-900ER and A321-200 would struggle to make the UK nonstop.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: center;"><b>Still Air Range Comparison of the 757-200 to the 737-900ER, A321-200 and A321 NEO</b><br />
</div><div style="text-align: center;"><b> </b></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div style="text-align: center;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-gp3JpdHZ-wE/T0GoUIp1-CI/AAAAAAAABzk/pDhhqj6jhrI/s1600/08-29-11+06.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="640" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-gp3JpdHZ-wE/T0GoUIp1-CI/AAAAAAAABzk/pDhhqj6jhrI/s640/08-29-11+06.png" width="640" /></a></div><span style="font-size: x-small;"><br />
</span></div><div style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">Map generated by the Great Circle Mapper - copyright © Karl L. Swartz</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-size: small;"><b>Capacity</b></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-size: small;">The difference in seating capacity is negligible between all four aircraft, with the A321-200 and A321 NEO holding a five seat advantage over the 737-900ER and a one seat deficit to the 757-200 using a consistent seat pitch in a typical two class layout.</span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><b><span style="font-size: small;">Comparative Economics</span></b></span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><b><span style="font-size: small;"> </span></b></span></div><div style="text-align: center;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/--4LHixFK7SA/T0Goc6o2PqI/AAAAAAAABzs/myG90y6Vev8/s1600/08-29-11+07.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="278" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/--4LHixFK7SA/T0Goc6o2PqI/AAAAAAAABzs/myG90y6Vev8/s640/08-29-11+07.png" width="640" /></a></div><br />
</div><div style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">AirInsight 757 Replacement Report </span></span><b><span style="font-size: small;"><br />
</span></b></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-size: small;">When comparing the economics of the A321-200 and 737-900ER in terms of seat-mile and aircraft mile costs the 737-900ER holds a small but significant advantage. The 737-900ER has a cost per available seat mile advantage of 1.9% and a 54 cent edge in cost per aircraft mile over the A321-200 when compared to the baseline 757-200.</span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-size: small;">However when both the A321-200 and 757-200 are compared to the A321 NEO, the NEO leaves both in the dust. The difficulty in comparing the NEO to the two existing production airplane, is that the former's economics are based on modeling and not real world operational experience. While there is little doubt that the re-engined A321 offering from Airbus will realize significant improvements in fuel efficiency and reduce airline operating costs when compared to its contemporaries the actual real world savings are hard to quantify as the aircraft's final configuration hasn't been frozen yet. As with most aircraft even a derivative such as the A321 NEO, tweaks to engine thrust, weight and the overall configurations are likely before the design is frozen which will undoubtedly change the aircraft's economics, especially when you consider that Airbus is being pressured by operators to increase both the thrust and range of the aircraft to cover the full mission profile of the 757.</span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-size: small;">In some ways the 737-800 has already supplanted the 757 in the U.S. domestic market. Continental, American and Delta all have large existing 737-800 fleets, and all of these carriers currently deploy the airplane extensively across their respective domestic networks. But the 737-800 has not been used by these carriers to replace the 757. Instead airlines, most specifically Continental have introduced the 737-800 and more recently 900ER into the domestic system on routes previously flown by the 757-200, which has allowed the airline to deploy its 757 fleet on higher yield international routes to South America and Europe. This successful strategy has allowed airlines to extend the life of this aging airframe, effectively giving the 757 a second lease on life.</span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-size: small;">For Delta and American the time to act on a 757 replacement is now, with both announcing large narrow-body orders within the last 30 days primarily to replace their 757's. Delta chose the 737-900ER due largely to the availability of early delivery positions and attractive pricing. Delta's replacement timetable didn't allow for Boeing to offer the 737RE and likewise Airbus was forced to offer a mixture of A321-200's and A321 NEO's which was not an attractive solution to Delta. It didn't hurt that the 737-900ER has slightly better economics and the carrier still has a gentlemen's agreement with Boeing that gives it the ability to jump the production line and secure delivery positions that are not available to the average airline customer.</span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><br />
</div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-size: small;">American chose a different path, splitting the order between Airbus and Boeing. The airline ordered a total of 260 Airbus aircraft, 130 of which are from the current A320 family and the other 130 being A321 NEO's. The A321's are presumably to replace the 757-200 fleet. American also ordered 200 aircraft from Boeing, split equally between the existing 737NG, most likely more 737-800's as well as some new 900ER's. The remaining 100 aircraft will be for the newly announced 737RE. The biggest concern for American was price and financing arrangements, as the carrier's current debt rating makes securing financing through traditional avenues difficult.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><br />
</span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-size: small;">United/Continental has yet to decide how they will replace their 757's but a decision is probably not far away especially considering the combined 137 strong 757 fleet is an average of 17.6 years old.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-size: small;">But unlike American and Delta, Continental's entire 757-200 fleet is dedicated almost exclusively to international flying, primarily on transatlantic sectors from Newark. Continental pushes their 757's to edge of the performance/range envelope so any potential replacement is going to have to match the 757's full payload range of 3,900 nm to be a serious contender. United's 757's on the other hand are deployed extensively on its domestic network where the aircraft's top end range doesn't come into play. This also explains why United has only equipped a handful of their p.s. 757's which operate on trans-continental sectors between JFK-SFO and LAX with the blended winglets. With the exception of the trans-continental routes the 737-900ER or A321-200 could plug into United's domestic network and cover 99% of the routes without much difficulty.</span></span><br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><b>Continental Airlines 757-200 Trans-Atlantic Routes</b></span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><b> </b></span></span></div><div style="text-align: center;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-v9UKGVBirNs/T0GoliO7-uI/AAAAAAAABz0/1xvnneO2p7c/s1600/08-29-11+08.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="640" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-v9UKGVBirNs/T0GoliO7-uI/AAAAAAAABz0/1xvnneO2p7c/s640/08-29-11+08.png" width="616" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-size: small;">Of the two currently available solutions the 737-900ER is slightly more cost effective, but probably not enough to sway an existing Airbus A320 series operator and the same can be said of existing Boeing 737 customers. At the end of the day while there is no 1:1 replacement, both the 737-900ER and A321-200 come close enough to replacing the 757-200 that it doesn't really make sense for either manufacturer to chase this limited niche market for the handful of operators like Continental and Icelandair that utilize the 757-200's full performance/range capabilities. Airbus and Boeing will likely both try to squeeze additional range out of their re-engined aircraft families to get as close as possible to covering the full 757 market, but the simple reality is that the market that the 757 was built to cover doesn't exist anymore. Instead it has fragmented into several sub-markets with the 737-800, 737-900ER, A320-200, and A321 taking over the bulk of the domestic 757 routes and the 787-8 providing the best solution for existing 757 customers like Icelandair and Continental/United that need the extra range but don't want a huge increase in capacity over the 757-200.</span></span></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div>Gregory Maxwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14018544410005482774noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-339348712464762588.post-55898438650381559912010-06-20T19:29:00.008-07:002013-03-02T16:41:35.176-08:00Braniff International Airways Boeing 747 Fleet<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjIrNDPr0-GqEUz85CO04Wv1NajRPcnT3AaCtiNLhDdhG49oOPS5XSg_AgyRupiOKnw467JWKSOy9rD7j4tioUTf6exbQjhBnoVXbF0SXPtq3kfQK_rCAlaNOnZwtsjio_OfT0Q0pUaNkCx/s1600/06-20-10+01.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="188" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjIrNDPr0-GqEUz85CO04Wv1NajRPcnT3AaCtiNLhDdhG49oOPS5XSg_AgyRupiOKnw467JWKSOy9rD7j4tioUTf6exbQjhBnoVXbF0SXPtq3kfQK_rCAlaNOnZwtsjio_OfT0Q0pUaNkCx/s640/06-20-10+01.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
At the height of its post deregulation, <a href="http://www.braniffpages.com/1965/1965.html">Harding Lawrence</a> led, expansion in the fall of 1979 <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Braniff_International_Airways">Braniff International Airways</a> was operating no fewer than 11 <a href="http://www.boeing.com/commercial/747family/pf/pf_classic_back.html">Boeing 747's</a> on an expansive international route network that spanned both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. The company's fleet was made up of 4x 747-100's, 4x 747-200's and 3x 747SP's and operated out of three primary bases in Los Angeles (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_International_Airport">KLAX</a>), Dallas/Fort Worth (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dallas/Fort_Worth_International_Airport">KDFW</a>) and Boston (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logan_International_Airport">KBOS</a>). But of the eleven airframes you may be surprised to learn that only six were owned outright by the company with the remaining five aircraft being leased from various different airlines.<br />
<br />
But before the deregulation expansion madness which would eventually spell the death of the company Braniff began it's Boeing 747's operations with a single aircraft. <a href="http://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-b747-20207.htm">N601BN</a>, nicknamed "The Great Pumpkin", "<a href="http://www.braniffpages.com/1965/pic6.html">Big Orange</a>," or "Fat Albert" due to its bright orange paint scheme which covered the giant aircraft from nose to tail, was the <a href="http://www.airfleets.net/listing/b747-2-lnasc.htm">100th 747</a> to roll of the Everett line and was delivered new to the company on December 28, 1970.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-_LPv_wHU6_g/T0FjfZ7oQAI/AAAAAAAABkk/Ej5DJbW7Qvc/s1600/06-20-10+02.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="188" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-_LPv_wHU6_g/T0FjfZ7oQAI/AAAAAAAABkk/Ej5DJbW7Qvc/s640/06-20-10+02.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<br />
<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">N601BN, The original "Big Orange"</span> </div>
<br />
Braniff wanted to make a splash with its new aircraft, and so the company spared no expense appointing the airplane with the finest leathers and interior furnishings. The cavernous cabin was divided it into five distinct rooms, with each room having a different color and its own dedicated passenger lounge. The new airplane with its opulent furnishings and first class service was branded as 747 Braniff Place, "The Most Exclusive Address in the Sky."<br />
<br />
During the first two weeks in January the company sent the N601BN on a publicity tour covering 17 cities. These flights were meet with great public interest with one particular stop in Memphis attracting 10,000 people to the airport just to see "The Great Pumpkin." Flight crews used these flights to build time on the aircraft and iron out the bugs and fine tune cabin service. Finally, N601BN was ready for line service and on January 14, 1971 the aircraft operated is first revenue flight, BN501, the companies flagship Dallas-Honolulu (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Honolulu_Airport">PHNL</a>) route, replacing the <a href="http://www.boeing.com/commercial/707family/product.html">707-300C</a> which had flown the flight since its inception in August of 1969.<br />
<br />
For the next seven years and one month this remarkable aircraft soldiered on as the companies lone 747 operating the companies daily Dallas to Honolulu flight on a breakneck schedule departing Dallas, at 12:45 p.m. as BN501, and flying 3,784 miles to Honolulu arriving at 4:52 p.m. local time. The aircraft was on the ground in Honolulu for only 2 hours and 23 minutes before departing as BN502 at 7:15 p.m. and flying 3,784 miles back to Dallas arriving at 6:08 a.m. the next day. Due to this insane schedule N601BN on average achieved a daily utilization rate of 15.5 hours which was a record for the type for many years.<br />
<br />
In the short 6 hours and 37 minutes that the aircraft was on the ground in Dallas mechanics had to perform all required routine maintenance to ensure the aircraft was in good mechanical condition and ready to operate the next flight to Honolulu. In order to ensure an extremely high dispatch reliability rate for its solitary 747 fleet Braniff adapted a progressive maintenance system, modeled after Continental Airlines which pioneered the concept in order to squeeze as much flying time out of its relatively small Boeing 707 fleet. Under this system Braniff performed preventative maintenance, babying the airplane and going well above and beyond routine maintenance schedules to ensure that N601BN could be dispatched on time, every day. On those rare occasions when the aircraft couldn't be dispatched from Dallas because of a technical problem the airline kept several 707-300C's in reserve to cover the 322 seat capacity of its single 747.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-jj-6O61R7Ow/T0FjtsNLaLI/AAAAAAAABks/gWjAfS9QgOU/s1600/06-20-10+03.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="188" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-jj-6O61R7Ow/T0FjtsNLaLI/AAAAAAAABks/gWjAfS9QgOU/s640/06-20-10+03.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">N9666, 747-100 leased from American Airlines in March, 1978</span></div>
<br />
On February 28, 1978 Braniff inaugurated Dallas-London Gatwick (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gatwick_Airport">EGKK</a>) service from its dedicated Terminal 2W at the relatively new DFW Hub which had opened just four years earlier. N601BN was still the only 747 on the property an as such it was needed for the new London route meaning the Honolulu route had to be temporarily downgraded to a DC-8 until a second 747 was acquired. Finally in March Braniff leased a second 747-100, registered <a href="http://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-b747-20105.htm">N9666</a>, from <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines">American Airlines</a> which joined N601BN and effectively doubled the size of Braniff's 747 fleet. N9666 was never painted in full Braniff colors and retained its bare metal American paint scheme with the addition of Braniff titles and a big orange cheat line down the side of the fuselage. With the arrival of the second 747, N601BN returned to the Dallas-Honolulu route and N9666 took over the London duties.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br />
Flightplan from Inaugural Dallas-London Flight, February 28, 1978<br />
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-XFp_jPHva3A/T0FkCg7WtlI/AAAAAAAABk0/EQvD_HzqtEY/s1600/06-20-10+04.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="640" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-XFp_jPHva3A/T0FkCg7WtlI/AAAAAAAABk0/EQvD_HzqtEY/s640/06-20-10+04.png" width="488" /></a></div>
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Provided by Braniff International Chief 747 Pilot, Captain Billy Self </span></div>
<br />
In October of 1978 Braniff leased a second 747-100 from American, registered <a href="http://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-b747-20106.htm">N9667</a>, this aircraft also received the same hybrid paint scheme as its sister N9666. The third 747 was brought online to handle the newly awarded DFW-SEA-PDX-HNL route which was initiated on November 1, 1978.<br />
<br />
The next aircraft, registered <a href="http://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-b747-19746.htm">N610BN</a>, the companies fourth 747-100 an ex <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lufthansa">Lufthansa</a> aircraft arrived the following month in November. The fifth aircraft, registered <a href="http://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-b747-20927.htm">N620BN</a>, a 747-200B leased from <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canadian_Pacific_Air_Lines">Canadian Pacific</a> entered the property a week later. Both N610BN and N620BN received a revised orange paint color with the new Ultra Livery which was introduced by the company the previous year. The aircraft were quickly deployed onto Braniff's growing international route network.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-K5urtKHmPNk/T0FkNRMfTvI/AAAAAAAABk8/r-8_ol8nEVE/s1600/06-20-10+05.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="188" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-K5urtKHmPNk/T0FkNRMfTvI/AAAAAAAABk8/r-8_ol8nEVE/s640/06-20-10+05.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">N620BN, Braniff's 5th 747, leased from Canadian Pacific Airlines in November, 1978</span> </div>
<br />
With the passage of the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airline_Deregulation_Act">Airline Deregulation Act</a> on October 18, 1978 Harding Lawrence convinced that airline deregulation would not last launched a bold and ambitious expansion plan which would see Braniff double in size within a year and set in motion events which would lead to the extinction of the airline four short years later. So it was one week later on October 25, 1978 that Braniff overwhelmed the soon to be defunct <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_Aeronautics_Board#Civil_Aeronautics_Authority">Civil Aeronautics Board</a> with filings for 626 of the 1,300 routes available. The CAB eventually awarded the carrier 32 routes from 16 new cities and gave Braniff 45 days to start the new routes.<br />
<br />
Early in 1979 the carrier in response to <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan_American_Airways">Pan American's</a> plan to abandon Boston-Europe services, seized on the opportunity to build a trans-Atlantic base in Boston. Braniff applied for and was granted route authorities to serve Amsterdam (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amsterdam_Airport_Schiphol">EHAM</a>), Brussels (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brussels_Airport">EBBR</a>), Frankfurt (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frankfurt_Airport">EDDF</a>) and Paris de Gaulle (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_de_Gaulle_Airport">LFPG</a>) from Logan. In addition the airline received authority to serve these same markets nonstop from its DFW hub. To support these new routes Braniff leased three addition 747-200's, bringing the fleet total to 8 aircraft split evenly with four 747-100's and four 747-200's. The Sixth 747, registered <a href="http://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-b747-20653.htm">N749WA</a>, a 747-200C leased from <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Airways">World Airways</a> came online in April of 1979. The seventh aircraft, registered <a href="http://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-b747-21682.htm">N602BN</a>, a 747-200B leased from <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People_Express">People Express</a> arrived later the same month. The eighth 747, registered <a href="http://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-b747-20527.htm">N611BN</a>, also an ex Lufthansa airframe, entered the property the following month. All three of the newly acquired aircraft, N749WA, N602BN and N611BN received the full Ultra Orange paint scheme. By June of 1979 the carrier was operating a fleet of eight 747's to Europe and Hawaii from hubs in Boston and Dallas.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-EVFBgcUjVZo/T0FkT7HbKiI/AAAAAAAABlE/RZvUEehxeGY/s1600/06-20-10+06.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="188" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-EVFBgcUjVZo/T0FkT7HbKiI/AAAAAAAABlE/RZvUEehxeGY/s640/06-20-10+06.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">N603BN, Braniff's first 747SP purchased new from Boeing was delivered in October, 1979</span> </div>
<br />
The last phase of international expansion occurred in the summer of 1979 with Braniff opening up a new trans-Pacific 747 base at LAX. Braniff's Pacific services began on May 4, 1979 when the company was issued temporary route authority on the LAX-HNL route due to a pilot's strike at United which temporarily grounded the airline. On July 3, 1979 the airline added its second destination from LAX when it launched direct service from Los Angeles to Hong Kong (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hong_Kong_Kai_Tak_Airport">VHHH</a>) via Guam (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guam_Airport">PGUM</a>). This was followed quickly by the launch of nonstop service to Santiago, Chile (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comodoro_Arturo_Merino_Ben%C3%ADtez_International_Airport">SCEL</a>) on August 1 and Seoul, South Korea (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seoul-Kimpo_International_Airport">RKSS</a>) on September 15. With the delivery of the first new <a href="http://www.boeing.com/commercial/747family/pf/pf_classic_back.html#3">747SP</a>, registered <a href="http://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-b747-21785.htm">N603BN</a>, the company extended its Seoul service to Singapore (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore_Changi_Airport">WSSS</a>), officially launching the new service on October 31, 1979. The 747SP was originally ordered to serve a proposed ultra long haul Dallas-Houston-Dubai (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dubai_International_Airport">OMDB</a>) oil flight which never materialized. LAX served as the home for the airline's 747SP fleet which at its peak numbered three aircraft, all receiving the full Ultra Orange scheme.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-BGgL_rj5FH8/T0FkkdLzcOI/AAAAAAAABlM/hjdidioV9dk/s1600/06-20-10+07.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="348" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-BGgL_rj5FH8/T0FkkdLzcOI/AAAAAAAABlM/hjdidioV9dk/s640/06-20-10+07.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
The last two 747SP's were brought into line service the following year with <a href="http://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-b747-21786.htm">N604BN</a> arriving in April of 1980 and its sister <a href="http://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-b747-21992.htm">N606BN</a> arriving a month later in May. By the close of spring of 1980 Braniff's international expansion reach its zenith, with the airline operating eleven Boeing 747's on a far flung route network that spanned two oceans and three continents. Harding Lawrence had greater ambitions though evident by the carrier's pending route applications which would see the airline land in Australia, Thailand, and India. Together with the pending Dallas-Bahrain (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bahrain_Airport">OBBI</a>) application Braniff would complete its world spanning route network by tying east and west together thus becoming a truly global airline. But the pace of the airline's domestic and international expansion and the vast amounts of capital it required were ultimately unsustainable and the airline started to hemorrhage money. For the year ending 1979 Braniff reported its first ever loss under Harding Lawrence sliding from an <strong><span style="color: black;">$80,159,000</span></strong> profit in 1978 to a <span style="color: black;"><strong>$38,438,00</strong></span> loss in 1979.<br />
<br />
Less than a year later in the face of mounting debt and losses in the Pacific of neary $1 million a week Braniff shuttered the Singapore route on May 15. By July 1 the Pacific operation had been reduced to a shadow of its former self with only the Hong Kong and Seoul flights operating on a greatly reduced schedule. The second 747SP, N604BN, barely five months old was the first Braniff owned 747 to leave the property being sold to <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aerol%C3%ADneas_Argentinas">Aerolineas Argentinas</a> in September to raise much needed cash. Next to go were the continental European routes from Boston, which were below break even and loosing money. The carrier then moved on to its DFW hub cutting the unprofitable nonstop European flights to Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Brussels and Paris. Only the London flight remained with service to Brussels and Frankfurt being served as an add-on service from London. By October 1, Braniff suspended the remaining trans-Pacific flights out of LAX and closed the crew base there. By the close of 1980, a slowing economy and resulting poor load factors combined with an <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PATCO_strike">air traffic controller's strike</a>, huge debt incurred from the massive expansion and poor management led to a loss of <span style="color: black;"><strong>$107,493,000</strong></span>.<br />
<br />
The company faired no better in 1981 posting a staggering third consecutive yearly loss of <span style="color: black;"><strong>$94,800,000</strong></span>. By this time the company's financial state was such that employees and customers alike feared the airline might go out of business any day. Less than a year later the public's fears were realized when on <a href="http://www.texasmonthly.com/issue/july-1982">May 12, 1982</a> the once proud airline reached the ends of its road. Ironically, N601BN the first 747 delivered to Braniff back in 1971 operated the companies last flight BN501-502, the daily Honolulu flight which had made the airline famous. The aircraft had operated one of the few regularly scheduled flights to depart from DFW on May 12 and it returned the following morning to a virtual ghost town, with terminal 2W devoid of any human activity and Braniff jets littering the tarmac as far as the eye could see. The landing of N601BN from Honolulu on that dreary day in May marked the close to the life of one of the most vibrant airlines in U.S. history and the final chapter to its Boeing 747 story.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-nfWZHKHVgi4/T0Fk7a12_qI/AAAAAAAABlU/nQ9sHmJiP4c/s1600/06-20-10+08.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="462" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-nfWZHKHVgi4/T0Fk7a12_qI/AAAAAAAABlU/nQ9sHmJiP4c/s640/06-20-10+08.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<div style="text-align: center;">
</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: x-small;">Braniff Terminal 2W on May 13, 1982 - The day after the airline shutdown</span></div>
</div>
Gregory Maxwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14018544410005482774noreply@blogger.com13tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-339348712464762588.post-84405933809856603502010-05-22T19:14:00.002-07:002013-03-02T12:23:43.214-08:00Biofuels a Costly Diversion for the Airline Industry<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-kG4xVfcVx6o/T0FcggFQRUI/AAAAAAAABjU/ulaJi-QUfyA/s1600/05-22-10+01.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="296" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-kG4xVfcVx6o/T0FcggFQRUI/AAAAAAAABjU/ulaJi-QUfyA/s640/05-22-10+01.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<br />
In recent years the commercial aviation industry has been buffeted by severe turbulence left in the wake of the Global Warming movement. Aviation in all its forms has become the poster child for environmentalist and is being used as a symbol of the unnecessary excess in today’s society which is supposedly driving our planet to the brink of an irreversible slide towards extinction. Despite popular belief, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Warming">anthropogenic global warming</a> is not a fact but rather a scientific theory which is based on extrapolations of historical global climatic data that is fed into computer models, producing nothing more than probability distributions which attempt to predict the likelihood of possible scenarios. But absent a time machine there is no way to validate any particular model’s accuracy with any degree of certainty as it is impossible for us to know what the earth’s climate will look like in 50 or 100 years.<br />
<br />
For its part the industry as a whole has failed miserably in its response to the threat the Global Warming movement poses to its continued viability. In response to the public assault airlines have been very open about their plans to reduce carbon emissions and be better environmental stewards. One of the most popular demonstrations of this commitment has been <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biofuel">biofuel</a> test flights. Every month it seems that another airline is conducting a biofuel trial and touting the benefits of a particular exotic blend which it promises when put into large scale use will greatly reduce the airlines carbon footprint. But once you peel away the sexy packaging and trendy marketing do biofuels really live up to the hype? Are they the future fuel source that will power the next generation of jetliners?<br />
<br />
Before you answer these questions consider this: Biofuels can be derived from a variety of food and feed stocks, but the most productive in terms of maximizing carbon storage and therefore reducing carbon emissions, are primarily grown in the tropic regions of the world in countries like Malaysia, Indonesia and Brazil. These tropical ecosystems are dominated by extremely productive forest lands, which collectively store an enormous <a href="http://news.stanford.edu/news/2009/february18/biofuels-rainforest-destruction-gibbs-021809.html">340 billion tons of carbon</a>, this is equivalent to more than 40 times the total annual anthropogenic emissions from fossil fuels combustion <a href="http://jet-age.net/Documents/Bio_Fuels/Gibbs_et_al_2007_Monitoring_and_Estimating_Tropical_Forest_Carbon_Stocks.pdf">(Gibbs et al 2007)</a>. When forests and grasslands are cleared, burned and then converted into farmland the carbon stored in the soil is released into the atmosphere. Scientists estimate that approximately 1.5 billion tons of carbon leach into the atmosphere every year due to tropical deforestation in the name of agricultural expansion. This accounts for approximately 20% of annual global CO2 emissions <a href="http://ipcc.ch/">(IPCC 2007)</a>. To be fair this is not a new phenomenon caused by the expanding market for biofuels, but traditionally has been linked to an increased worldwide demand for both food and feed stocks caused by population increases and rising dietary affluence. However, there is no doubt that the increased <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/blog/2007/aug/17/biofuelsmenacerainforests">popularity of biofuels</a> is leading to more deforestation as the biofuel crops are forced to compete for land with food and feed crops.<br />
<br />
In fact, concern is mounting in the scientific community that crop-based biofuels may actually increase net greenhouse gas emissions. It is estimated that biofuel crop expansion into natural areas and the resulting deforestation could release 17-420 times more CO2 than the annual potential savings realized by replacing fossil fuels <a href="http://jet-age.net/Documents/Bio_Fuels/Fargione_et_al_2008_Land_Clearing_and_the_Biofuel_Carbon_Debt.pdf">(Fargione et al 2008)</a>. The reason is rooted in the decades and is some cases centuries it takes for biofuel crop production to overcome the initial carbon debt caused by deforestation. For example the production of biofuel crops like <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maize">maize</a> and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soybean">soybeans</a> on deforested tropical forest land requires approximately 300-1500 years of biofuel carbon savings to compensate for the initial lose of carbon stored in the soils of the mature forests <a href="http://jet-age.net/Documents/Bio_Fuels/Gibbs_et_al_2008_Carbon_Payback_Times_for_Crop_Based_Biofuel_Expansion_in_the_Tropics.pdf">(Gibbs et al 2008)</a>.<br />
<br />
Even so called second generation biofuel crops, which can be grown in more arid climates on less productive soils, therefore not competing with food and feed crops are not the answer. <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jatropha">Jatropha</a> which was flight tested by both <a href="http://www.united.com/">Continental Airlines</a> and <a href="http://www.airnewzealand.com/">Air New Zealand</a> and was once touted as the second generation crop that would revolutionize the biofuel industry, as the plant produces seeds which yield a very high oil content, around 35% on average. To validate Jatropha’s potential in 2007, <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/environmentalcapital/2009/07/17/bp-gives-up-on-jatropha-for-biofuel/">British Petroleum</a> partnered with British biofuels company D1 Oils on a five-year, 100 million project to grow the plant in India, Southeast Asia, and Southern Africa. Together the two companies planted more than 200,000 hectares, or 25% of the worldwide crop. What BP learned which was validated by Researchers from the University of Twente, in the Netherlands, and report in a recent issue of the <a href="http://www.pnas.org/">Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences</a> is that Jatropha requires five times as much water per unit of energy as sugarcane and corn, and nearly ten times as much as sugar beet--the most water-efficient biofuel crop. In fact if the 13 biofuel crops whose water footprint were studied researchers calculated that <a href="http://www.technologyreview.com/energy/22766/">Jatropha</a> was the least efficient, requiring an average of 5,283 gallons of water to produce .26 gallons of biodiesel in India, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Brazil, and Guatemala--the only countries for which Jatropha production figures were available. Soybeans and rapeseed were the second and third least efficient crops requiring on average 3,698 gallons of water to produce the same .26 gallons of biodiesel. It was further discovered that when Jatropha was grown in arid climates in less productive soils its oil yield became marginal.<br />
<br />
Environmental conservation, and finding ways to minimize our impact on the earth is very important. Biofuels are an important step in developing the next generation of fuels that will power the global economy. But if the goal is to reduce the carbon footprint of the aviation industry how can the airlines endorse fuel sources that increase carbon emissions, expand deforestation and in general are less energy efficient than fossil fuels to produce. Biofuels may be a popular trend but when the payback to replace the initial carbon release is measured in hundreds of years how can this be a viable solution when environmentalists say that we have possibly only a decade to reverse the otherwise inevitable fate of our planet as a result of global warming. <br />
<br />
The current generation of biofuels simply are not the solution for the airlines or other transportation modes. The industry should abandon its fashionable affair with biofuels and instead should focus on more realistic incremental improvements in fuel efficiency and emissions reductions using proven technology paths. Biofuels in their current form are not close to being carbon neutral. Instead of decreasing emissions they actually produce a net increase in carbon emissions which take centuries to overcome. More research and experimentation in this field is needed before plant sources can be considered a viable alternative to fossil fuels for the commercial airline industry. It is irresponsible for the industry to continue to funnel millions of dollars into an unsustainable fuel source in the name of environmental activism.Gregory Maxwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14018544410005482774noreply@blogger.com3